Michael Sequeira Osorto v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    OCT 13 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    MICHAEL U. SEQUEIRA OSORTO,                      No.   20-72162
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A209-240-020
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted October 7, 2021**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: W. FLETCHER, IKUTA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Sequeira Osorto seeks review of a decision of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    deny his motion to reopen and rescind his order of removal entered in absentia.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    .
    Because Sequeira conceded that he received actual notice of the hearing in
    which he was ordered removed in absentia, and because the notice met the
    applicable statutory requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), we reject
    Sequeira’s argument that he did not receive notice because he relied on statements
    by a government employee that he did not need to attend the hearing. Therefore,
    the IJ and BIA did not err in concluding that Sequeira’s in absentia removal order
    could be rescinded only if he “demonstrate[d] that the failure to appear was
    because of exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). The BIA
    and IJ did not abuse their discretion in ruling that Sequeira’s decision to rely on the
    oral statements of an unnamed government employee instead of the official,
    written notice of the hearing failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances”
    beyond Sequeira’s control. See Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 
    170 F.3d 943
    , 946-47 (9th
    Cir. 1999); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ and the
    BIA’s decision not to reopen the removal proceedings sua sponte. See Lona v.
    Barr, 
    958 F.3d 1225
    , 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2020).
    We reject Sequeira’s argument that the BIA and IJ abused their discretion by
    failing to consider the merits of his asylum eligibility, because Sequeira failed to
    2
    submit an application for asylum relief with his motion to reopen. Tadevosyan v.
    Holder, 
    743 F.3d 1250
    , 1255 (9th Cir. 2014).
    Sequeira’s claims that he was defrauded by the government and that he is
    prima facie eligible for protection or withholding for removal are unexhausted, and
    therefore we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of those claims. See Barron v.
    Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 674
    , 677 (9th Cir. 2004).
    DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-72162

Filed Date: 10/13/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2021