Ivan Lee v. City of Sacramento ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IVAN LEE, an individual, No. 20-17003
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:17-cv-00118-JAM-EFB
v.
CITY OF SACRAMENTO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 19, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and BEA, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO,*** District Judge.
Appellant Ivan Lee, a street construction laborer for the City of Sacramento,
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
California alleging that his employer had racially discriminated and retaliated
against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2,
and state law. Days after settling his claims through the mediation of a magistrate
judge, Lee moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(1), to
vacate the settlement agreement, while the City cross-moved to enforce it. The
district court denied Lee’s motion and granted the City’s cross-motion. We have
jurisdiction over Lee’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review for abuse
of discretion, and we affirm.
The central question presented by this appeal is whether an oral exchange of
claim release and dismissal for a lump sum of money in open court created, as the
district court found, an enforceable contract. Nothing in either law or rule requires
that the agreement be reduced to writing. It is required, however, that the binding
terms of the agreement be complete and that they have the assent of the settling
parties. Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the
agreement by the parties in open court was as complete as the law requires.
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There is, likewise, no shortage of record support showing that Lee and his
counsel consented to the settlement agreement. A district court applies California
law in determining whether a legally enforceable settlement agreement was
reached, even where the underlying cause of action arises under federal law. See
Jeff D. v. Andrus, 889 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). Though it is true that the
magistrate judge did not ask Lee to ratify the settlement with a ‘yes,’ California
law does not prescribe the form in which a party’s consent must be expressed.
Rather, “[t]he test is whether a reasonable person would, from the conduct of the
parties, conclude that there was a mutual agreement.” Marin Storage & Trucking,
Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1050 (2001).
The settlement agreement Lee seeks to set aside was the product of lengthy
and intense mediation by the magistrate judge. Lee was present with his counsel
the entire time, both during the off-the-record negotiations and when the terms of
the agreement were outlined in open court and counsel advised of the parties’
consent to the agreement. It was at that time that the magistrate judge expressed to
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Lee that the settlement fairly and adequately resolved the case, and Lee personally
thanked the magistrate judge for helping to bring about the agreement.
The record developed on Lee’s motion to set aside the agreement, which was
referred to the same magistrate judge who had mediated the settlement, only
fortifies the conclusion that the district court’s determination that Lee had assented
to the agreement, and that the agreement should be enforced rather than set aside,
was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, notwithstanding his
contrary claims made now, during the colloquy with the magistrate judge on his
Rule 60(b)(1) motion, Lee did not dispute that he was present and participating in
the mediation and had raised no objection in open court when the terms of the
agreement were outlined and the consent of the parties entered on the record.
In essence, Lee’s argument before the magistrate judge was that he had
made a mistake, due to poor advice from counsel, by assenting to the agreement.
Yet Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to provide relief from an otherwise enforceable
settlement agreement or “to remedy the effects of a deliberate and independent
litigation decision that a party later comes to regret,” even if it is “a poor litigation
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decision made because of inaccurate information or advice” from an attorney.
Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1109–1101 (9th Cir.
2006).
Although Lee regrets the settlement reached in his case, he makes no
showing that, at the time of his assent to it, he was not informed of its terms or that
his agreement was unintentional or involuntary. Since the recommendation of the
magistrate judge that Lee’s motion to vacate the settlement agreement be denied,
and the City’s motion to enforce it granted, was well-supported by the record, the
district court’s adoption of that recommendation was not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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