United States v. Maxwell Gaffney ( 2021 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 20 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    20-50037
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
    3:17-cr-03330-MMA-1
    v.
    MAXWELL JOSEPH GAFFNEY,                         MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 5, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GRABER and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG,** District
    Judge.
    Maxwell Gaffney appeals his conviction for distribution of heroin resulting
    in death in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge
    for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    1. The district court did not err in declining to instruct the jury that
    proximate cause was required to convict Gaffney. We review de novo whether an
    instruction omitted or misstated an element of the charged offense. United States v.
    Hofus, 
    598 F.3d 1171
    , 1174 (9th Cir. 2010). “[P]roximate cause is not a required
    element for conviction and sentencing under § 841(b)(1)(C).” United States v.
    Houston, 
    406 F.3d 1121
    , 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court’s decision
    in Burrage v. United States, 
    571 U.S. 204
     (2014), holding that but-for causation is
    required, did not call into question the holding or reasoning in Houston. See United
    States v. Gonzalez, 
    906 F.3d 784
    , 799 (9th Cir. 2018).
    2. The district did not err in declining to give Gaffney’s proposed jury
    instructions concerning his theory of defense. We review de novo “[w]hether the
    other instructions adequately cover the theory of defense.” United States v. Del
    Muro, 
    87 F.3d 1078
    , 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). Gaffney’s proposed instructions either
    were repetitive of instructions given by the court or misstated the law. See id.;
    United States v. George, 
    420 F.3d 991
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
    defendant “is not entitled to an instruction that misstates the law”).
    3. The district court did not err in admitting images of Facebook messages
    between Gaffney and another heroin purchaser. We review evidentiary rulings for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Whittemore, 
    776 F.3d 1074
    , 1077 (9th Cir.
    2015). The text messages were relevant, probative, and properly authenticated, and
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    they were not inadmissible hearsay. As the messages were similar to the ones
    between Gaffney and the decedent Kyle Rodriguez, they were relevant to
    Gaffney’s knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake concerning the sale of heroin to
    Rodriguez. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency
    to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[.]”);
    Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Given the relevance of the messages, any prejudicial
    effect did not “substantially outweigh[]” their probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
    The messages were properly authenticated because, among other reasons, the
    phone number used by the account holder “Max Gaffney” in the messages was
    Gaffney’s phone number. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
    Additionally, non-constitutional errors in evidentiary rulings are subject to
    harmless error review. United States v. Seschillie, 
    310 F.3d 1208
    , 1214 (9th Cir.
    2002). The messages between Gaffney and the other purchaser only went to the
    elements of whether Gaffney sold heroin to Rodriguez and whether he knew what
    he sold was heroin. The government provided other evidence of these elements at
    trial, including the messages between Gaffney and Rodriguez, and drug
    paraphernalia found in Gaffney’s home. Even if the district court erred in admitting
    the messages between Gaffney and the other purchaser, “it is more probable than
    not that the error did not materially affect the verdict.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Finally, the messages sent to Gaffney were admissible
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    as non-hearsay evidence because they were admitted to show their effect on
    Gaffney, not for their truth. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2).
    4. Sufficient evidence supports the verdict. Gaffney argues that there was
    insufficient evidence that Rodriguez had lethal levels of heroin in his system and
    that the heroin Rodriguez used when he overdosed must have been supplied by
    someone other than Gaffney. Multiple experts, however, testified that Rodriguez
    would not have died but for the heroin. The case agent who reviewed the contents
    of Rodriguez’s phone testified that the only messages in which Rodriguez
    successfully arranged to buy heroin close to the date of his death were the ones
    with Gaffney. Further, the government also presented evidence that Rodriguez did
    not use heroin earlier in the evening before his overdose at home. Friends and
    family testified that Rodriguez did not appear to be on drugs earlier in the day, and
    that Rodriguez ate a large meal on his way home, which an expert opined he would
    not have been able to eat if he had already used heroin that evening. Viewing the
    evidence “in the light most favorable for the prosecution . . . [a] rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gaffney’s motion
    for a new trial. See United States v. King, 
    660 F.3d 1071
    , 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)
    4
    (reviewing for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a new trial). Although
    the standard governing motions for a new trial is “much broader” than the one
    governing motions for acquittal, United States v. Kellington, 
    217 F.3d 1084
    , 1097
    (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 
    974 F.2d 1206
    , 1211 (9th Cir. 1992)), this case is not an “exceptional case[] in which the
    evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict,” United States v. Pimentel, 
    654 F.2d 538
    , 545 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Instead, the government provided significant evidence to support each of the
    elements of the offense. Further, Gaffney argues that his prosecution and
    conviction were unfair given his lack of prior involvement in Rodriguez’s battle
    with addiction. This argument, however, concerns Congress’s design of the statute,
    not a lack of evidence to support the conviction.
    AFFIRMED.
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