Bhupinder Singh v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BHUPINDER SINGH, No. 20-71412
Petitioner, Agency No. A200-891-205
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 12, 2021**
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Bhupinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law,
including the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable,
except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the
governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-
42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings. Id. at 1241. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The agency did not err in concluding that Singh failed to establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular
social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh failed to
establish that the harm he experienced or fears was or would be on account of a
political opinion. See Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005)
(to establish a nexus to a political opinion ground, petitioner must show “(1) that
[he] had either an affirmative or imputed political opinion, and (2) that [he was]
targeted on account of that opinion.”).
Singh’s contention that the agency failed to consider his claim of future
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persecution as a supporter of the Akali Dal Mann party fails. See Najmabadi v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not “write an exegesis on
every contention”). Singh’s contentions that the BIA otherwise erred in failing to
address his arguments as to an objective fear of future persecution fail. See
Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are
not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Singh’s pattern or practice of persecution
claims. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks
jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). To the extent the
particular social groups raised in Singh’s opening brief differ from those raised to
the agency, and are therefore raised in the first instance, we also lack jurisdiction to
consider them. Id.Thus, Singh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Singh failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Wakkary v. Holder, 558
F.3d 1049, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no likelihood of torture).
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The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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