Hosea Byrd v. A. Arias , 411 F. App'x 105 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 21 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    HOSEA BYRD,                                      No. 09-55522
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:08-CV-01459-DMS-
    AJB
    v.
    A. ARIAS; et al.,                                MEMORANDUM *
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 10, 2011 **
    Before:        BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Hosea Byrd appeals pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing his civil rights action, alleging that defendants violated his
    Eighth Amendment and Due Process rights by finding him eligible for double
    celling. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    dismissal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2). Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 
    410 F.3d 1136
    , 1138 (9th Cir. 2005). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
    record. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 
    502 F.3d 1056
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). We
    affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Byrd’s Eighth Amendment claim
    because Byrd’s second amended complaint failed to allege any facts suggesting
    that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety. See
    Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994) (to state an Eighth Amendment
    claim for deliberate indifference, “the official must both be aware of facts from
    which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
    and he must also draw the inference”).
    Byrd failed to allege facts showing that his placement in the Behavior
    Modification Unit resulted in a “significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
    the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484 (1995).
    Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed.
    Byrd’s appeal of the denial of his motion for injunctive relief is moot. See
    Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 
    954 F.2d 1441
    , 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when
    underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary
    injunction would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot);
    2                                    09-55522
    Sec. & Exch. Comm. v. Mt. Vernon Mem’l Park, 
    664 F.2d 1358
    , 1361 (9th Cir.
    1982) (futile to review a district court’s action on a petition for preliminary relief
    where the district court has already issued a decision on the merits).
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     09-55522