Pablo Pina v. Warden Lewis ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 3 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PABLO P. PINA, No. 16-15645
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:10-cv-03784-RMW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WARDEN LEWIS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2018**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Pablo P. Pina appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process
violation and state law tort claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Pina’s due
process claim because Pina failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant Diggle deprived him of a protected liberty interest. See Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995) (a constitutionally protected liberty
interest arises when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); see also Duffy v.
Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting de novo review standard for a
grant of summary judgment).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Pina’s state law claim against defendant Lewis. See
Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court does
not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
claims after granting summary judgment on federal claims).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without
prejudice Pina’s claims as to Officer Boniti and his estate because the district court
provided Pina with notice of the dismissal for failure to serve and extended the
time for service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 511 (9th
Cir. 2001) (standard of review).
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pina’s motion to
extend discovery because Pina did not identify “specific facts that further
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discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would preclude summary
judgment.” Tatum v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir.
2006) (stating the standard of review and necessary requirements for continuing
discovery).
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pina’s motion to
compel for failing to comply with local rules. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d
732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating the standard of review and noting that district
courts have broad discretion to permit or deny discovery); see also Tri-Valley
CARES v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a
motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district
court’s discretion.”).
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants’
motion to stay discovery because the question of defendants’ immunity had not
been resolved. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining
that until the “threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed”); Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating the
standard of review and noting that staying discovery pending a decision on
immunity is not an abuse of discretion).
7. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pina’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Pina did not demonstrate exceptional
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circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating
the standard of review and noting that a civil litigant generally has no right to
counsel unless “exceptional circumstances” are present).
8. We reject as without merit Pina’s contentions regarding administrative
exhaustion.
9. We do not consider any matters that Pina did not specifically and
distinctly raise and argue in his opening brief, or arguments and allegations he
raises for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2
(9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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