Quantum Technology Partners Ii v. Altman Browning and Company , 436 F. App'x 792 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 07 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY                               No. 10-35162
    PARTNERS II, L.P., a Delaware limited
    partnership,                                     D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00376-BR
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    ALTMAN BROWNING AND
    COMPANY, an Oregon corporation;
    BAKER GROUP LLP; KAY E.
    ALTMAN, an individual; MICHAEL J.
    BAKER, an individual; DAVID M.
    BROWNING, an individual; DOES, 1
    through 20; APEX DRIVE
    LABORATORIES, INC., nominal
    defendant, a Delaware corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 3, 2011
    Portland, Oregon
    Before:       KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    page 2
    1. There is complete diversity between the parties. See Johnson v. Columbia
    Props. Anchorage, LP, 
    437 F.3d 894
    , 899 (9th Cir. 2006).
    2. While the bylaws of a Delaware corporation “are a contract between the
    corporation and its stockholders,” Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 
    674 A.2d 483
    , 492
    (Del. 1995), Quantum didn’t cite any authority holding that shareholders can sue
    each other for breach of such bylaws. We conclude they cannot.
    3. Quantum didn’t allege facts showing that the representations about
    Altman Browning & Company (ABCo)’s capabilities were false or misleading
    when Browning and Baker made them to Dickman. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,
    
    191 F.3d 983
    , 993 (9th Cir. 1999). The falsity of the statements can’t be inferred
    from ABCo’s failure to meet the milestones in the agreement with Apex. See
    Commc’ns Grp., Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Or., 
    871 P.2d 502
    , 504 (Or. Ct. App.
    1994); see also In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
    42 F.3d 1541
    , 1548–49 (9th Cir.
    1994) (en banc).
    4. Dickman’s email to Apex’s largest shareholder, which predicted that
    Quantum’s suit would make “Apex’s and possibly [the shareholder’s] fund raising
    somewhat radioactive,” causing Apex not to “survive[]” for very long, is strong
    page 3
    evidence that Quantum’s interests diverged from those of Apex’s other
    shareholders. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 
    564 A.2d 670
    , 673–74 (Del. Ch.
    1989). The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in finding that Quantum wasn’t
    an adequate shareholder representative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
    5. Quantum can’t claim demand futility because it made demand on Apex’s
    board of directors. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 
    571 A.2d 767
    , 775 (Del. 1990).
    Apex’s Special Investigation Committee (SIC), which had “sole authority” to
    investigate Quantum’s allegations, concluded that the “ultimate outcome” of the
    challenged board actions “was fair to [Apex],” and that “the diversion of resources
    to pursue litigation . . . would surely cripple [Apex].” (Emphasis added.) This
    conclusion isn’t subject to judicial review, 
    id. at 778
    , and Quantum hasn’t alleged
    facts indicating that the SIC’s investigation was deficient, see Grimes v. DSC
    Commc’ns Corp., 
    724 A.2d 561
    , 565 (Del. Ch. 1998); see also Levine v. Smith, 
    591 A.2d 194
    , 214 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 
    746 A.2d 244
    , 253–54 (Del. 2000).
    AFFIRMED.