Dennis Rosa Collazo v. Wayne Estelle, Warden, California Mens Colony , 884 F.2d 1168 ( 1989 )


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  • FARRIS, Circuit Judge:

    Dennis Collazo appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that incriminating statements which he made while in custody should have been excluded at trial because they were the product of police coercion. We affirm.

    On September 27, 1982, Collazo was arrested in connection with a fatal shooting and was taken to an interrogation room at the San Jose police station. After two police officers advised him of his rights under Miranda, Collazo requested to confer with counsel. The police twice told Collazo that things “might be worse” for him if he did not cooperate, and that he might be charged with murder. The police then promptly terminated the interrogation. Three hours later, after speaking with his wife, Collazo initiated further discussions with the police and confessed to his role in the shooting. Collazo’s confession was admitted into evidence over his objection at trial. He was convicted of felony murder, burglary, and conspiracy, and was sentenced to 26 years imprisonment.

    In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 98 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the Supreme Court stated the following test for determining whether a suspect’s Miranda rights have been validly waived:

    First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the *1169right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

    The Spring test has been satisfied. Although the police officers’ comments were no doubt improper, the state court found, after conducting a full evidentiary hearing, that Collazo’s subsequent initiation of talks with the police was not the “product” of the earlier impropriety. Our own review of the record convinces us that the state court was correct.

    Collazo had a prior criminal history, and was experienced in the routine of police interrogation. He was a paid informant of the DEA. There was a lapse of approximately three hours between the first interrogation session and Collazo’s subsequent confession. Collazo conferred with his wife in the interim. Finally, at the time of his confession, Collazo stated that he was not acting under pressure of any promise or threat. Based on the “totality of the circumstances,” Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 857, we conclude that Collazo freely and voluntarily waived his fifth amendment rights.

    We also agree with Judge Trott that the policemen’s statements to Collazo after he had invoked his right to remain silent, and before the police terminated the interrogation, constituted “interrogation” under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). “But that is not the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of police.... ” Id. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691 (emphasis added). The evidence in the record establishes no causal link between Collazo’s confession and the prior conduct of the police.

    AFFIRMED.

Document Info

Docket Number: 88-2443

Citation Numbers: 884 F.2d 1168

Judges: Farris, Thompson, Trott

Filed Date: 9/1/1989

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024