Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp. , 491 F.3d 1053 ( 2007 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERT BURNSIDE; FRANCISCO              
    GOMEZ; RAY ARNETT, Individually,
    on behalf of themselves and all
    others similarly situated; CHARLES
    LINGENFELTER; RON CRUES;
    CHARLES R. WILLIAMS,
    No. 04-57134
    Individually, on behalf of
    themselves and all others similarly
    situated,
           D.C. No.
    CV-04-01745-MLH
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,           OPINION
    v.
    KIEWIT PACIFIC CORPORATION, a
    Delaware Corporation; DOES, 1
    through 100 inclusive.
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued February 16, 2007
    Submitted June 20, 2007
    Pasadena, California
    Filed June 20, 2007
    Before: Harry Pregerson, William A. Fletcher, and
    Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Berzon
    7279
    7282          BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    COUNSEL
    George F. Schaefer, Law Offices of George F. Schaefer, San
    Diego, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.               7283
    Thomas R. Kaufman, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, Cali-
    fornia, for the defendant-appellee.
    OPINION
    BERZON, Circuit Judge:
    The named plaintiffs in this case (whom we will call
    “Burnside,” for the first named plaintiff) represent approxi-
    mately 270 former and current employees of defendant Kiewit
    Pacific Corporation (“Kiewit”). Burnside alleges that Kiewit
    never compensated the employees for time they spent travel-
    ing from designated meeting sites to their jobsites and from
    those jobsites back to the designated meeting sites. Kiewit,
    Burnside further alleges, required them to undertake this
    round trip daily; they were not allowed to get to the jobsites
    on their own. This appeal requires us to decide a single ques-
    tion: Whether the employees’ claims, brought under state law,
    are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
    tions Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). We hold that they are
    not, reverse the district court’s decision to the contrary, and
    remand with instructions to remand to the Superior Court of
    San Diego County.
    I
    A
    Robert Burnside, Francisco Gomez, Ray Arnett, Charles
    Lingenfelter, Ron Crues, and Charles Williams, along with
    approximately 265 additional members of a putative class, are
    all current and former Kiewit employees. Over a four-year
    period that began around October 20001 these employees
    worked to install duct and fiber optic lines on two Kiewit
    1
    The employees were hired on various dates beginning in October 2000
    and continuing through January 2001.
    7284              BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    projects: (1) the Santee-Yuma Project, linking Santee, Cali-
    fornia to Yuma, Arizona; and (2) the Victorville-Prim Project,
    linking Victorville, California, to Prim, Nevada.
    According to the complaint, Kiewit prohibited its employ-
    ees from reporting directly to their daily jobsites. Instead, the
    employees working on the Santee-Yuma Project were
    required to meet at a designated site in either Alpine, Califor-
    nia or El Centro, California; employees working on the
    Victorville-Prim Project were required to meet at a Barstow,
    California site. At these designated meeting sites Kiewit’s
    managers instructed the employees “on the day’s tasks” and
    had them “retrieve equipment and plans for use on the Fiber
    Optic Projects.” Once these initial meetings concluded, the
    employees traveled in company vans or pickup trucks, fre-
    quently operated by the employees themselves, to their job-
    sites. At the end of the work day, employees re-boarded these
    vans and trucks to return to the original meeting sites. The
    complaint alleges that Kiewit managers told employees work-
    ing on the Santee-Yuma Project that the reason for this
    arrangement was “a shortage of parking spaces” at the jobsite.2
    Burnside estimates that the combined meeting and travel
    time added two to two-and-one-half hours of work to each
    employee’s day. Burnside also represents that each employee
    already worked more than eight hours every day and more
    than forty hours every week, so the meeting and travel time
    constituted overtime; as a result, Burnside maintains, Kiewit
    must pay the employees the overtime wage rate for those
    2
    Burnside supported the allegations made in the complaint with declara-
    tions from two named plaintiffs, Gomez and Crues, both of whom worked
    on the Santee-Yuma Project. In their declarations, both stated that Kiewit
    required its employees to arrive at the meeting sites and drive from there,
    in company vans or trucks, to the jobsites; that no free or employer-paid
    parking was provided at the jobsites; and that with the exception of one
    crew, no Kiewit employee was ever compensated for this meeting and
    travel time.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7285
    hours. In total, Burnside “conservatively estimate[s]” that
    Kiewit owes the employees more than $16 million in wages.
    B
    At all times relevant to this litigation, many of the terms
    and conditions of each employee’s work for Kiewit were gov-
    erned by one of five collective bargaining agreements
    (“CBAs”). Because these CBAs will feature prominently in
    our subsequent analysis, we describe them here. We first
    identify the CBAs, and for ease of reference, assign each a
    number:
    Agreement 1:    Associated General Contractors of
    America, San Diego Chapter, Inc. &
    International Union of Operating
    Engineers, Local Union No. 12
    Agreement 2:    Associated General Contractors of
    America, San Diego Chapter, Inc. &
    Laborers’ International Union of
    North America, Local No. 89
    Agreement 3:    Associated General Contractors of
    America, San Diego Chapter, Inc. &
    Building Material, Construction,
    Industrial, Professional and Techni-
    cal Teamsters Union, Local No. 36
    Agreement 4:    Associated General Contractors of
    California, Inc. & International
    Union of Operating Engineers, Local
    Union No. 12
    Agreement 5:    Southern California General Con-
    tractors & The Southern California
    District Council of Laborers
    7286                BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    Each CBA is fairly extensive, covering, among other
    things, the length of a typical shift, holidays and vacation
    time, and the payment of overtime wages. For our purposes,
    we focus on those terms and conditions related to transporta-
    tion and parking, two topics that are addressed differently in
    different CBAs:
    Three of the five CBAs — Agreements 1, 4, and 5 — use
    the following language, which we take directly from Agree-
    ment 1, or a slight variant thereof:
    4. Employees shall travel to and from their daily ini-
    tial reporting place on their own time and by means
    of their own transportation.[3] The Contractor shall
    be responsible for payment of wages from the report-
    ing point (parking area), as ordered by the Contrac-
    tor to the jobsite and from job-to-job and return.
    However, employees who voluntarily report to a
    point for free transportation to the jobsite will not be
    compensated for the time in route and return. . . .
    5. Whenever, because of remoteness of parking
    areas, hazardous road conditions or security restric-
    tions, the Contractor is required to furnish transpor-
    tation for workmen within his jobsite to the place of
    their work, this transportation shall be equipped with
    seats and handrails.[4]
    3
    At this point in the CBA, Agreement 4 includes one additional, related
    sentence: “Whenever free parking is not available on or within 350 yards
    of a jobsite, the contractor shall be responsible for designating a free park-
    ing area for his employees.” A substantially similar sentence appears else-
    where in Agreement 1, see note 4 infra, and Agreement 5, see note 5 infra.
    4
    Agreement 1 also includes the following language, not included in
    Agreements 4 and 5:
    6. The Contractor shall provide or pay for parking facilities for
    employees where a sufficient quantity of available free parking
    is not available within three (3) blocks of the job. This shall apply
    to all jobs or projects when work is being performed by Operat-
    ing Engineers within the entire jurisdiction of Local No. 12.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                    7287
    (Emphasis added.) In other words, although Agreements 1, 4,
    and 5 first establish that each employee is responsible for his
    own transportation to a “daily initial reporting place,” they
    also make clear that the “Contractor” is “responsible for pay-
    ment of wages” for round-trip commutes from “the reporting
    point . . . to the jobsite,” unless the employee has reported to
    that initial meeting point “voluntarily.”
    The other two CBAs — Agreements 2 and 3 — include
    only the following language regarding transportation and
    parking:
    Employees shall travel to and from work on their
    own time and by means of their own transportation.
    ...
    In the event free parking facilities are not available
    within three hundred and fifty (350) yards of a job-
    site, the Employer will provide such facilities and
    shall have the right to designate parking areas to be
    used. Where, because of congested parking condi-
    tions, it is necessary to use public facilities, the
    Employer shall reimburse the employee for the cost
    of such parking upon being presented with a receipt
    or voucher certifying to the cost thereof, such reim-
    bursement to be made on a weekly basis or at the
    conclusion of the project, whichever occurs earlier.[5]
    5
    Agreement 2 also includes the following language, not included in
    Agreement 3: “The Employer shall not be responsible for toll expenses.”
    Agreement 3 contains the following sentence, not included in Agreement
    2: “No employee shall be required to furnish to the employer transporta-
    tion of the employer’s tools, materials, or equipment of any kind.” The
    second paragraph here (“In the event free parking facilities . . . whichever
    occurs earlier.”) appears in its entirety in Agreements 4 and 5, although
    not in Agreement 1. Finally, Agreements 2, 3, 4, and 5 also include the
    following sentence at the end of that paragraph: “Designated parking areas
    shall be reasonably level and graded to drain.”
    7288            BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    (Emphasis added.) Thus, unlike Agreements 1, 4, and 5,
    Agreements 2 and 3 are silent regarding the existence of a
    “daily initial reporting place,” separate and apart from the job-
    site, and so do not address whether the employer would be
    responsible for compensating his employees for any time
    spent traveling between these two points.
    C
    Burnside made no mention of these CBAs in the complaint
    filed against Kiewit. Instead, the complaint set forth three
    claims, all based on state law. Specifically, the employees
    alleged: (1) violations of California’s Business & Professions
    Code §§ 17200 et seq., on the theory that non-payment of
    wages, overtime, and employment taxes and benefits gave
    Kiewit an unfair competitive advantage, see CAL. BUS. &
    PROF. CODE §§ 17200 et seq.; (2) violations of California
    Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 16-2001, and
    sections 200, 500, 510, 1194, and 1198 of the California
    Labor Code, for unpaid regular and overtime wages, see CAL.
    CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 200, 500, 510,
    1194, 1198; and (3) conversion, premised on the allegation
    that Kiewit wrongfully withheld its employees’ regular wages
    and overtime compensation for its own use.
    In its answer to the complaint, Kiewit asserted that Burn-
    side’s state law claims were preempted by section 301 of the
    LMRA. Two days after filing its answer, Kiewit removed the
    case to federal district court, stating as the basis for removal
    that the case arises under section 301 and is thus within the
    district court’s federal question jurisdiction.
    Once in federal court Kiewit moved for summary judg-
    ment. Before the district court could rule on that motion,
    Burnside filed a motion to remand the matter to state court for
    lack of jurisdiction. The district court ultimately denied that
    remand motion, concluding that his claims were indeed pre-
    empted by, and thus arose under, section 301 because they
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7289
    “substantially depend” on an interpretation of the CBAs’
    terms and provisions. In a subsequent order, the district court
    granted Kiewit’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
    Burnside’s claims failed because he did not first exhaust his
    contractual grievance procedures or, in the alternative,
    because he did not file suit within the six-month statute of
    limitations period provided by the LMRA. See 29 U.S.C.
    § 160(b).
    Burnside timely appealed.
    II
    We review de novo the district court’s holding that the state
    causes of action actually arise under section 301. Cramer v.
    Consol. Freightways, Inc., 
    255 F.3d 683
    , 689 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (en banc). After doing so, we hold that Burnside’s claims are
    not preempted by section 301 and may go forward under state
    law because (1) the right to be compensated for employer-
    mandated travel time is a right conferred by state law, inde-
    pendent of the CBAs; and (2) the matter at hand can be
    resolved without interpreting the CBAs. We explain each of
    our conclusions below, after first laying out the guiding prin-
    ciples regarding section 301 preemption.
    A
    [1] The history and preemptive scope of section 301 of the
    LMRA has been well-chronicled both by the Supreme Court
    and by our own circuit. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 
    512 U.S. 107
    , 121-24 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
    
    486 U.S. 399
    , 403-06 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
    
    471 U.S. 202
    , 208-13 (1985); 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 689-93
    ;
    Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 
    208 F.3d 1102
    , 1106-09 (9th Cir. 2000). We rely on this extensive pre-
    cedent to review the essentials.
    Under section 301,
    7290           BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
    and a labor organization representing employees in
    an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
    chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
    may be brought in any district court of the United
    States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
    respect to the amount in controversy or without
    regard to the citizenship of the parties.
    29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court decided early on that
    in enacting this statute, Congress charged federal courts with
    a “mandate . . . to fashion a body of federal common law to
    be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.”
    
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209
    ; see also Local 174, Teamsters v.
    Lucas Flour Co., 
    369 U.S. 95
    , 104 (1962) (explaining that “in
    enacting [section] 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
    labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules”);
    Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 
    353 U.S. 448
    ,
    456 (1957) (concluding that “the substantive law to apply in
    suits under [section] 301(a) is federal law, which the courts
    must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws”). As
    a result of this broad federal mandate, the Supreme Court has
    explained, the “preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful
    as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation
    of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.”
    Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 
    463 U.S. 1
    , 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Once preempted, “any claim purportedly based on [a] . . .
    state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim,
    and therefore arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, Inc. v.
    Williams, 
    482 U.S. 386
    , 393 (1987) (citing Franchise Tax
    
    Bd., 463 U.S. at 24
    ). This is true even in some instances in
    which the plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in
    their complaint, if the plaintiffs’ claim is either grounded in
    the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation
    of it. See 
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 210
    (“If the policies that animate
    [section] 301 are to be given their proper range, . . . the pre-
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.             7291
    emptive effect of [section] 301 must extend beyond suits
    alleging contract violations.”). Otherwise, parties would be
    able “to evade the requirements of section 301 by relabeling
    their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract”
    or some other state cause of action, and thus “elevate form
    over substance.” 
    Id. at 211.
    [2] To prevent such evasion, the Lueck line of section 301
    preemption cases and its progeny require, first, an inquiry into
    whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred
    upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA. If the
    right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is
    preempted, and our analysis ends there. See 
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212
    (holding that section 301 cannot “preempt state rules
    that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations,
    independent of a labor contract”); 
    Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394
    (explaining that section 301 only “governs claims founded
    directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agree-
    ments”). If, however, the right exists independently of the
    CBA, we must still consider whether it is nevertheless “sub-
    stantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
    agreement.” See 
    Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394
    (quoting Int’l
    Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 
    481 U.S. 851
    , 859 n.3
    (1987)); see also 
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213
    (explaining that
    when “state . . . law purports to define the meaning of the con-
    tract relationship, that law is preempted”). If such dependence
    exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if not, then
    the claim can proceed under state law.
    Tracing the line of “demarcation between preempted claims
    and those that survive [section] 301’s reach” — is not a task
    that always “lends itself to analytical precision.” 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    . We are aided in our quest, however, by useful
    guidelines developed by the Supreme Court.
    First, to determine whether a particular right inheres in state
    law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA, the Court has
    instructed us to consider “the legal character of a claim, as
    7292           BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining agree-
    ment [and] not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely
    the same set of facts’ could be pursued.” 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123
    (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
    
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213
    , and 
    Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410
    , respec-
    tively). The Court also has made clear that reliance on the
    CBA as an aspect of a defense is not enough to “inject[ ] a
    federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a
    state-law claim.” See 
    Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99
    (explaining that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,”
    and that if the defendant could engineer “the forum in which
    the claim shall be litigated” based on the substance of his
    defense, “the plaintiff would be master of nothing”); see also
    
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    .
    [3] Second, to determine whether a state law right is “sub-
    stantially dependent” on the terms of a CBA, see 
    Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394
    , the Court directs us to decide whether the
    claim can be resolved by “look[ing] to” versus interpreting
    the CBA, see 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125
    ; 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    (citing 
    Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1108-09
    ). If the latter, the
    claim is preempted; if the former, it is not. Although the “look
    to”/“interpret” distinction is “not always clear or amenable to
    a bright-line test,” see 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    , some assess-
    ments are easier to make than others. For example, we know
    that neither “ ‘look[ing]’ to the CBA merely to discern that
    none of its terms is reasonably in dispute,” see 
    id. at 692
    (alteration in original) (quoting 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125
    ), nor
    “the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in com-
    puting [a] penalty,” see 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125
    , is enough
    to warrant preemption. See also 
    id. at 124
    (explaining that
    “when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dis-
    pute, the bare fact that a [CBA] will be consulted in the
    course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the
    claim to be extinguished”). Similarly, “alleging a hypothetical
    connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA is not
    enough to preempt the claim.” 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    .
    Finally, in cases presenting the question whether the plain-
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7293
    tiff’s union “bargained away the state law right at issue. . . .
    a court may look to the CBA to determine whether it contains
    a clear and unmistakable waiver of state law rights without
    triggering [section] 301 preemption.” 
    Id. at 692.
    With these interpretive principles in place, we turn our
    attention to Burnside’s claims against Kiewit.
    B
    Burnside argues, first, that the employees’ right to be com-
    pensated for time spent in compulsory round-trip travel exists
    as a matter of state law and is independent of any provision
    found in the CBAs. We agree.
    1
    [4] The California Supreme Court has recognized an
    employee’s state law right to be compensated for time spent
    traveling from a designated meeting point to the jobsite and
    from the jobsite back to the meeting point, when the employer
    requires this travel. See Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 
    22 Cal. 4th 575
    , 578 (2000) (applying a wage order that covers
    agricultural employees). Moreover, post-Morillion, the state’s
    Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) adopted a regula-
    tion, known as California Industrial Commission Wage Order
    16-2001, that applies this right to the employees in this
    appeal. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160. As a result,
    because the right to be compensated for employer-mandated
    travel exists as a matter of state law, independent of the
    CBAs, on this initial basis at least the employees’ claims are
    not preempted.
    The facts of Morillion are entirely reminiscent of the facts
    alleged in the instant complaint. Like Kiewit, the defendant in
    Morillion, Royal Packing Company, required its employees,
    who were agricultural workers, “to meet for work each day at
    specified parking lots or assembly areas” and “prohibited
    7294              BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    [them] from using their own transportation to get to and from
    the fields.” 
    Id. at 579.
    From these “departure points,” Royal
    Packing transported its employees, in buses that it provided
    and paid for, “to the fields where plaintiffs actually worked.”
    
    Id. “At the
    end of each day,” Royal Packing “transported
    plaintiffs back to the departure points on its buses.” 
    Id. Like the
    employees here, the employees in Morillion were never
    paid “for the time they spent (1) assembling at the departure
    points; (2) riding the bus to the fields; (3) waiting for the bus
    at the end of the day; and (4) riding the bus back to the depar-
    ture points.” 
    Id. They sued
    for compensation for those time
    periods. 
    Id. The California
    Supreme Court found in the employees’
    favor. Its opinion was largely based on an interpretation of the
    relevant language in Wage Order 14-80, a regulation issued
    by IWC to cover agricultural employees.6 See CAL. CODE
    REGS. tit. 8, § 11140. Wage Order 14-80 defines the term
    “[h]ours worked” as “the time during which an employee is
    subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time
    the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not
    required to do so.” 
    Id. § 11140(2)(G).
    Because the agricultural
    employees in Morillion were “required to spend [time] travel-
    ing on their employer’s buses” to arrive at their daily jobsites,
    the state supreme court concluded that these employees had
    been “subject to the control of an employer” during those
    
    hours. 22 Cal. 4th at 578
    (internal quotation marks omitted).7
    6
    Operating under the auspices of the Department of Industrial Relations,
    the IWC is the state agency “authorized to formulate wage orders govern-
    ing employment in California.” See Bearden v. U.S. Borax, Inc., 138 Cal.
    App. 4th 429, 433-34 (2006) (citing Collins v. Overnite Transp. Co., 
    105 Cal. App. 4th 171
    , 174 (2003)); see also CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1173,
    1178.5, 1182, 1185. Although the state legislature defunded the IWC,
    effective July 1, 2004, the agency’s wage orders remain in effect. See
    Huntington Mem’l Hosp. v. Superior Court, 
    131 Cal. App. 4th 893
    , 902
    n.2 (2005). Courts treat IWC wage orders as “quasi-legislative regulations
    that are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes.” Watkins v.
    Ameripride Servs., 
    375 F.3d 821
    , 825 (9th Cir. 2004).
    7
    The Morillion court rejected Royal Packing’s argument that traveling
    time did not constitute “hours worked” because employees were not tech-
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                    7295
    In other words, the travel time qualified as “hours worked,”
    and was therefore compensable under state law. 
    Id. At the
    same time, Morillion made clear that “[t]ime employees
    spend traveling on transportation that an employer provides
    but does not require its employees to use may not be compen-
    sable as ‘hours worked.’ ” 
    Id. at 588;
    see also Overton v. Walt
    Disney Co., 
    136 Cal. App. 4th 263
    , 265 (2006) (holding that
    no compensation was due employees for time spent traveling
    to work on an employer-provided shuttle bus, as the employ-
    ees were not required to ride the shuttle bus but were free to
    use alternate means of transportation).
    Unlike the agricultural employees in Morillion, the parties
    here are not covered under Wage Order 14-80. Instead, the
    applicable IWC regulation is Wage Order 16-2001, which
    covers employees in the construction, drilling, logging, and
    mining industries. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160.8 Even
    though this appeal involves a different regulation than the one
    at issue in Morillion, at least two aspects of Wage Order 16-
    nically “working” as they rode the bus, and instead were free to “read . . .
    or perform other personal activities.” 
    Id. at 586.
    In doing so, the court
    emphasized just how extensively Royal Packing’s mandated travel time
    curtailed its employees’ rights, explaining that “employees who commute
    to work on their own decide when to leave, which route to take to work,
    and which mode of transportation to use” and that “[b]y commuting on
    their own, employees may choose and may be able to run errands before
    work and to leave from work early for personal appointments.” 
    Id. at 586-
    87.
    8
    Wage Order 16-2001 was adopted on October 23, 2000, but only
    became effective on January 1, 2001, after at least some of the plaintiffs
    in this putative class had been hired by Kiewit. See Small v. Superior
    Court, 
    148 Cal. App. 4th 222
    , 226 (2007). The complaint alleges, how-
    ever, that the plaintiffs “were employed by [Kiewit] at various times span-
    ning . . . [a] four year period.” Complaint ¶ 14. Although Wage Order 16-
    2001, in all likelihood, did not cover every putative class member for the
    entirety of his tenure with Kiewit, the regulation was in effect during the
    majority of the time period at issue in this litigation, a point that neither
    party disputes.
    7296           BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    2001 lead us to conclude that California state law confers on
    employees here the same right recognized in Morillion.
    [5] First, Wage Order 16-2001 and Wage Order 14-80 use
    the same “hours worked” definition that the California
    Supreme Court so carefully parsed and relied upon in Moril-
    lion. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160 (2)(J), with
    CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11140(2)(G) (both defining
    “ ‘[h]ours worked’ ” as “the time during which an employee
    is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the
    time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether
    or not required to do so.”). Second, and more importantly,
    Wage Order 16-2001 contains explicit language, not found in
    Wage Order 14-80, that extends the right to be compensated
    for compulsory travel time — as was articulated in Morillion
    with respect to agricultural employees — to construction
    industry employees:
    In section (5)(A), under the heading “Reporting Time Pay,”
    Wage Order 16-2001 provides that,
    All employer-mandated travel that occurs after the
    first location where the employee’s presence is
    required by the employer shall be compensated at
    the employee’s regular rate of pay or, if applicable,
    the premium rate that may be required by the provi-
    sions of Labor Code Section 510 and Section 3,
    Hours and Days of Work, above.
    CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160 (5)(A) (emphasis added). Sec-
    tion (5)(D) then adds:
    Collective Bargaining Agreements. This section
    shall apply to any employees covered by a valid col-
    lective bargaining agreement unless the collective
    bargaining agreement expressly provides otherwise.
    
    Id. § 11160
    (5)(D) (emphasis added).
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                     7297
    [6] Two aspects of section 5 are noteworthy for purposes
    of this case. First, section (5)(A) does not set the rate of com-
    pensation for reporting time. 
    Id. § 11160
    (5)(A). It explains
    only that employees can be paid either the “regular rate of pay
    or, if applicable,” the overtime rate. 
    Id. The overtime
    rate
    referred to by the regulation is provided for by both the state’s
    Labor Code, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 510, and by a separate pro-
    vision in Wage Order 16-2001, see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8,
    § 11160 (3). Second, section (5)(D) stresses that section
    (5)(A) automatically applies to employees already covered by
    a CBA, “unless [the CBA] expressly provides otherwise.” 
    Id. § 11160
    (5)(D) (emphasis added). In other words, the opera-
    tive presumption is that the right to be compensated for com-
    pulsory travel time, as articulated in Morillion, instantly
    attaches to all employees covered under Wage Order 16-2001,
    disappearing only if a governing CBA includes clear language
    to the contrary.9
    Kiewit argues, however, that the IWC actually intended —
    contrary to the plain language of section (5)(D), as enacted —
    9
    The history behind the regulation’s enactment further evinces the
    IWC’s intent to extend Morillion to employees covered by Wage Order
    16-2001. The agency’s “statement as to the basis” for the wage order, for
    example, explicitly cites to Morillion in its discussion of section (5)(A).
    See INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION, STATEMENT AS TO THE BASIS FOR
    WAGE ORDER NO. 16 REGARDING CERTAIN ON-SITE OCCUPATIONS IN THE
    CONSTRUCTION, DRILLING, MINING, AND LOGGING INDUSTRIES, SECTION 5:
    REPORTING TIME PAY 10, http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/StatementAsToThe
    BasisWageorder16.pdf (last visited June 13, 2007) (hereinafter “STATE-
    MENT”). In addition, IWC members referred to Morillion at least once dur-
    ing a series of public hearings held in the fall of 2000 regarding Wage
    Order 16-2001. See Transcript of Record, State of California, Department
    of Industrial Relations, Industrial Welfare Commission, Public Hearing
    (Sept. 21, 2000), http://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/PUBHRG9211.htm (where
    various IWC commissioners discuss the then-proposed order’s “Reporting
    Time Pay” provision, explain that “the issue . . . is the definition of ‘hours
    worked,’ ” and add that the “Supreme Court” has said that the definition
    of “hours worked” depends on “[w]hether the employer controls it or
    not”).
    7298              BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    for Section (5)(A) not to apply to employees covered by
    CBAs, unless the CBA expressly provided otherwise. To sup-
    port its position, Kiewit points to some of the language found
    in IWC’s “statement as to the basis” for Wage Order 16-2001.10
    According to the paraphrase of section (5)(D) found in the
    statement as to the basis, section (5)(D) “does not apply to
    any employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agree-
    ment unless the collective bargaining agreement expressly
    provides otherwise.” See STATEMENT at 10 (emphasis added).
    We have reviewed the relevant administrative record but
    have found nothing that explains the contradiction between
    the paraphrase of section (5)(D) that appears in the “statement
    as to the basis” and the version codified. Kiewit has no expla-
    nation either. The best we can surmise is to assume that the
    “statement as to the basis” incorrectly paraphrased the statu-
    tory language. Our conclusion that the final choice of lan-
    guage in section (5)(D) means what it says rather than the
    opposite of what it says is corroborated by the fact that
    another “opt-out” provision — i.e., a provision stating that a
    right “shall apply . . . unless the collective bargaining agree-
    ment provides otherwise” — as well as an “opt-in” provision
    — i.e., a provision stating that a right “shall not apply . . . if
    the agreement expressly provides” — both appear elsewhere
    in the wage order. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11160
    (3)(H)(2), with 
    id. § 11160
    (3)(H)(1); see Stewart v. Ragland,
    
    934 F.2d 1033
    , 1041 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When certain statutory
    10
    Under California state law, the IWC is required to “ ‘prepare a state-
    ment as to the basis upon which an adopted or amended order is predicat-
    ed.’ ” See 
    Small, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 232
    (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE
    § 1177(b)). Although “[i]t ‘need not be a totally exhaustive document,’ ”
    the statement as to the basis should “provide ‘an explanation of how and
    why the [IWC] did what it did.’ ” 
    Id. (second alteration
    in original) (quot-
    ing Cal. Lab. Fed’n, AFL-CIO v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 
    63 Cal. App. 4th
    982, 997 (1998)); see also Cal. Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. Indus. Welfare
    Comm’n, 
    25 Cal. 3d 200
    , 213 (1979) (explaining that to facilitate judicial
    review of the agency’s action, “[t]he statement should reflect the factual,
    legal, and policy foundations for the action taken”).
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7299
    provisions contain a requirement and others do not, we should
    assume that the legislature intended both the inclusion and the
    exclusion of the requirement.”).
    [7] In any event, it is the plain language of an actual,
    enacted regulation which must govern, not language that
    appears in the underlying rationale. See Brewer v. Patel, 
    20 Cal. App. 4th 1017
    , 1021 (1993) (explaining that “[w]hen . . .
    language [of a regulation] is clear, we must apply that lan-
    guage without indulging in interpretation”) (citing Delaney v.
    Superior Court, 
    50 Cal. 3d 785
    , 800 (1990)); see also Man-
    riquez v. Gourley, 
    105 Cal. App. 4th 1227
    , 1235 (2003) (writ-
    ing that a court “may look” to “extrinsic aids,” including “the
    purpose of the regulation, the legislative history, public pol-
    icy, and the regulatory scheme of which the regulation is a
    part,” to help it interpret a regulation “[w]hen the agency’s
    intent cannot be discerned directly from the language of the
    regulation”). We therefore proceed with that understanding of
    section (5)(D) — i.e., that employers and employees may opt
    out of the state-law right through provisions in CBAs, but
    need not affirmatively opt in.
    2
    Kiewit argues that the presence of an “opt-out” provision
    in section (5)(D) of Wage Order 16-2001 militates against
    concluding that the right to be compensated for employer-
    mandated travel time is a right conferred as a matter of state
    law that exists independently of the CBAs. The very fact that
    the right can be bargained away, Kiewit contends, suggests it
    does not exist independently of the CBA, and leads inevitably
    to the conclusion that Burnside’s claims are preempted.
    [8] We must disagree. Initially, as a matter of pure logic,
    a right that inheres unless it is waived exists independently of
    the document that would include the waiver, were there a
    waiver. The right arises from state law, not from the CBA,
    and is vested in the employees directly, not through the
    7300               BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    medium of the CBA. And if the CBA says nothing at all about
    pay for travel time, the right to be paid for that time still
    exists. The right is therefore one that came into existence
    entirely independently of the CBA, and that remains in exis-
    tence, independently of the CBA, unless a condition subse-
    quent — waiver by the CBA — occurs.
    [9] Moreover, neither the Supreme Court nor, as far as we
    can determine, any other court, has ever held that the potential
    for waiver absent actual waiver is enough — standing alone
    — to trigger preemption under section 301. And for good rea-
    son. To adopt the contrary position, as Kiewit asks us to,
    would be to effectively penalize unionized employees simply
    because they have the option of waiving a state-law-conferred
    right through collective bargaining, presumably in exchange
    for some other benefit. Nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence,
    as we illustrate below, suggests that the section 301 preemp-
    tion doctrine requires this result.11
    We begin with Lueck and its statement that “state-law
    rights and obligations that do not exist independently of pri-
    vate agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered
    by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those
    
    agreements.” 471 U.S. at 213
    (emphasis added). Read in iso-
    lation, this sentence — more precisely, its highlighted portion
    — might be understood to suggest that for a state-law right to
    be entirely independent of a private agreement, it cannot be
    subject to any bargaining or negotiation. On this interpreta-
    tion, independence and nonwaivability are simply two sides
    of the same coin. For two reasons, however, we do not accept
    this reading of Lueck as supporting Kiewit’s position that the
    inchoate possibility of opting out of coverage of a state law
    through a CBA means automatic section 301 preemption,
    whether or not the CBA actually contains any such waiver:
    11
    Our decision today reaches only opt-out, not opt-in, statutes. The latter
    present a somewhat different problem. Under the opt-in approach, the
    state-law rights can be more readily viewed as existing only if the CBA
    says so and as therefore dependent on the CBAs.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                     7301
    (1) First, if read as we have posited, the above cited lan-
    guage from Lueck would be patent dicta. After all, Lueck’s
    focus was solely on whether the particular right in question —
    a state tort action for the bad-faith handling of an insurance
    claim — was so derivative of the terms of the CBA that it
    would not exist independently of the agreement, and was thus
    subject to section 301 preemption. In Lueck, the only reason
    the plaintiff had an insurance claim at all was because the
    CBA created an obligation on the part of the employer to pro-
    vide the insurance benefit in question. See 
    id. at 217
    (“The
    duties imposed and rights established through the state tort
    thus derive from the rights and obligations established by the
    contract.”); 
    id. at 218
    (“Because the right asserted not only
    derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual
    obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here
    inevitably will involve contract interpretation.”). The Lueck
    Court therefore had no need to consider whether a state-law
    right that is not derivative of or dependent on a CBA is none-
    theless preempted for unionized employees if that right poten-
    tially could be — but was not — waived in the CBA. See
    Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
    , 454-55 (1972)
    (explaining that “broad language . . . unnecessary to the
    Court’s decision . . . cannot be considered binding authority”).12
    12
    For the same reason, other language in Lueck is dicta as well, if
    applied to rights not created in the first instance by the CBA. In particular,
    Lueck states that a court’s preemption analysis “must focus . . . on whether
    the [state cause of action] . . . confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on
    employers or employees independent of any right established by contract,
    or, instead, whether evaluation of the . . . claim is inextricably intertwined
    with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” 471 at 213 (empha-
    sis added). The term “nonnegotiable” is repeated in one other instance in
    Lueck, see 
    id. at 217
    n.11 (“We pass no judgment on whether an indepen-
    dent, nonnegotiable, state-imposed duty which does not create similar
    problems of contract interpretation would be pre-empted under similar cir-
    cumstances.”), as well as once in Livadas, 
    see 512 U.S. at 123
    (writing
    that “[section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable
    rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”). In
    each of these instances, the use of the word “nonnegotiable” — as a defin-
    7302               BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    (2) Second, the cited language from Lueck need not be, and
    in our view should not be, interpreted as we have initially pos-
    ited — i.e., as a statement that if a right can be waived, then
    it is not independent. The more plausible reading is one that
    conforms with the situation faced by the Court in Lueck: that
    if a right exists only because of the CBA and, “as a result”
    of that dependence “can be waived or altered by agreement of
    the parties,” see 
    Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213
    (emphasis added),
    then there is preemption. This interpretation makes far more
    sense given the context of Lueck, which, as we have
    explained, was concerned with a benefit that existed solely as
    a result of the CBA.
    This second, alternative interpretation of the language from
    Lueck — and the one we adopt — is corroborated by the
    Supreme Court’s post-Lueck cases, none of which assert the
    proposition that waivability means non-independence if the
    source of the right in question is indubitably state law and not
    the CBA. To be sure, and as we have noted, the Court has
    never squarely addressed the role that opt-out provisions such
    as the one in this case must play in section 301 preemption
    analysis. In Lingle, however, the Court had occasion again to
    define the term “ ‘independent’ . . . for [section] 301 pre-
    emption purposes,” and did so by explaining that a “state-law
    remedy . . . is ‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining
    agreement” if “resolution of the state-law claim does not
    require construing the collective-bargaining 
    agreement.” 486 U.S. at 407
    . Lingle, in other words, made no mention of non-
    waivability or nonnegotiability as defining features of an “in-
    dependent” state-law right. See also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
    v. Norris, 
    512 U.S. 246
    , 262 (1994) (characterizing the
    ing aspect of an “independent” state-law right — would be dicta if read
    as Kiewit would have us do, to describe a state law containing a one-way
    opt-out provision, like the state law at issue here. (For that matter, it would
    be dicta even in the context of a one-way opt-in provision, as neither
    Lueck nor Livadas concerned such a provision.)
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                     7303
    Court’s ruling in Lingle as one in which “the LMRA pre-
    empts state law only if a state-law claim is dependent on the
    interpretation of a CBA” (emphasis added)).
    Moreover, as Lingle goes on to emphasize, even in
    instances in which the state has granted workers a “nonnego-
    tiable” right, the fact of nonnegotiability alone is not a talis-
    man for determining preemption. Instead, Lingle explained,
    “[w]hile it may be true that most state laws that are not pre-
    empted by [section] 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights that
    are shared by all state workers, . . . neither condition ensures
    nonpre-emption,” nor is the contrary the 
    case. 486 U.S. at 407
    n.7. “[A] law could cover only unionized workers,” the Lingle
    Court went on, “but remain unpre-empted if no collective-
    bargaining agreement interpretation was needed to resolve
    claims brought thereunder.” 
    Id. Thus, in
    a situation like the
    one presented here — where section (5)(D)’s opt-out provi-
    sion applies only to unionized workers — preemption would
    follow only if the CBA had to be interpreted to resolve Burn-
    side’s claims. We address the question of interpretation in a
    subsequent section.13 For present purposes, though, Lingle
    supports the proposition that the mere presence of an opt-out
    provision in a state law — a provision which, by definition,
    pertains only to unionized workers — cannot be enough to
    trigger preemption.14
    13
    In particular, we respond to Kiewit’s contention that because a court
    would have to review the CBA to see whether the employees did choose
    to waive their state-law right, that review would constitute an “interpreta-
    tion” of, rather than a “looking to,” the CBAs. See infra p. 7311.
    14
    There are cases in our circuit and in California that have held the par-
    ticular rights at issue to be conferred as a matter of state law, and indepen-
    dent of the CBAs, in large part because the state legislature had been
    explicit about their inherent non-waivability. See Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp.,
    
    410 F.3d 1071
    , 1077-80 (9th Cir. 2005) (surveying the relevant statutory
    provisions and legislative history before concluding that the state legisla-
    ture intended that “the substantive provisions mandating meal periods . . .
    could not ‘in any way be contravened or set aside by a private agreement,
    whether written, oral, or implied’ ” (quoting CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 219,
    7304               BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    Our reading of Lueck is also corroborated by Livadas’s dis-
    cussion of waiver during the collective bargaining process.
    Livadas involved a claim brought under section 203 of the
    California Labor Code, which renders an employer liable if he
    fails to pay an employee all wages owed her immediately
    upon her 
    discharge. 512 U.S. at 111
    . The Court concluded
    that the employee’s claim was not preempted, because “[t]he
    only issue raised . . . was a question of state law, entirely
    independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-
    bargaining agreement,” and because the fact that the agree-
    ment might eventually be “ ‘look[ed] to’ . . . for damages
    computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated
    by [section] 301.” 
    Id. at 124-25.
    In addition, Livadas went on,
    preemption was not warranted because “[t]here is no sugges-
    tion here that Livadas’s union sought or purported to bargain
    away her protections under [state law], a waiver that we have
    said would . . . have to be ‘clear and unmistakable,’ for a
    court even to consider whether it could be given effect.” 
    Id. (quoting Lingle,
    486 U.S. at 409 n.9 (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Of course, if the very fact that a right could be
    waived were enough to warrant preemption then, logically
    speaking, just how “clear or unmistakable” the waiver actu-
    226.7)); 
    Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1111
    (holding that “[t]he rights granted to
    employees by California Labor Code § 201.5 are not subject to negotia-
    tion,” given the legislative history surrounding the statute); Zavala v. Scott
    Bros. Dairy, Inc., 
    143 Cal. App. 4th 585
    , 596 (2006) (holding that rights
    related to “rest periods and wage-stub itemization” were nonwaivable and
    nonnegotiable, noting that state legislators had specified that these rights
    constituted “minimum substantive guarantees” and that, through section
    219 of the Labor Code, “the Legislature has categorically forbidden the
    modification of any provision of these laws” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Nothing in these cases, however, states the opposite proposition
    — that a state law-conferred right is necessarily preempted if it is waiv-
    able in a CBA under state law. And to read these cases as implicitly adopt-
    ing that proposition would be to suppose that they contradict the Supreme
    Court’s explicit Lingle assertion that “nonnegotiability” is not talismanic,
    in either direction, with regard to section 301 preemption, a supposition
    in which we cannot indulge. See 
    Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407
    n.7.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7305
    ally turned out to be should have no impact on a court’s pre-
    emption analysis. That the nature of the actual, consummated
    waiver does matter, however, supports our conclusion that the
    possibility of waiver, by itself, is not enough to make an oth-
    erwise independent state-law right contingent on the terms of
    a CBA in the sense necessary to trigger preemption under sec-
    tion 301.
    3
    Our conclusion that the possibility of waiver does not auto-
    matically trigger preemption makes sense not only as a ratio-
    nal derivation of the pertinent portions of Lueck, Lingle, and
    Livadas, but also as it relates to the Supreme Court’s more
    general jurisprudence concerning the collective bargaining
    process and the protections accorded unionized workers. Sec-
    tion 301 preemption focuses on the impact of state law on the
    enforcement of the end-product of that process, the CBAs
    negotiated between unions and employers. More broadly, the
    interplay of collective bargaining, state labor law, and the
    rights of both employers and employees also features in cases
    involving the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
    §§ 157-158 (“NLRA”), which is “concerned primarily with
    establishing an equitable process for determining terms and
    conditions of employment,” see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass.,
    
    471 U.S. 724
    , 753 (1985), and the corresponding Machinists
    preemption doctrine, see Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists
    v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 
    427 U.S. 132
    . 140-41
    (1976). Under that doctrine, state activity may be restricted
    “on the theory that pre-emption is necessary to further Con-
    gress[’s] intent that ‘the conduct involved be unregulated
    because [it should be] left to be controlled by the free play of
    economic forces.’ ” Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 
    482 U.S. 1
    , 19-20 (1987) (second alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
    Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140
    ).
    In the Machinists line of cases, the Court has repeatedly
    repudiated the idea that the mere ability of unionized workers
    7306            BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    to bargain collectively somehow makes it permissible to give
    unionized employees fewer minimum labor-standards protec-
    tions under state law than other employees. See, e.g., Fort
    Halifax 
    Packing, 482 U.S. at 21
    (explaining that “pre-emption
    should not be lightly inferred . . . , since the establishment of
    labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the
    State”); 
    id. at 21-22
    (“[T]he mere fact that a state statute per-
    tains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain can-
    not support a claim of pre-emption, for ‘there is nothing in the
    NLRA . . . which expressly forecloses all state regulatory
    power with respect to those issues . . . that may be the subject
    of collective bargaining.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
    Malone v. White Motor Corp., 
    435 U.S. 497
    , 504-05 (1978)));
    Metro. Life 
    Ins., 471 U.S. at 755-56
    (rejecting the argument
    that the state’s establishment of minimum substantive labor
    standards undercut the collective bargaining process and thus
    should be preempted by the NLRA, and adding that “[i]t
    would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its
    head to understand it to have penalized workers who have
    chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefitting
    from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on
    nonunion employers”). Livadas, in turn, heavily relied on this
    logic in holding California policy differentiating between
    union and nonunion employees “irreconcilable” with the
    NLRA. 
    See 512 U.S. at 132
    . In doing so, it articulated a non-
    discrimination rationale relevant to the instant appeal.
    As explained earlier, Livadas involved an employee’s claim
    against her employer after the employer failed to pay all
    wages owed her immediately upon discharge, as required by
    the state’s labor code. 
    Id. at 111.
    California’s Labor Commis-
    sioner refused to take action against the employer, citing its
    policy of not enforcing the state’s severance pay provisions
    when the employee involved in the dispute is covered by a
    CBA that contains an arbitration clause. 
    Id. at 112-13.
    Before
    the Supreme Court, the Commissioner sought to defend this
    “hands off” policy by arguing that “official restraint will actu-
    ally encourage the collective-bargaining and arbitral processes
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7307
    favored by federal law.” 
    Id. at 126;
    see also 
    id. at 128.
    To bol-
    ster this defense, the Commissioner pointed to “a number of
    state and federal laws that draw distinctions between union
    and nonunion represented employees,” presumably as evi-
    dence that other states give employees the option of “forfeit[-
    ing]” certain state-law rights upon entering a CBA. 
    Id. at 131-
    32 (citing, as examples of the such statutes, “D.C. CODE ANN.
    § 36-103 (1993) (‘Unless otherwise specified in a collective
    agreement . . . [w]henever an employer discharges an
    employee, the employer shall pay the employee’s wages
    earned not later than the working day following such dis-
    charge’); 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (‘Hours [w]orked’ for Fair Labor
    Standards Act measured according to ‘express terms of . . . or
    practice under bona fide collective-bargaining agreement’)”
    (alterations in original)).
    The Livadas Court rejected the argument that a state’s
    “hands off” policy advances federal labor policy with regard
    to unionized employees, explaining — in language largely
    borrowed from the Machinists line of case law — that the
    Commissioner’s “assertion that represented employees are
    less ‘in need’ precisely because they have exercised federal
    rights poses special dangers that advantages conferred by fed-
    eral law will be canceled out and its objectives undermined.”
    
    Id. at 129
    (citing Metro. Life 
    Ins., 471 U.S. at 756
    ); see also
    
    id. at 130
    (“[W]e have never suggested that labor law’s bias
    toward bargaining is to be served by forcing employees or
    employers to bargain for what they would otherwise be enti-
    tled to as a matter of course.” (citing Metro. Life 
    Ins., 471 U.S. at 757
    )); 
    id. at 131
    (explaining that in Fort Halifax Pack-
    ing, “the minimum protections” of the state’s labor law “were
    relinquished not by the mere act of signing an employment
    contract (or collective-bargaining agreement), but only by the
    parties’ express agreement on different terms” (citing Fort
    Halifax 
    Packing, 482 U.S. at 21
    )).
    Livadas also explained that although the Commissioner
    correctly pointed out that it is not atypical for state laws to
    7308              BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    distinguish between union and nonunion employees by enact-
    ing statutes with “opt-out” provisions, “virtually all” of those
    statutes15 still afforded “union-represented employees . . . the
    full protection of the minimum [state] standard, absent any
    agreement for something different.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    “These ‘opt out’ statutes,” the Court continued, “are thus
    manifestly different in their operation (and their effect on fed-
    eral rights) from the Commissioner’s rule that an employee
    forfeits his state-law rights the moment a collective-
    bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause is entered
    into.” 
    Id. at 131-
    32. In so stating, the Court clarified the con-
    tinuing validity, not invalidity, of such statutes. 
    Id. at 132
    (“[O]ur holding that the Commissioner’s unusual policy is
    irreconcilable with the structure and purposes of the Act
    should cast no shadow on the validity of these familiar and
    narrowly drawn opt-out provisions.”). Yet, under Kiewit’s
    theory, these statutes would not in practice afford union-
    represented employees full protection absent waiver. Instead,
    combined with the section 301 preemption doctrine, they
    would disadvantage unionized workers just for being union-
    ized workers, by “forcing [unionized] employees . . . to bar-
    gain for what they otherwise would be entitled to as a matter
    of course.” 
    Id. at 130.
    To so understand the impact of section
    301 preemption is to run squarely into the Supreme Court’s
    assertion in Livadas that opt-out provisions are generally con-
    sistent with federal labor policy.
    [10] Read together, then, Metropolitan Life Insurance, Fort
    Halifax Packing, and Livadas crystallize the Supreme Court’s
    view that a unionized employee cannot be deprived of the full
    protections afforded by state law simply by virtue of the fact
    that her union has entered into a CBA. Although her union
    may certainly bargain “for something different” or reach “ex-
    15
    Livadas never explains this caveat. Because the language used in sec-
    tion (5)(D) of Wage Order 16-2001 is very similar to the language used
    in the opt-out provisions cited in Livadas, though, the caveat is irrelevant
    for present purposes.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7309
    press agreement on different terms,” see 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 131
    , the fact remains that “if impasse is reached” during those
    negotiations, then the “pre-existing state law” remains intact,
    see Fort Halifax 
    Packing, 482 U.S. at 21
    . The state-law-
    conferred right, in other words, remains with the employee
    unless and until it is expressly given away. To hold otherwise
    would impermissibly disadvantage the unionized employee,
    because a failure to negotiate the right nevertheless will result
    in its forfeiture.
    In the specific context of this appeal, this would mean that
    Burnside instantly would have waived his state-law-conferred
    right to be compensated for compulsory travel time — thus
    triggering section 301 preemption — the moment he became
    part of a bargaining unit covered by a CBA, regardless of
    whether his union ever sought to trade that right for some
    other benefit during the collective bargaining process. The
    result would be that simply because he worked at a unionized
    workplace, Burnside would have neither the right to travel
    time nor any benefit obtained in exchange for it. This conclu-
    sion could not be reconciled with Livadas’s disapproval of
    approaches to labor preemption doctrine that disadvantage
    unionized employees simply for being covered by a CBA,
    regardless of its terms. 
    See 512 U.S. at 129
    (explaining that
    “the widespread practice in Congress and in state legislatures”
    has always been that “basic employment guarantees and pro-
    tections” should be bestowed “on individual employees with-
    out singling out members of labors unions (or those
    represented by them) for disability”).
    [11] We should not interpret the doctrine of section 301
    preemption so broadly as to undermine the broader precepts
    of federal labor policy of which enforcement of CBAs is a
    part. After all, the Supreme Court has termed section 301 pre-
    emption but an “acorn,” not a “mighty oak.” 
    Id. at 122.
    We
    therefore hold that the mere presence of an opt-out provision
    in section (5)(D) of Wage Order 16-2001 does not automati-
    cally sever the employees’ connection to their state-law
    7310                BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    rights, as articulated in section (5)(A) of the same wage order
    and in Morillion.
    *****
    [12] In conclusion, we hold that Burnside’s claims that
    Kiewit must compensate the employees for time spent travel-
    ing from designated meeting points to their jobsites and back,
    as Kiewit required, are based on a right conferred as a matter
    of state law — in particular, Morillion and Wage Order 16-
    200116 — not by the CBAs. That Wage Order 16-2001 con-
    tains an opt-out provision does not change our analysis. Burn-
    side’s claims are thus not preempted by section 301 on the
    ground that they assert a state cause of action dependent on
    rights created by the CBAs.
    C
    This conclusion does not end our inquiry. We must now
    separately consider whether Burnside’s claims are neverthe-
    less preempted by section 301 because they “substantially
    16
    We note that we found no other statute in the state’s Labor Code that
    addresses commuting or traveling time in a manner relevant to this appeal,
    nor did either party alert us to any. The district court erred by suggesting
    otherwise, when discussing section 510(b) of the California Labor Code
    in the order denying the employees’ motion to remand. Under section
    510(b),
    Time spent commuting to and from the first place at which an
    employee’s presence is required by the employer shall not be
    considered to be a part of a day’s work, when the employee com-
    mutes in a vehicle that is owned, leased, or subsidized by the
    employer and is used for the purpose of ridesharing, as defined
    in Section 522 of the Vehicle Code.
    CAL. LABOR CODE § 510(b) (emphasis added). The language of the statute
    is clear that this provision pertains only to an employee’s commute from
    a location, such as her home, to the first location her employer requires her
    presence (and back), not any commute she would undertake after arriving
    at that first location.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                 7311
    depend[ ] on” an interpretation of the terms of the CBAs. See
    
    Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394
    . After examining the relevant
    CBA provisions, we conclude that the claims can be resolved
    by — at most — merely “looking to” the CBAs and that the
    claims, therefore, are not preempted by section 301.
    1
    We begin by reviewing the relevant text of each CBA
    regarding the employees’ right to be compensated for time
    spent commuting. Agreements 1, 4, and 5 include substan-
    tially similar versions of the following provision, which we
    take from Agreement 1:
    [13] The Contractor shall be responsible for payment
    of wages from the reporting point (parking area), as
    ordered by the Contractor to the jobsite and from
    job-to-job and return. However, employees who vol-
    untarily report to a point for free transportation to the
    jobsite will not be compensated for the time in route
    and return.
    So these three CBAs address the issue of compensation for
    travel time between a “reporting point” and “jobsite,” and dis-
    tinguish between employer-mandated travel and voluntary
    travel. Agreements 2 and 3, on the other hand, do neither.
    Instead, they state only the following:
    Employees shall travel to and from work on their
    own time and by means of their own transportation.
    Despite these differences in wording, none of the CBAs
    require an “interpretation” of their provisions to determine
    whether Kiewit owed its employees compensation for com-
    pulsory travel time. Examining any of them would only con-
    firm that none contain an express waiver, as contemplated by
    section (5)(D) of Wage Order 16-2001, of the right codified
    in section (5)(A). The need to conduct such a cursory exami-
    7312           BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    nation does not “trigger[ ] [section] 301 preemption,” as “a
    court may look to” — not interpret — “the CBA[s] to deter-
    mine whether [they] contain[ ] a clear and unmistakable
    waiver of state law rights.” See 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692
    (emphasis added).
    [14] Nor is there any other provision in any of the agree-
    ments that would need to be interpreted to decide Burnside’s
    claim. By specifying that “[t]he Contractor shall be responsi-
    ble for payment of wages from the reporting point . . . to the
    jobsite and from job-to-job and return,” Agreements 1, 4, and
    5, at best, merely confirm that they confer upon employees
    the same right already conferred upon them by state law. As
    the Court explained in Lingle, “[T]he mere fact that a broad
    contractual protection . . . may provide a remedy for conduct
    that coincidentally violates state-law does not make the exis-
    tence or the contours of the state law violation dependent
    upon the terms of the private contract.” 
    See 486 U.S. at 412
    -
    13. Agreements 2 and 3 provide even less — in fact, no —
    fodder for interpretation, as they do not even broach the sub-
    ject of compensation for compulsory travel time.
    Kiewit argues to the contrary, contending that an “interpre-
    tation” of the CBAs’ “work rules” are needed before employ-
    ees’ claims could be resolved. In so arguing, Kiewit relies on
    Morillion, which discussed Royal Packing’s “work rules”
    when determining whether the employees there were, in fact,
    required to travel to their job sites from a designated meeting
    point. 
    See 22 Cal. 4th at 579
    & n.1. There is no indication in
    Morillion, however, that the California Supreme Court ascer-
    tained those “work rules” based on an interpretation of an
    employer-employee contract. In fact, there is no indication
    from Morillion that the agricultural employees concerned
    were even covered by a CBA.
    Even assuming that the Morillion court deciphered the rele-
    vant rules from a CBA, the “work rules” that Kiewit points to
    here are wholly irrelevant to the central issue in this appeal.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7313
    In its briefs, for example, Kiewit points to the fact that “the
    CBAs each contain provisions stating that the employer will
    provide free or employer-paid parking at the worksites unless
    parking areas were remote or hazardous,” and thus argues that
    “[t]he terms ‘remote’ and ‘hazardous’ are subject to conflict-
    ing interpretations, such that there may be a dispute whether
    employees had a right under the CBA to parking at a given
    worksite.” Whether Kiewit had an obligation to provide
    employees with parking near the jobsite, however, does not
    bear on whether Kiewit in fact required its employees to com-
    mute to the jobsite from a designated meeting point.
    Kiewit also argues that some of “the CBAs provide that
    employees will not be paid when they voluntarily chose to
    ride the van to work,” and that “the term ‘voluntarily’ is sub-
    ject to conflicting interpretation[s].” But Wage Order 16-2001
    requires payment for travel time only when the employer
    mandates use of its transportation. The CBA provisions thus
    do not change the state-created rule, and, as far as we can tell,
    will not need to be consulted to implement it. Nor does Kiewit
    suggest any specific interpretation of the term “voluntarily”
    that would affect the application of Wage Order 16-2001 to
    the circumstances of this case. Our circuit has repeatedly
    frowned upon defendants who have invoked tangentially
    related CBA provisions in a strained and transparent effort to
    extinguish state-law claims via preemption. See, e.g., 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 694
    (“Consolidated cannot create a dispute as to
    the meaning of the terms of the CBA by picking out terms
    that refer to videotapes and drug use, particularly when a cur-
    sory examination of those provisions makes clear they apply
    to a completely different context and set of circumstances.”);
    Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 
    473 F.3d 994
    , 999 (9th
    Cir. 2007) (rejecting defendant Circus’s contention that “its
    right to direct and control its employees pursuant to the CBA
    requires interpretation,” and writing that “[t]he connection
    between Circus controlling its employees and using any
    amount of physical force against them is even more attenu-
    7314             BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    ated than the connection held to be insufficient in . . .
    Cramer”). We refuse to break from that tradition today.
    [15] Certainly, some amount of fact-finding will have to be
    done in this case to determine whether Kiewit actually
    required its employees to travel on Kiewit-owned and -oper-
    ated vehicles from a designated meeting point to the jobsite
    and back. The need for a “purely factual inquiry . . . [that]
    does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-
    bargaining agreement,” however, is not cause for preemption
    under section 301. See 
    Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407
    . In Lingle, the
    plaintiff-employee was covered by a CBA that afforded her “a
    contractual remedy for discharge”; she sought instead to “en-
    force her state-law remedy for retaliatory discharge.” 
    Id. at 401.
    While under both the contractual and state-law causes of
    action the employer would have had to show that “it had a
    nonretaliatory reason for the discharge,” the Court disagreed
    with the position that “such parallelism renders the state-law
    analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis” and found
    the employee’s claim not preempted. 
    Id. at 407-08,
    413. As
    in Lingle, Kiewit cannot maintain that its employees’ claims
    are preempted merely because a state court eventually will
    have to determine whether the travel was compulsory, even if
    a court would have had to undertake the same inquiry to
    enforce rights contained in Agreements 1, 4, and 5.17
    2
    Finally, Kiewit argues that this dispute is really one over
    overtime wages, not compensation for compulsory travel
    time. As a result, it contends, Burnside’s claims are pre-
    empted by section 301 under our decision in Firestone v.
    Southern California Gas Co., 
    219 F.3d 1063
    (9th Cir. 2000).
    17
    Agreements 2 and 3 do not present even the possibility of a parallel
    factual inquiry, as those CBAs do not afford the right to compensable,
    compulsory travel time.
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.                 7315
    In Firestone, the dispute between the parties was over the
    rate paid for overtime work — specifically, whether the
    employer had “fail[ed] to provide a ‘premium’ wage rate for
    overtime work,” as required by state law. 
    Id. at 1066.
    We held
    that determining whether an employee was receiving a “pre-
    mium wage rate” for overtime under a CBA, such that the
    employer would be exempt from section 510 of the California
    Labor Code,18 was a dispute that could not be resolved with-
    out interpretation of the agreement. 
    Id. As a
    result, we found
    the employees’ claims preempted by section 301. 
    Id. Burnside, in
    turn, relies on Gregory v. SCIE, LLC, 
    317 F.3d 1050
    , 1053 (9th Cir. 2003), to support his contention that pre-
    emption is not warranted when there is no dispute over the
    “method” of calculating overtime, simply the “result” of such
    calculations. In Gregory, the employee claimed that his
    employer failed to pay him “premium wage rates” for all
    “hours worked in excess of eight hours in one workday and
    forty hours in one workweek,” in accordance with section 510
    of the California Labor Code. 
    Id. at 1051-52.
    [16] The answer to this debate, however, resides in neither
    Firestone nor Gregory; rather, it is directly provided by Liva-
    das. There, the employee never disputed how much her
    employer owed her; she merely disputed the fact that her
    18
    Section 510 codifies when overtime must be paid and what the over-
    time rate will be. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510. Under section 514 of the
    state’s labor code, section 510
    do[es] not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective
    bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the
    wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees,
    and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all over-
    time hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those
    employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state mini-
    mum wage.
    CAL. LABOR CODE § 514. Substantially similar versions of sections 510 and
    514 also appear in Wage Order 16-2001. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8,
    § 11160 at (3).
    7316              BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.
    employer failed to pay her immediately upon discharge. 
    See 512 U.S. at 125
    (“There is no indication that there was a ‘dis-
    pute’ in this case over the amount of the penalty to which
    Livadas would be entitled.”). Still, in Livadas, a court eventu-
    ally would “need to ‘look to’ the collective-bargaining agree-
    ment for damages computation,” as the statutory penalty
    depended on the employee’s wage rate, 
    see 512 U.S. at 125
    ,
    and the wage rate was set by the CBA. So recognizing, Liva-
    das held that “the mere need to ‘look to’ the collective-
    bargaining agreement for damages computation is not reason
    to hold the state-law claim defeated by section 301. 
    Id. (citing Lingle,
    486 U.S. at 413 n.12).
    [17] Like Livadas, Burnside is not — as in Firestone —
    complaining about the wage rate the employees were paid for
    certain work, but about the fact that he was not paid at all.
    The CBAs all contain provisions governing the regular rate
    and the rate of overtime wages. As in Livadas, there is no
    indication in this case of any dispute concerning which wage
    rate would apply to any or all hours of transportation time, if
    those hours are compensable. The basic legal issue presented
    by this case, therefore, can be decided without interpreting the
    CBA. Depending on how that issue is resolved, damages may
    have to be calculated, and in the course of that calculation,
    reference to — but not interpretation of — the CBAs, to
    determine the appropriate wage rate, would likely be required.19
    19
    It is of course possible — just as it was in Livadas — that some dis-
    pute we cannot now foresee will arise in the course of computing damages
    that will require the interpretation of the CBAs. If that contingency even-
    tuates, the district court will be able to devise processes to preserve the
    preeminent role of the CBAs’ dispute resolution processes to address the
    discrete dispute then arising. See 
    Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124
    n.18 (noting
    that “[h]olding the plaintiff’s cause of action substantively extinguished
    may not . . . always be the only means of vindicating the arbitrator’s pri-
    macy as the bargained-for contract interpreter”); see also 
    Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691
    . The alternative Kiewit suggests — preempting the entire
    cause of action now, even though the likelihood is that no dispute requir-
    ing interpretation of the CBAs will ever arise — would turn section 301
    preemption doctrine — into the “mighty oak” we know it is not. See Liva-
    
    das, 512 U.S. at 122
    .
    BURNSIDE v. KIEWIT PACIFIC CORP.            7317
    Under Livadas, this need to consult the CBAs to determine
    the wage rate to be used in calculating liability cannot, alone,
    trigger section 301 preemption.
    [18] In short, Burnside’s central claim — that Kiewit must
    compensate the employees for time they spent traveling as
    required by Kiewit — does not require an “interpretation” of
    the CBAs. That claim is therefore not preempted by section
    301. That is all that matters for present purposes.
    III
    [19] In conclusion, Burnside’s claims are not preempted by
    section 301 because the right to be compensated for compul-
    sory travel time is a right conferred as a matter of state law
    that exists independent of the terms of the CBAs, and because
    the claims to compensation for that time can be resolved with-
    out interpreting these agreements. The district court erred in
    concluding otherwise. We therefore vacate the district court’s
    orders denying employees’ motion to remand and granting
    defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remand with
    instructions for the district court to remand the matter to the
    Superior Court of San Diego County.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-57134

Citation Numbers: 491 F.3d 1053, 2007 WL 1760747

Judges: Pregerson, Fletcher, Berzon

Filed Date: 6/19/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (20)

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts , 105 S. Ct. 2380 ( 1985 )

kathy-j-ward-individually-dora-starnes-individually-bertha-garcia , 473 F.3d 994 ( 2007 )

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 105 S. Ct. 1904 ( 1985 )

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 107 S. Ct. 2425 ( 1987 )

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. , 108 S. Ct. 1877 ( 1988 )

Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. , 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 3 ( 2000 )

ronald-e-stewart-john-a-gromala-john-e-donohue-gerald-r-harland-keith , 934 F.2d 1033 ( 1991 )

Livadas v. Bradshaw , 114 S. Ct. 2068 ( 1994 )

lloyd-w-cramer-daniel-e-lipich-v-consolidated-freightways-inc , 255 F.3d 683 ( 2001 )

samuel-firestone-calvin-miyashiro-jack-putnam-brian-frazen-individually , 219 F.3d 1063 ( 2000 )

David Valles John Breslin, and Members of the General ... , 410 F.3d 1071 ( 2005 )

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler , 107 S. Ct. 2161 ( 1987 )

Kastigar v. United States , 92 S. Ct. 1653 ( 1972 )

Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. ... , 82 S. Ct. 571 ( 1962 )

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation ... , 103 S. Ct. 2841 ( 1983 )

Delaney v. Superior Court , 50 Cal. 3d 785 ( 1990 )

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris , 114 S. Ct. 2239 ( 1994 )

Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. , 77 S. Ct. 912 ( 1957 )

Malone v. White Motor Corp. , 98 S. Ct. 1185 ( 1978 )

California Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare ... , 25 Cal. 3d 200 ( 1979 )

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