Steven Iglesias v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN MANUEL IGLESIAS, AKA No. 20-70377
Steven Acosta, AKA Steven M. Iglesias
Acosta, AKA Steven Iglesias, AKA Steven Agency No. A094-304-583
Iglesias Acosta, AKA Steven M. Iglesias
Acosta,
MEMORANDUM*
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 12, 2021**
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Steven Manuel Iglesias, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his request to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
terminate and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision
finding him removable, denying his prior motion to terminate, and denying his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review for substantial evidence whether clear and convincing evidence establishes
removability, Nakamoto v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2004), and
determinations regarding social distinction, Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d
1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
motion to terminate. Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We
review de novo questions of law, including whether a particular social group is
cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation
of the governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1241-42.
We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the
government met its burden of establishing that Iglesias is removable where he
conceded removability and did not seek to amend his concession. See Shin v.
Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here the alien concedes
removability, the government’s burden in this regard is satisfied.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). The agency did not abuse its discretion in
denying Iglesias’s motion to terminate based on a challenge to removability where
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he failed to meet his burden that he was “lawfully present in the United States
pursuant to a prior admission.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Iglesias’s request to
terminate based on Pereira v. Sessions, ––– U.S. –––, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018),
where his contention that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his
proceedings is foreclosed by Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir.
2020) (“the lack of time, date, and place in the NTA sent to [petitioner] did not
deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction over her case”). Iglesias’s contention
that he did not receive proper service of his NTA fails where he conceded such
service.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Iglesias established changed
circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum application. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.4(a)(4). Thus, Iglesias’s asylum claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Iglesias failed
to establish his proposed particular social groups are socially distinct. See Conde
Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (substantial evidence supported the agency’s
determination that petitioner’s proposed social group was not cognizable because
of the absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the agency
did not err in concluding that Iglesias did not establish membership in a cognizable
particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016)
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(in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant
must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
237 (BIA 2014))). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination
that Iglesias failed to establish the harm he fears would be on account of an
imputed nationality. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (an
applicant “must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial”). In
his opening brief, Iglesias does not challenge the agency’s determination that he
failed to establish the harm he fears would on account of a political opinion. See
Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not
specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). Thus,
Iglesias’s withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Iglesias failed to show it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by or with
the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras. See Aden
v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider Iglesias’s contention that the IJ failed to consider
humanitarian asylum because the BIA did not decide the issue, see Santiago-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (review limited to grounds
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relied on by the BIA), and Iglesias does not argue that was in error, see Lopez-
Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079-80. Iglesias’s contentions that the agency otherwise
erred in its legal analysis or ignored evidence fail. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597
F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency adequately considered evidence and
sufficiently announced its decision).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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