Rene Herrera-Castanola v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 528 F. App'x 721 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                  JUN 17 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RENE ALBERTO HERRERA-                            No. 12-15022
    CASTANOLA,
    D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00203-ECR-
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             WGC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General;
    JANET A. NAPOLITANO, Secretary of
    the Department of Homeland Security,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Edward C. Reed, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 8, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Rene Alberto Herrera-Castanola appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his request for declaratory relief on the pleadings. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Herrera-Castanola seeks a declaration of citizenship by naturalization as a
    remedy for “governmental misconduct [that] prohibited Herrera from acquiring
    American citizenship.” Because of Herrera-Castanola’s extensive criminal record,
    he is currently ineligible for naturalization. See Castiglia v. INS, 
    108 F.3d 1101
    ,
    1102–03 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that good moral character is a requirement for
    naturalization).
    The district court dismissed Herrera-Castanola’s complaint in part based on
    a finding that it lacked authority to grant citizenship by naturalization. It
    alternatively held that no subject-matter jurisdiction existed over Herrera-
    Castanola’s claims. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a
    complaint. See N. Cnty. Cmty. Alliance, Inc. v. Salazar, 
    573 F.3d 738
    , 741 (9th
    Cir. 2009). And, if support exists in the record, we can affirm a dismissal “on any
    proper ground, even if the district court did not reach the issue or relied on
    different grounds or reasoning.” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 
    143 F.3d 1293
    ,
    1295 (9th Cir. 1998).
    Because we must address whether the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction
    before [we] can decide whether a complaint states a claim,” Moore v. Maricopa
    Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 
    657 F.3d 890
    , 895 (9th Cir. 2011), we first consider whether
    the district court properly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
    2
    We assume without deciding that Herrera-Castanola did not abandon his
    right to challenge the dismissal of his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on
    appeal by failing to properly raise the issue in his opening brief. See Recinto v.
    Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    706 F.3d 1171
    , 1176 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Fed.
    R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 
    94 F.3d 1256
    , 1259–60 (9th Cir.
    1996). And we review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
    jurisdiction de novo. Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 
    671 F.3d 969
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2012). But we conclude that no statute gave the district court
    jurisdiction over Herrera-Castanola’s claims.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
     does not provide jurisdiction because that statute only
    “enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend
    their jurisdiction.” Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 
    339 U.S. 667
    , 671 (1950).
    And although 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
     gives courts original jurisdiction over civil actions
    arising under federal law, the provision “does not create causes of action, but only
    confers jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its
    limiting provisions.” Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 
    341 U.S. 246
    ,
    249 (1951).
    Herrera-Castanola points to no federal law that gives life to his claims for
    relief. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1433
     and § 1503(a) do not pertain to the instant case. 8 U.S.C.
    3
    § 1252 is not relevant because Herrera-Castanola is not petitioning for review of a
    final order of removal and such petitions cannot be brought directly in the district
    court. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    (c) does not apply to this action because Herrera-Castanola
    was not in federal custody when he filed his complaint. And although Herrera-
    Castanola alleges constitutional violations, he insufficiently pleaded those claims.
    See Terenkian v. Iraq, 
    694 F.3d 1122
    , 1131 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Hall v. N. Am.
    Van Lines, Inc., 
    476 F.3d 683
    , 687 (9th Cir. 2007).
    A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 
    593 F.3d 1031
    , 1034 (9th Cir.
    2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 697 (2009)). And, while courts
    must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, they do not have to accept
    “bare assertions.” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 681
    . Herrera-Castanola’s complaint only
    states that the “action arises under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United
    States Constitution.” Nowhere else does it mention a specific constitutional
    violation or explain how that alleged violation occurred. The complaint also fails
    to state any facts that would support a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Krainski v.
    Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 
    616 F.3d 963
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing to Brewster v.
    Bd. of Ed., 
    149 F.3d 971
    , 982 (9th Cir. 1998)) (holding that a person asserting a
    constitutional claim must allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty
    4
    or property interest and denial of adequate procedural protections to make out a
    procedural due-process violation); see also Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 676
     (holding that a
    claimant must plausibly suggest that a named defendant acted with a
    discriminatory purpose to treat plaintiff differently than similarly situated persons
    for a discrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment). Because we hold that
    Herrera-Castanola did not sufficiently plead a plausible constitutional claim and no
    other statute provides jurisdiction, we conclude that the district court lacked
    subject-matter jurisdiction over the entire action.1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Herrera-
    Castanola’s claims, we need not decide whether the district court erred in
    concluding that it lacked authority to award him United States citizenship under
    INS v. Pangilinan, 
    486 U.S. 875
    , 883–84 (1988).
    5