Jason Coapland v. Long , 464 F. App'x 664 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 03 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASON ELLSWORTH COAPLAND, No. 10-35952
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00486-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
LONG, Sgt.; IDAHO STATE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
*
Mikel H. Williams, Magistrate Judge, Presiding *
Submitted October 27, 2011 ***
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, BEEZER, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jason Coapland appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Sgt. Sandra Long on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The
facts of this case are known to the parties. We need not repeat them here.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Sgt. Long. To
prove an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner-plaintiff
must show that the prison official was subjectively aware of the risk. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Coapland provided no evidence, other than
his unsupported allegations, to suggest that Sgt. Long knew the identity of the man
who allegedly assaulted Coapland, and “this court has refused to find a genuine
issue where the only evidence presented is uncorroborated and self-serving
testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also note that Copeland gave
conflicting accounts regarding his own knowledge of the identity of the assailant,
and he never identified the assailant in the pleadings or other filings.
Coapland argues strenuously that discovery was inadequate, but his proper
recourse would have been a Rule 56(f) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). A
district court may enter summary judgment, where it is otherwise appropriate, if
the non-moving party fails to file a Rule 56(f) application. See Carpenter v.
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Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). For the
reasons stated above, the district court properly granted summary judgment, thus
Coapland’s failure to move for a Rule 56(f) continuance prevents him from
challenging the inadequacy of evidence before the district court. Even if we were
to treat his final motion to compel discovery as a Rule 56(f) application, he has not
provided sufficient facts to show that the alleged tape recording exists. See Blough
v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).
We have reviewed Coapland’s remaining contentions, and determine that
they lack merit.
AFFIRMED.
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