Curtis Thompson v. Officer Burach , 513 F. App'x 691 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS S. THOMPSON, No. 12-35126
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02064-JLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
OFFICER BURACH, King County Jail; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2013**
Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Curtis S. Thompson, a Washington state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment and judgment following a bench trial in his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order), and summary
judgment, Toguchi v Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We review de
novo a district court’s conclusions of law and for clear error its findings of fact
following a bench trial. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Indus., Inc., 634 F.3d 1092,
1096 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record,
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s claims against the
supervisory defendants because Thompson failed to allege facts demonstrating
their personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal connection
between their conduct and any such violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under
§ 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s claims against the Seattle
Police Department, King County Prosecutor’s Office, and the King County Jail
alleging municipal liability because Thompson did not allege facts demonstrating
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that defendants’ actions were the result of an official policy or custom. See Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s claims against prosecutors
in his criminal proceedings on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity
under § 1983 for “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to defendant Higa
because Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether it
was not objectively reasonable for Higa to hit him with a flashlight to effectuate his
arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989) (setting forth the
objective reasonableness standard). To the extent that Thompson challenges the
district court’s denial of leave to amend his complaint to add the second arresting
officer, the district court did not abuse its discretion because it had already
determined that Thompson’s rights had not been violated. See Thinket Ink Info.
Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissal without leave to amend is proper where the complaint cannot be saved
by any amendment).
Denial of judgment for Thompson following the bench trial was proper
because Thompson failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
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the remaining defendants used excessive force when they attempted to restrain and
subdue Thompson with the use of pepper spray and counter-joint techniques. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-97.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s
motion to appoint counsel because Thompson failed to show exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s
motion for recusal. See Taylor v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712-
13 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review
and noting that adverse rulings alone are insufficient to demonstrate judicial bias).
Thompson’s contentions that the district court erred in denying his motions
to compel discovery, in its evidentiary rulings, and in its trial management
decisions, are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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