Pablo Pina v. C. Scavetta , 467 F. App'x 605 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PABLO P. PINA, No. 10-16749
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-04989-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
C. SCAVETTA, Associate Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 17, 2012 **
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Pablo P. Pina, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising
from his indeterminate confinement in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wyatt v. Terhune,
315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies);
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record,
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Pina’s mail-related claims because Pina
failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95 (2006) (concluding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory
and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); McKinney v. Carey,
311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies prior to filing suit); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d
1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (the Prison Litigation Reform Act allows for an
amended complaint to allege new and newly exhausted claims addressing incidents
that had not yet transpired at the original time of filing).
Dismissal of Pina’s due process claim was proper because, even assuming
that there was a liberty interest at stake in avoiding continued confinement in the
SHU, Pina failed to allege facts showing that he was denied due process. See
Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (prison gang validation
decisions need only be supported by “some evidence,” and prison officials need
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only provide the inmate with some notice of the charges against him and an
opportunity to present his views); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378(c)(6)(C)
(providing for the use of a “Confidential Information Disclosure Form” for
disclosure to the inmate of information used in the validation or inactive status
review).
Dismissal of Pina’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions in the
SHU was proper because “administrative segregation . . . is within the terms of
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence.” Anderson v. County of Kern,
45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (conditions associated with administrative
segregation, such as confinement in a cell for most of the day, did not violate the
Eighth Amendment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
Pina’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We grant Pina’s pending motion to file a substitute Reply Brief, and we
instruct the clerk to file the Reply Brief received on September 29, 2011.
AFFIRMED.
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