Elhadji Toure v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 19 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ELHADJI OMAR TOURE,                             Nos. 20-70369
    20-72920
    Petitioner,
    Agency No. A209-169-468
    v.
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                    MEMORANDUM*
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted August 2, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Dissent by Judge CALLAHAN
    Petitioner Elhadji Omar Toure, a native and citizen of Senegal, petitions for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”) orders (1) dismissing his
    appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal,
    and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”); and (2) denying his
    motion to reopen. Toure’s first petition (No. 20-70369) challenges the agency’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    adverse credibility determination and its denial of CAT relief. The second petition
    (No. 20-72920) challenges the BIA’s denial of Toure’s motion to reopen. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We grant Toure’s first petition, remand, and
    deny Toure’s second petition as moot.
    Toure argues that the agency’s adverse credibility determination is not
    supported by substantial evidence. We agree. 1
    We review an adverse credibility finding for substantial evidence. Qiu v.
    Barr, 
    944 F.3d 837
    , 842 (9th Cir. 2019). “Although that standard is deferential,
    there must be a ‘specific cogent reason’ for [such a] finding.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). “We review those parts of the IJ’s adverse credibility findings on which
    the BIA relied.” Id.; see also Iman v. Barr, 
    972 F.3d 1058
    , 1064 (9th Cir. 2020).
    The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination on a single
    ground. It concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in finding an inconsistency
    between Toure’s initial written statements, which explained that he was persecuted
    in Senegal because he worked as a tailor for gay clientele, and his later testimony
    that he is himself gay. But the IJ’s finding is belied by the record, as the purported
    inconsistency is not an inconsistency at all. See Perez-Arceo v. Lynch, 
    821 F.3d 1
    The government’s waiver and exhaustion arguments are meritless. Toure’s
    opening brief did not waive his claims for asylum and withholding of removal, and
    all Toure’s claims were properly exhausted before the BIA, see Diaz-Jimenez v.
    Sessions, 
    902 F.3d 955
    , 959-60 (9th Cir. 2018).
    2
    1178, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding the IJ’s noted inconsistency “cannot
    support a negative credibility determination” because “there was no inconsistency
    . . . at all”). There is no inherent inconsistency between Toure’s superseding I-589
    application, which explained that he was persecuted for catering to the gay and
    bisexual community in Senegal, and his testimony at the hearing that he is gay.
    See 
    id. at 1185
    .
    Moreover, Toure’s application specifically stated that the government and
    his uncle persecuted him because they believe he is gay. And Toure’s written
    statement explained that, when his younger uncle saw him in Brazil, the uncle
    “told everybody” that Toure is gay, that he worked for the gay and bisexual
    community in Senegal, and that he was a shame to their religion. Thus, the
    purported inconsistency was not “a ‘specific cogent reason’ for [the] adverse
    credibility finding.”2 Qiu, 944 F.3d at 842 (citation omitted).
    We grant Toure’s first petition on this basis and remand his claims for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.3 See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr,
    
    968 F.3d 1070
    , 1089 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “CAT’s implementing
    regulations require the agency to consider ‘all evidence relevant to the possibility
    2
    We express no opinion on whether the IJ’s other findings adequately supported
    the adverse credibility determination. See Iman, 972 F.3d at 1064.
    3
    In light of this disposition, we need not address Toure’s other arguments
    concerning his CAT claim. Toure may raise those arguments in any future
    petition, if necessary.
    3
    of future torture’” (citation omitted)). In light of our disposition of the first
    petition, we dismiss Toure’s second petition as moot.
    Additionally, Toure’s motion for a stay of removal is granted. Toure’s
    removal is stayed pending issuance of the mandate.
    Petitions for review GRANTED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, and
    REMANDED.
    4
    FILED
    Toure, Nos. 20-70369 & 20-72920                                              OCT 19 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I dissent. The majority does not deny that Toure first stated that he worked
    as a tailor for gay clientele and later testified that he was himself gay. Indeed, the
    BIA commented that the IJ “found that [Toure] initially testified that he had
    problems because he worked as a tailor for gay clientele, but later changed his
    testimony to say that he was actually gay himself” and that Toure did not “address
    this discrepancy on appeal.” The majority opines that this “is not an inconsistency
    at all,” but offers no authority for this conclusion. One might argue as to the
    consequences of Toure’s inconsistent testimony, but the record fully supports the
    IJ’s and BIA’s finding of an inconsistency. Furthermore, a review of the entire
    record reveals that in his initial interview with an immigration officer, Toure stated
    that he left Senegal because his town was burned down in 2013, he wanted to go to
    New York to work, and could not return to Senegal because “people lent me
    money in Senegal and I don’t have money to pay them back.” Because there is
    substantial evidence to support the agency’s adverse credibility determination, I
    would deny Toure’s first petition for review. 1
    1
    Because the majority dismisses Toure’s second petition as moot, I do not
    address its merits.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-70369

Filed Date: 10/19/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2021