Richard Neal v. State of Arizona , 436 F. App'x 811 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JUN 08 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICHARD LELAND NEAL; REX CARL                    No. 10-15364
    SAGELY,
    D.C. No. 3:09-cv-08203-JAT
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    STATE OF ARIZONA; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 24, 2011 **
    Before:        PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Richard Leland Neal and Rex Carl Sagely (“plaintiffs”) appeal pro se from
    the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging that defendants
    unlawfully refused to recognize as valid for use in Arizona their purported Indian
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    tribe-issued driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations, and vehicle titles. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Rhoades v. Avon Prods.,
    Inc., 
    504 F.3d 1151
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any ground
    supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir.
    2008), and we affirm.
    Dismissal of plaintiffs’ Indian tribal sovereignty and Indian Commerce
    Clause claims was proper because the group whose purported rights plaintiffs are
    asserting is not an Indian tribe or band. See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 
    386 F.3d 1271
    , 1272-74 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that members of a tribe are of a same
    or similar race); Navajo Tribal Utility Auth. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    608 F.2d 1228
    , 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Indian tribes or bands are separate communities of
    citizens of Indian descent, possibly with a common racial origin, possessing the
    power of a sovereign to regulate their internal and social relations.”); see also
    Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 
    650 F.2d 1104
    , 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1981)
    (discussing tribal sovereignty claims), amended on denial of reh’g, 
    665 F.2d 1390
    (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs’ treaty-based claims also fail. See Skokomish Indian
    Tribe v. United States, 
    410 F.3d 506
    , 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
    (addressing treaty-based claims).
    Dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal protection claims was proper because their
    2                                    10-15364
    group is not situated similarly to governmental entities that issue driver licenses,
    vehicle registrations, and vehicle titles. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 
    425 F.3d 1158
    , 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs’ due process claims also fail. See
    Miller v. Reed, 
    176 F.3d 1202
    , 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding no constitutional
    right to drive).
    Plaintiffs’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
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