Timmy Tyson v. Woodford ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 20 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIMMY RAY TYSON, a.k.a. Muwakkil No. 11-16262
D.S. Al-Hizbullahi, a.k.a. Timmy Ray
Tyson, Sr., D.C. No. 3:04-cv-04903-MMC
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MEMORANDUM *
v.
WOODFORD; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012 **
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Timmy Ray Tyson appeals pro se from the district
court’s dismissal order and summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging various constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to serve the
summons and complaint in a timely manner, Oyama v. Sheehan (In re Sheehan),
253 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 2001), and we review de novo summary judgment,
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
the claims against all defendants except Woodford for failure to effect timely
service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (requiring service within 120 days
after the complaint is filed); In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 512-13 (discussing good
cause standard and the district court’s broad discretion to extend time for service or
dismiss without prejudice).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for Woodford on
Tyson’s claims concerning his placement in administrative segregation and secured
housing, his denial of good time credits, his access to mail and the courts, the
restriction of outdoor exercise, and the refusal to recognize his legal name because
Tyson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Woodford
directed, participated in, or had knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations.
See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a
showing of personal participation by the defendant.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tyson’s motions for
reconsideration because Tyson failed to show grounds warranting reconsideration.
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See Sch. Dist. No. IJ, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. AcandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion and setting forth requirements
for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tyson’s motions to
compel discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
(setting forth standard of review and describing district court’s broad discretion to
permit or deny discovery).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tyson’s motions for
appointment of counsel because Tyson failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstance” requirement).
Tyson’s contentions regarding the denial of his application for in forma
pauperis status for service on defendants and the denial of his various motions for
default are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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