Multistar Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation , 707 F.3d 1045 ( 2013 )


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  •                FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC., DBA          No. 12-73138
    Multifrost, Inc.,
    Petitioner,        TRAN No.
    461410
    v.
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
    TRANSPORTATION ; FEDERAL MOTOR
    CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION ,
    Respondents.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC., DBA          No. 12-73485
    Multifrost, Inc.,
    Petitioner,
    OPINION
    v.
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
    TRANSPORTATION ; FEDERAL MOTOR
    CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION ,
    Respondents.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Department of Transportation,
    National Transportation Safety Board
    2             MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    Argued and Submitted
    December 5, 2012—Pasadena, California
    Filed February 7, 2013
    Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit
    Judges, and Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge.*
    Opinion by Judge Berzon
    SUMMARY**
    Transportation
    The panel dismissed in part, and denied in part,
    consolidated petitions for review challenging a compliance
    review of a for-hire motor carrier conducted by the U.S.
    Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration.
    As to petitioner’s substantive challenge, the panel held
    that it could not reach the merits of petitioner’s substantive
    claims because there was no final decision by the agency as
    to certain violations, and dismissed the petition for review as
    to the merits of those violations. As to petitioner’s procedural
    due process challenge, the panel denied the petition for
    *
    The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                 3
    review because petitioner received all of the process it was
    due with regard to the contested violations, and the agency’s
    denial of petitioner’s petition for review was not arbitrary or
    capricious.
    COUNSEL
    Timothy W. Wiseman (argued) and Christopher C. McNatt,
    Jr., Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C.,
    Indianapolis, Indiana, for Petitioner.
    Jonathan H. Levy (argued) and Matthew Collette, United
    States Department of Justice, Civil Division; Stuart F. Delery,
    Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Robert S.
    Rivkin, General Counsel; Paul M. Geier, Assistant General
    Counsel for Litigation; Timothy H. Goodman, United States
    Department of Transportation; T.F. Scott Darling, III, Chief
    Counsel; Fred K. Ford, Assistant Chief Counsel; Jedd
    Miloud, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
    OPINION
    BERZON, Circuit Judge:
    Petitioner Multistar Industries, Inc. (“Multistar”) is a for-
    hire motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting
    hazardous materials. As a result of a recent compliance
    review of Multistar’s operations, conducted by the U.S.
    Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration (“FMCSA” or “the agency”), Multistar was
    assigned an “unsatisfactory” safety rating and, as a
    4         MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    consequence, ordered to cease operations. The agency denied
    Multistar’s subsequent administrative appeal, which
    challenged certain violations discovered during the
    compliance review.
    Multistar now petitions for review of FMCSA’s order,
    and, in a separate petition for review, challenges the agency’s
    denial of Multistar’s petition for administrative review. We
    dismiss in part and deny in part the consolidated petitions.
    I. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    Congress has directed the Secretary of Transportation to
    “determine whether an owner or operator is fit to operate
    safely commercial motor vehicles, utilizing among other
    things . . . [the] safety inspection record of such owner or
    operator.” 
    49 U.S.C. § 31144
    (a)(1). To do so, the Secretary
    is directed to “maintain by regulation a procedure for
    determining the safety fitness of an owner or operator.” 
    Id.
    § 31144(b); see also id. § 31136. With regard to the
    transportation of hazardous materials, Congress has declared
    that “an owner or operator who the Secretary determines is
    not fit may not operate in interstate commerce beginning on
    the 46th day after the date of such fitness determination and
    until the Secretary determines that such owner or operator is
    fit.” Id. § 31144(c)(3).
    The Secretary’s authority to regulate the procedures of
    such fitness determinations has been delegated to the
    FMCSA. See 
    49 U.S.C. § 113
    (f); 
    49 C.F.R. § 1.87
    (f).
    FMCSA has established a fitness determination procedure as
    directed by Congress. See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 385. Under this
    regulatory framework, a motor carrier is either “unrated” or
    is assigned one of three possible safety ratings: “satisfactory,”
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                        5
    “conditional,” or “unsatisfactory.” See 
    id.
     § 385.3. A motor
    carrier receives a “satisfactory” safety rating if it has in place
    “adequate safety management controls” to meet the safety
    fitness standard prescribed in § 385.5.1 Id. A motor carrier
    is assigned a “conditional” safety rating if it “does not have
    adequate safety management controls in place to ensure
    compliance with the safety fitness standard that could result
    in” violation of safety regulations. Id. § 385.3.
    An “unsatisfactory” safety rating means that the carrier
    “does not have adequate safety management controls in place
    to ensure compliance with the safety fitness standard,” and
    that, as a result, violation of the safety regulations has
    occurred. Id. Pursuant to FMCSA’s safety ratings
    procedures, a hazardous materials carrier that receives an
    “unsatisfactory” safety rating is prohibited from operating a
    commercial motor vehicle in interstate or intrastate
    commerce.      Id. § 385.13(a)(1); see also 
    49 U.S.C. § 31144
    (c)(3). FMCSA may also revoke the operating
    registration of a motor carrier rated “unsatisfactory.”
    
    49 C.F.R. § 385.13
    (e).
    The factors considered in determining a carrier’s safety
    rating include information collected during “on-site
    examination[s] of motor carrier operations,” termed
    “compliance reviews.” 
    Id.
     §§ 385.3, 385.7. During a
    compliance review, FMCSA evaluates the motor carrier’s
    compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Regulations2 (“FMCSRs”) and Hazardous Materials
    1
    All citations are to Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations unless
    otherwise noted.
    2
    See 49 C.F.R. parts 350–399.
    6              MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    Regulations3 (“HMRs”). See id. Pt. 385, App. B § (d). Based
    on the information collected from the compliance review,
    FMCSA assigns the carrier a proposed safety rating based on
    any regulatory violations found. Id. § 385.9(a).
    The methodology for determining the proposed safety
    rating is contained in Appendix B to Part 385. Section VII of
    Appendix B categorizes certain regulations (i.e., certain
    FMCSRs and HMRs) as “acute” or “critical.” The ratings
    methodology provides that each violation of an acute
    regulation is considered one “point.” Each pattern of
    violations of a critical regulation (meaning more than one
    violation of the same critical regulation) is considered one or
    two points, depending on which critical regulation is violated.
    Id. Pt. 385, App. B, § II(g), VII. All regulatory violations
    (acute, critical, or otherwise) are grouped into six Factors,
    which are associated with particular parts of the FMCSRs or
    HMRs:
    •   Factor 1 - General (Parts 387 and 390)
    •   Factor 2 - Driver (Parts 382, 383, and 391)
    •   Factor 3 - Operational (Parts 392 and 395)
    •   Factor 4 - Vehicle (Parts 393 and 396)
    •   Factor 5 - Hazardous Materials (Parts 397, 171, 177
    and 180)
    •   Factor 6 - Accident Factor
    3
    See 49 C.F.R. parts 171–180.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                7
    Id. § II(C). Based on data gathered during the compliance
    review, each Factor is assigned a rating of “satisfactory” if no
    points have been assigned, “conditional” if one point has been
    assigned, and “unsatisfactory” if two or more points have
    been assigned. Id. § III(A). Finally, the ratings for the six
    Factors are combined into a single “overall” rating for the
    carrier according to a “Rating Table.” Id. If two or more
    Factors are rated “unsatisfactory,” the carrier’s proposed
    overall rating is “unsatisfactory.” Id. § III(B).
    A proposed overall “unsatisfactory” safety rating is
    provisional and does not become final until 45 days after the
    carrier receives written notice of the proposed rating. Id.
    § 385.11(c)(1). Pursuant to 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.15
    , a carrier may
    seek administrative review of a proposed or final safety rating
    within 90 days of its issuance. 
    Id.
     § 385.15(a), (c)(2).
    Carriers assigned an “unsatisfactory” rating, however, are
    encouraged to file such requests within 15 days to allow the
    agency to issue a “final decision” before the prohibition on
    operating accompanying such a rating takes effect. Id.
    § 385.15(c)(1).
    In addition to, or instead of, seeking administrative review
    under § 385.15, a carrier may request an upgrade of its safety
    rating under § 385.17 based on steps the carrier has taken to
    correct violations found during the compliance review. Such
    “upgrade requests” are separate from petitions for
    administrative review under § 385.15, and may be filed at any
    time, including after the proposed safety rating becomes final
    and operating authority is revoked. See id. § 385.17(a).
    Upon receipt of an upgrade request, the agency must
    determine whether “the motor carrier has taken the corrective
    actions required and [whether] its operations currently meet
    the safety standard and factors specified in [49 C.F.R.]
    8          MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    §§ 385.5 and 385.7.” Id. § 385.17(h), (i). If the agency
    denies the upgrade request, the carrier may seek
    administrative review of that denial under § 385.15(c)(2).
    II. Factual and Procedural Background
    A. Multistar’s Compliance Review and Safety Rating
    On August 13, 2012, FMCSA conducted a compliance
    review of Multistar’s operations. That review found 26 total
    sets of violations of various regulations, resulting in
    unsatisfactory Factor 2 and Factor 5 ratings and, therefore, an
    overall “unsatisfactory” rating. Multistar’s Factor 2 rating
    was based on discovered violations of two acute regulations.4
    Its unsatisfactory Factor 5 rating was based on violations of
    two acute and five critical regulations.5 Pursuant to the
    4
    Specifically, FM CSA discovered violations of 
    49 C.F.R. § 383.37
    (a)
    (knowingly allowing, requiring, permitting, or authorizing an employee
    with a suspended, revoked, or canceled commercial driver’s license to
    operate a commercial motor vehicle), identified in the compliance report
    as Violation 17, and of 
    49 C.F.R. § 391.11
    (b)(4) (using a physically
    unqualified driver), identified in the compliance report as Violation 20.
    5
    The agency found violations of 
    49 C.F.R. § 172.800
    (b) (offering or
    transporting hazardous materials without a security plan), identified as
    Violation 3 in the compliance report; 
    49 C.F.R. § 177.800
    (c) (failing to
    train hazardous materials employee), identified as Violation 4 in the
    compliance report; 
    49 C.F.R. § 177.801
     (transporting or accepting a
    shipment of hazardous materials not in proper condition for transportation
    or not certified as to proper packaging, marking, and description),
    identified as Violation 5 in the compliance report; 
    49 C.F.R. § 177.817
    (a)
    (transporting a shipment of hazardous materials not accompanied by a
    properly prepared shipping paper), identified as Violation 7 in the
    compliance report; 
    49 C.F.R. § 180.407
    (a) (transporting a hazardous
    material in a DOT specification cargo tank for which a test or inspection
    specified in this section has become due), identified as Violation 9 in the
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                          9
    agency’s ratings methodology, Multistar was assigned two
    points for Factor 2 and seven points for Factor 5, which in
    turn resulted in a proposed overall safety rating of
    “unsatisfactory.” See 49 C.F.R. Pt. 385, App. B, § III.
    Four days later, on August 17, FMCSA sent Multistar an
    official notice stating that the proposed “unsatisfactory”
    rating would become final and Multistar would be prohibited
    from operating commercial motor vehicles in 45 days—that
    is, on October 2, 2012—unless it took the steps necessary to
    improve its rating before that date. The notice also provided
    information regarding how to request a safety rating upgrade
    under § 385.17 and how to file an administrative appeal under
    § 385.15. With respect to the latter, the notice pointed out
    that although Multistar had 90 days in which to file an appeal,
    it was encouraged to do so within 15 days if it wanted the
    agency to rule before the “unsatisfactory” rating became
    final.
    B. Administrative Proceedings
    1. Multistar’s Administrative Appeal under § 385.15
    On August 31, 2012—fourteen days after FMCSA sent
    the official notice—Multistar filed a petition for
    administrative review of the proposed “unsatisfactory” safety
    rating under § 385.15 (“petition for administrative review”).
    That petition challenged five of the regulatory violations
    compliance report; 
    49 C.F.R. § 180.407
    (c) (failing to periodically test and
    inspect a cargo tank), identified as Violation 11 in the compliance report;
    and 
    49 C.F.R. § 180.417
    (a)(1) (failing to retain a cargo tank
    manufacturer’s data report, certificate, and related documentation),
    identified as Violation 15 in the compliance report.
    10         MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    FMCSA discovered during the August 13 compliance
    review—specifically, violations numbers 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17.
    Pursuant to § 385.15, FMCSA was obligated to issue a
    written response to the petition within 30 days. 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.15
    (e)(1).
    On September 25, 2012, FMCSA issued a letter to
    Multistar ordering it to cease all transportation operations by
    October 2, 2012, as required under 
    49 U.S.C. §§ 13905
    (f)(1)(B) and 31144(c)(3), and 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.13
    (a)(1) and (d)(1) (the “order”). The order also
    revoked Multistar’s motor carrier registration as of October
    2. See 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.13
    (e).
    The following week, on October 1, FMCSA issued its
    decision denying Multistar’s petition for administrative
    review. In doing so, FMCSA noted that violations 8 and 14
    were neither acute nor critical, and therefore were irrelevant
    to Multistar’s overall safety rating under the ratings
    methodology.6 As to violation 17, the agency observed that
    Multistar denied merely “that it knowingly committed the
    violation,” with no further explanation or argument; FMCSA
    explained that “[g]eneral denials are insufficient to
    demonstrate that the Agency erred in assigning [Multistar]’s
    safety rating.” Finally, with respect to violations 5 and 11,
    the agency noted that those violations comprised only two of
    the seven total violations of acute or critical regulations
    falling within Factor 5, and, therefore, “removal of th[o]se
    violations would not change [Multistar’s] overall
    Unsatisfactory safety rating.” The agency thereby affirmed
    6
    Violation 8 related to Multistar’s failure to have proper emergency
    discharge controls on its cargo tanks; Violation 14 arose from
    shortcomings in M ultistar’s inspection of delivery hose assemblies.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                       11
    Multistar’s overall “unsatisfactory” rating and the order to
    cease operations.
    2. Multistar’s Upgrade Requests under § 385.17
    At the same time Multistar was pursuing its appeal with
    the agency, on September 7, 2012 it also requested a safety
    rating upgrade pursuant to § 385.17. FMSCA denied that
    request in a letter dated October 5, 2012, holding that
    Multistar had not taken steps adequate to correct the
    violations found during the August 13 compliance review.
    Multistar accepted FMCSA’s invitation to submit another
    upgrade request, which it did on October 25. FMCSA denied
    that second request on November 21, 2012. Multistar has
    ninety days from that date to seek an administrative appeal of
    the second upgrade request denial.7 See 
    49 C.F.R. §§ 385.15
    (c)(2), 385.17(j).
    C. Judicial Proceedings
    On October 1, 2012, the same day FMCSA denied
    Multistar’s petition for administrative review and one day
    before the order to cease operations was to take effect,
    Multistar filed a petition for judicial review of the order and
    an emergency motion to stay the requirement that it cease
    operations. We granted Multistar’s emergency motion and
    stayed the order pending resolution of Multistar’s petition for
    review. On October 25, 2012, Multistar filed a second
    petition for judicial review challenging the agency’s denial of
    its petition for administrative review. We consolidated the
    two petitions for review.
    7
    So far, Multistar has not sought administrative review of the agency’s
    denials of the upgrade requests.
    12        MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    III. Analysis
    We have jurisdiction to review specified final orders of
    the Secretary of Transportation under the Hobbs Act,
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2342
    (3)(A). “Generally, administrative orders
    are final and appealable if they impose an obligation, deny a
    right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the
    administrative process.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Comm’n, 
    862 F.2d 222
    , 225 (9th Cir. 1988). We
    review orders of the FMCSA under the Administrative
    Procedure Act (“APA”) and “may set aside an agency action
    only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t
    of Transp., 
    655 F.3d 1124
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
    
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)); see Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc. v.
    FMCSA, 
    296 F.3d 1120
    , 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
    Multistar asserts two principal challenges on appeal, one
    substantive and the other procedural. First, it argues that the
    agency abused its discretion in issuing the order to cease
    operations, because the “unsatisfactory” safety rating on
    which it was based was itself premised on the misapplication
    of certain safety regulations. Second, Multistar contends that
    the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously and violated its
    due process rights by denying Multistar’s petition for
    administrative review without providing a substantive
    response to some of the carrier’s challenges. We address
    each challenge in turn.
    A. Multistar’s Challenge to FMCSA’s “Unsatisfactory”
    Rating and Order to Cease Operations
    According to Multistar, the order to cease operations and
    the “unsatisfactory” rating should be set aside as an abuse of
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                          13
    discretion premised on a misapplication of certain safety
    regulations. Specifically, Multistar challenges violations 5
    and 11 listed in the compliance review,8 arguing that they
    were based on the agency’s erroneous findings that some of
    Multistar’s container tanks violated specified safety
    regulations, but, according to Multistar, the regulations relied
    upon did not apply to those types of tanks.
    Under the Hobbs Act and the APA, we are limited to
    reviewing only the “final” action taken by the agency.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2342
    (3)(A); 
    5 U.S.C. § 704
    . Here, FMCSA’s
    denial of Multistar’s petition for administrative review of the
    “unsatisfactory” rating is a final agency action, permitting
    judicial review of FMCSA’s unsatisfactory safety rating. 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.15
    (f). Multistar’s “unsatisfactory” safety rating
    became final agency action once the agency denied
    Multistar’s petition for administrative review of that rating.
    See 
    id.
     § 385.423(a) (“After a motor carrier has had an
    opportunity for administrative review of, or change to, a
    proposed safety rating, FMCSA’s issuance of a final safety
    rating constitutes final agency action . . . .”); see also Idaho
    Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 
    307 F.3d 815
    , 829 (9th Cir.
    2002), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res.
    Def. Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
     (2008) (noting that once an
    optional administrative appeal or rehearing concludes, the
    original decision is final for purposes of judicial review).
    FMCSA’s denial of Multistar’s petition for administrative
    8
    Unlike in its administrative appeal, M ultistar does not contest violation
    17. In its opening brief, M ultistar also challenged violations 8 and 14. As
    noted, FM CSA did not consider these two violations when calculating
    Multistar’s safety rating in the first place, as those violations were neither
    acute nor critical. Moreover, Multistar did not make any attempt to
    explain why the agency’s findings as to violations 8 and 14 were
    erroneous.
    14        MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    review upheld the “unsatisfactory” rating, and therefore
    represented the “consummation of the agency’s
    decisionmaking process” on the rating matter. Hells Canyon
    Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    593 F.3d 923
    , 930 (9th
    Cir. 2010).
    Absent our stay, the order to cease operations would have
    taken effect the day after the unsatisfactory rating became
    final. 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.13
    (a)(1). Because the validity of that
    order depends entirely on the unsatisfactory rating, see 
    id.
    §§ 385.13(a)(1), 385.15(c), which the denial of administrative
    review effectively upheld, we concentrate our analysis on the
    final rating.
    Significantly, Multistar’s final safety rating did not rely
    on or otherwise incorporate violations 5 and 11. Indeed,
    although these contested violations made up two of the seven
    Factor 5 violations that, combined with Multistar’s Factor 2
    violations, first resulted in the agency’s proposed
    “unsatisfactory” safety rating, the agency expressly
    disclaimed any reliance on them in denying Multistar’s
    petition for administrative review. As the agency explained,
    the August 13 compliance review revealed a total of seven
    violations of acute or critical regulations falling within Factor
    5. Because a finding of just two violations of acute or critical
    regulations yields an “unsatisfactory” factor rating, see 49
    C.F.R. Pt. 385 App. B, § III, removing violations 5 and 11
    would not affect Multistar’s Factor 5 rating; there would still
    remain five uncontested violations of acute or critical
    regulations mandating an “unsatisfactory” Factor 5 rating.
    That rating, combined with Multistar’s uncontested
    “unsatisfactory” Factor 2 rating, still added up to an overall
    “unsatisfactory” safety rating.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT              15
    Thus, violations 5 and 11 did not factor into Multistar’s
    final “unsatisfactory” safety rating, and so did not underlie
    the order to cease operations. In other words, there was no
    final agency action that found violations 5 and 11 or
    depended on such findings. Multistar cannot substantively
    challenge in this judicial, APA proceeding the propriety of
    those nonfinal determinations. Multistar does not contend
    that the “unsatisfactory” rating is invalid on the grounds on
    which it was upheld. We therefore must dismiss the petitions
    insofar as they challenge the “unsatisfactory” rating and the
    order to cease operations.
    Multistar’s assertion that its substantive challenges to
    violations 5 and 11 “work in tandem” with its upgrade
    requests does not change this conclusion. According to
    Multistar, if the agency were to grant the upgrade request,
    then the removal of violations 5 and 11 from the compliance
    review could become relevant to its overall safety rating. As
    noted, however, Multistar has yet to seek administrative
    review of either of the agency’s denials of its upgrade
    requests. Unless and until Multistar does so, the currently
    operative “unsatisfactory” safety rating and order to cease
    operations stand firmly on the uncontested violations, and not
    on violations 5 and 11. Without a final decision by the
    agency as to those violations, we may not reach the merits of
    Multistar’s substantive claims, and so dismiss the petition for
    review as to the merits of violations 5 and 11.
    B. Multistar’s Due Process Challenge to the Denial of its
    Petition for Administrative Review
    Multistar also challenges FMCSA’s denial of its request
    for administrative review, on the grounds that the agency’s
    refusal to address the merits of Multistar’s challenges to
    16          MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    violations 5 and 11 was arbitrary and capricious and violated
    the carrier’s due process rights.
    As noted, FMCSA denied the request for review because
    removing violations 5 and 11 would not alter Multistar’s
    overall safety rating. That response, Multistar asserts,
    deprived Multistar of a substantive answer to its claims and
    foreclosed its only means to contest those violations.9
    1
    As an initial matter, we note that, notwithstanding our
    dismissal of Multistar’s substantive claims, Multistar has
    standing to raise this procedural challenge. To satisfy Article
    III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) it “ha[s] suffered an
    ‘injury in fact’” that is “concrete and particularized” and
    “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) a
    “causal connection between the injury” and the challenged
    action of the defendant; and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed
    to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
    favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Our analysis of the first, injury in fact, aspect of standing
    is “not fundamentally changed by the fact that a petitioner
    asserts a procedural, rather than a substantive injury.”
    Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. NRC, 
    457 F.3d 941
    , 949 (9th
    Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as
    here, a plaintiff alleges injury based on the government’s
    failure to abide by a procedural requirement, it must show
    9
    N otably, since filing this appeal Multistar has received a proposed
    substantive decision, subject to administrative review, as to its challenges
    to violations 5 and 11.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                17
    that the procedures “protect[] a concrete threatened interest.”
    Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 
    545 F.3d 1220
    , 1229 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at
    573 & n.8. Once a plaintiff
    establishes such an interest, however, its burden to establish
    the other two standing elements—causation and
    redressability—is lessened. Salmon Spawning & Recovery
    Alliance, 
    545 F.3d at 1224
    . Notably, for standing purposes,
    a plaintiff alleging a procedural due process violation need
    not demonstrate that it would prevail had it been accorded
    adequate process. See Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 266
    (1978) (holding that “[t]he right to procedural due process . . .
    does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive
    assertions”).
    According to Multistar, the order to cease operations is
    invalid because the procedures for administrative review set
    forth in § 385.15 obligated FMCSA to provide a substantive
    response to Multistar’s challenges to violations 5 and 11.
    Without a substantive ruling on the contested violations,
    Multistar argues, it may be forced to expend resources on
    remedying those violations should it seek a ratings upgrade
    in the future, even though it could turn out that the violations
    were not accurately assessed against it in the first place. In
    that sense, the allegedly inadequate procedural protections
    afforded Multistar by FMCSA threaten Multistar’s economic
    interests. See Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 
    94 F.3d 658
    ,
    664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a plaintiff may
    establish injury in fact when asserting procedural injury by
    “show[ing] that the government act performed without the
    procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a
    particularized interest of the plaintiff”). As a remedy,
    Multistar seeks a remand to the agency for a substantive
    decision as to the contested violations.
    18        MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    We hold that the asserted injury is sufficient for standing
    purposes and that, as the claim asserted is procedural, the
    possibility that the claim could result in a final, judicially
    reviewable decision as to the validity of the two challenged
    violations meets the causation and redressability factors
    applicable to such procedural claims. In so ruling, of course,
    we assume, rather than decide, that Multistar’s procedural
    claim might result in some relief. See Scott v. Rosenberg,
    
    702 F.2d 1263
    , 1268 (9th Cir. 1983).
    2
    Reaching the merits of Multistar’s procedural claim
    accordingly, we conclude that FMCSA was not obligated in
    response to the request for review to provide a substantive
    response to Multistar’s challenges concerning violations 5
    and 11. Because those challenges, even if correct, could not
    have affected FMCSA’s final action, the agency was not
    obligated to reach their merits. Cf. Simpson v. Young,
    
    854 F.2d 1429
    , 1433–35 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that
    agencies generally are not obligated “to address every
    argument advanced [by a petitioner]. . . no matter how minor
    or inconsequential the argument may be”).
    Multistar argues that 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.15
     “contemplates a
    process by which a motor carrier can challenge any errors it
    believes the FMCSA committed in issuing its safety rating,”
    thus “serv[ing] as a guarantee of due process, ensuring that
    erroneous decisions made by FMCSA field agents do not go
    unchecked.” We disagree. Nothing in that regulation, nor,
    derivatively, in the APA, obligates FMCSA to address the
    merits of every contested agency finding when the agency did
    not rely on those findings in its final action. To the contrary,
    § 385.15 merely gives motor carriers the option to “request
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                19
    FMCSA to conduct an administrative review if it believes
    FMCSA has committed an error in assigning its proposed or
    final safety rating.” 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.15
    (a) (emphasis added).
    As FMCSA has previously explained, “[t]he purpose of an
    administrative appeal under [§ 385.15] is to determine
    whether FMCSA committed error in assigning a safety rating
    . . . not [] to provide motor carriers with an opportunity to
    seek ‘removal’ of violations that do not affect the safety
    rating.” In the Matter of West Marine Prods., Inc., FMCSA-
    2009-0138, 
    2009 WL 1581078
    , at *2 (June 4, 2009).
    Multistar relies on Darrell Andrews, 
    296 F.3d 1120
    , to
    argue that the agency in its review decision was obligated
    substantively to determine the challenges to violations 5 and
    11 raised in Multistar’s petition. In Darrell Andrews, a motor
    carrier petitioned for administrative review of FMCSA’s
    decision assigning the carrier a “conditional” safety rating
    pursuant to the ratings methodology contained in Appendix
    B to § 385. 
    296 F.3d at
    1122–23. That rating was based on
    the motor carrier’s failure to maintain certain toll receipts for
    its drivers in violation of § 395.8(k)(1). Id. at 1123–24.
    FMCSA denied the carrier’s petition for administrative
    review but did not address the carrier’s claim that toll receipts
    provided unreliable evidence of driving history. Id. at 1134.
    The D.C. Circuit held that the agency was obligated to
    address the carrier’s toll receipts assertion, noting that if the
    carrier were correct, then the agency might have to assign it
    a “satisfactory” safety rating. Id. at 1134–35; see 49 C.F.R.
    Pt. 385 App. B, § III.
    By contrast, FMCSA’s assignment of an “unsatisfactory”
    safety rating to Multistar was not based on the violations
    challenged in Multistar’s petition for administrative review.
    Multistar provides no basis—and we can conceive of
    20           MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    none—for concluding that there is a regulatory or statutory
    requirement that FMCSA address the merits of an allegation
    that, even if valid, could not have affected the agency’s final
    action.
    Transforming the same argument into a constitutional one
    grounded in a denial of due process does not assist Multistar.
    The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments protect against “depriv[ations] of life, liberty,
    or property.” Any procedural due process analysis must be
    preceded by a showing that such a deprivation has occurred.
    See, e.g., Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San
    Diego, 
    670 F.3d 957
    , 984 (9th Cir. 2011); Kildare v. Saenz,
    
    325 F.3d 1078
    , 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2003).
    As FMCSA concedes, its order requiring Multistar to
    cease operations constitutes a deprivation of Multistar’s
    property interests. But, as noted, that final agency action did
    not rest on violations 5 and 11.10 Whether the agency reached
    the merits of Multistar’s substantive challenges, therefore,
    had no bearing on the deprivation Multistar suffered.
    The Supreme Court’s decision in Codd v. Velger,
    
    429 U.S. 624
     (1977) (per curiam), is instructive in this regard.
    Codd involved the termination of a non-tenured police officer
    who asserted that information about an attempted suicide that
    was placed by the City Police Department in his personnel
    file was sufficiently stigmatizing to warrant a hearing under
    procedural due process principles. 
    Id.
     at 625–26. The Court
    declined to reach the merits of the officer’s due process
    claim, however, because “[n]owhere in his pleadings or
    elsewhere ha[d] [the officer] affirmatively asserted that the
    10
    See supra Part III.A.
    MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT                        21
    report of the apparent suicide attempt was substantially
    false.” Id. at 627. Because the officer did not challenge the
    validity of any underlying deprivation, the Court explained,
    “no hearing would afford a promise of achieving th[e] result
    [sought by] him,” i.e., the “opportunity to clear his name.”
    Id. at 627–28. Here too, the procedural protection that
    Multistar seeks—a decision by the agency on the merits of its
    substantive challenges to violations 5 and 11—would not
    affect “the legitimacy of the underlying deprivation,” i.e., the
    requirement to cease operations. Rector v. City & Cnty. of
    Denver, 
    348 F.3d 935
    , 944 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing
    Codd).
    Beyond the order to cease operations, Multistar has made
    no attempt to identify the property interest at stake, or to
    explain how it was deprived of any property right.11 It has
    therefore not raised a cognizable claim of deprivation of due
    process.
    Finally, the agency’s denial of administrative review did
    not, as Multistar alleges, deprive the carrier of a forum to
    contest violations 5 and 11 if and when they become the basis
    for an adverse order.12 Under 
    49 C.F.R. § 385.17
    (a), a motor
    carrier may seek an upgrade of its safety rating “at any time.”
    Along with its upgrade request, a carrier may submit any
    “other documentation the carrier wishes the FMCSA to
    consider,” including challenges to agency findings that the
    11
    W e are assuming that the due process concerns Multistar raises in
    passing would have to be rooted in a property right, as no impact on
    “liberty” or “life” has been suggested.
    12
    Multistar does not argue it has any other protectible interest in
    receiving a decision on the merits of its challenges to violations 5 and 11.
    22        MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. V . USDOT
    carrier has not “taken action to correct.” 
    Id.
     § 385.17(a)–(c).
    As noted, in evaluating an upgrade request, FMCSA is
    required to “determine[] [whether] the motor carrier has taken
    the corrective actions required and [whether] its operations
    currently meet the safety standard and factors specified in
    §§ 385.5 and 385.7.” Id. § 385.17(h) (emphasis added).
    Since filing its briefs in this case, Multistar has availed
    itself of this process, and has received a first-level substantive
    decision from the agency as to its challenges to violations 5
    and 11. Multistar may, within 90 days of the agency’s denial
    of its latest upgrade request, seek further administrative
    review pursuant to §§ 385.15(a).                   See also id.
    §§ 385.15(c)(2), 385.17(j). That review may result in a final
    agency decision as to the challenged violations, a decision
    that has not heretofore occurred.
    In short, Multistar has received all of the process it was
    due with regard to the contested violations, and FMCSA’s
    denial of Multistar’s petition for review was not arbitrary or
    capricious. Accordingly, we deny Multistar’s petition for
    review as to the due process issue.
    DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.