State of Alaska v. Jane Lubchenco , 723 F.3d 1043 ( 2013 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    STATE OF ALASKA,                     No. 12-35201
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. Nos.
    and                  3:10-cv-00271-TMB
    3:11-cv-00001-TMB
    FREEZER LONGLINE COALITION;        3:11-cv-00004-TMB
    ALASKA SEAFOOD
    COOPERATIVE; THE GROUNDFISH
    FORUM; ALASKA GROUNDFISH
    COOPERATIVE; CASCADE
    FISHING, INC.; M/V SAVAGE
    INC.; OCEAN PEACE, INC.; THE
    FISHING COMPANY OF ALASKA,
    INC.; ALASKA JURIS, INC.;
    ALASKA SPIRIT, INC.,
    Washington corporations;
    UNITED STATES SEAFOODS, LLC;
    ALASKA ALLIANCE, LLC;
    ALASKA LEGACY, LLC;
    SEAFREEZE ALASKA 1, LLC;
    ALASKA VAERDAL, LLC;
    IQUIQUE U.S., LLC; UNIMAK
    VESSEL, LLC; CAPE HORN
    VESSEL, LLC; REBECCA IRENE
    VESSEL, LLC; TREMONT VESSEL,
    LLC; ARICA VESSEL, LLC,
    Washington limited liability
    companies; FCA HOLDINGS,
    INC., an Alaska corporation;
    2               STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    O’HARA CORPORATION, a Maine
    corporation; AK VICTORY, INC.,
    a Washington corporation,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    JANE LUBCHENCO, in her official
    capacity as Administrator,
    National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration;
    NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
    SERVICE; JAMES W. BALSIGER, in
    his official capacity as NMFS
    Alaska Region Administrator;
    PENNY PRITZKER, in her official
    capacity as United States
    Secretary of Commerce,*
    Defendants-Appellees,
    OCEANA; GREENPEACE INC.,
    Intervenor-Defendants–
    Appellees.
    *
    *
    Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker is substituted for her
    predecessor, Gary Locke, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
    43(c)(2).
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO              3
    STATE OF ALASKA; FREEZER               No. 12-35203
    LONGLINE COALITION,
    Plaintiffs,           D.C. Nos.
    3:10-cv-00271-TMB
    and                   3:11-cv-00001-TMB
    3:11-cv-00004-TMB
    ALASKA SEAFOOD
    COOPERATIVE; THE GROUNDFISH
    FORUM; ALASKA GROUNDFISH
    COOPERATIVE; CASCADE
    FISHING, INC.; M/V SAVAGE
    INC.; OCEAN PEACE, INC.; THE
    FISHING COMPANY OF ALASKA,
    INC.; ALASKA JURIS, INC.;
    ALASKA SPIRIT, INC.,
    Washington corporations;
    UNITED STATES SEAFOODS, LLC;
    ALASKA ALLIANCE, LLC;
    ALASKA LEGACY, LLC;
    SEAFREEZE ALASKA 1, LLC;
    ALASKA VAERDAL, LLC;
    IQUIQUE U.S., LLC; UNIMAK
    VESSEL, LLC; CAPE HORN
    VESSEL, LLC; REBECCA IRENE
    VESSEL, LLC; TREMONT VESSEL,
    LLC; ARICA VESSEL, LLC,
    Washington limited liability
    companies; FCA HOLDINGS,
    INC., an Alaska corporation;
    O’HARA CORPORATION, a Maine
    corporation; AK VICTORY, INC.,
    a Washington corporation,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    4           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    v.
    JANE LUBCHENCO, in her official
    capacity as Administrator,
    National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration;
    NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
    SERVICE; JAMES W. BALSIGER, in
    his official capacity as NMFS
    Alaska Region Administrator;
    PENNY PRITZKER, in her official
    capacity as United States
    Secretary of Commerce,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    OCEANA; GREENPEACE INC.,
    Intervenor-Defendants–
    Appellees.
    STATE OF ALASKA; ALASKA                No. 12-35204
    SEAFOOD COOPERATIVE; THE
    GROUNDFISH FORUM; ALASKA                  D.C. Nos.
    GROUNDFISH COOPERATIVE;              3:10-cv-00271-TMB
    CASCADE FISHING, INC.; M/V           3:11-cv-00001-TMB
    SAVAGE INC.; OCEAN PEACE,            3:11-cv-00004-TMB
    INC.; THE FISHING COMPANY OF
    ALASKA, INC.; ALASKA JURIS,              OPINION
    INC.; ALASKA SPIRIT, INC.,
    Washington corporations;
    UNITED STATES SEAFOODS, LLC;
    ALASKA ALLIANCE, LLC;
    ALASKA LEGACY, LLC;
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO   5
    SEAFREEZE ALASKA 1, LLC;
    ALASKA VAERDAL, LLC;
    IQUIQUE U.S., LLC; UNIMAK
    VESSEL, LLC; CAPE HORN
    VESSEL, LLC; REBECCA IRENE
    VESSEL, LLC; TREMONT VESSEL,
    LLC; ARICA VESSEL, LLC,
    Washington limited liability
    companies; FCA HOLDINGS,
    INC., an Alaska corporation;
    O’HARA CORPORATION, a Maine
    corporation; AK VICTORY, INC.,
    a Washington corporation,
    Plaintiffs,
    and
    FREEZER LONGLINE COALITION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JANE LUBCHENCO, in her official
    capacity as Administrator,
    National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration;
    NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
    SERVICE; JAMES W. BALSIGER, in
    his official capacity as NMFS
    Alaska Region Administrator;
    PENNY PRITZKER, in her official
    6           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    capacity as United States
    Secretary of Commerce,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    OCEANA; GREENPEACE INC.,
    Intervenor-Defendants–
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Alaska
    Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 4, 2012—Seattle, Washington
    Filed July 23, 2013
    Before: Mary M. Schroeder, M. Margaret McKeown,
    and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Schroeder
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                            7
    SUMMARY**
    Environmental Law
    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting
    the claims of fishing industry representatives and the State of
    Alaska in an action challenging limitations to the commercial
    fishing industry the National Marine Fisheries Services
    placed on sub-regions of the Pacific Ocean inhabited by the
    endangered western Distinct Population Segment of Stellar
    sea lions.
    The panel held that use of sub-regions did not violate the
    Endangered Species Act and that the agency utilized
    appropriate standards to find that continuing previous fishing
    levels in those sub-regions would adversely modify the
    critical habitat and jeopardize the continued existence of the
    entire population. The panel also held that the district court
    did not err by refusing to order preparation of a Record of
    Decision pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
    because it would be premature in the absence of the agency’s
    proposed action based on the Environmental Impact
    Statement record it develops.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    8            STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    COUNSEL
    Bradley E. Meyen and Andrew R. Naylor, Assistant
    Attorneys General, State of Alaska, Department of Law,
    Anchorage, Alaska; Murray D. Feldman, Holland & Hart
    LLP, Boise, Idaho; Christina F. Gomez, Holland & Hart LLP,
    Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Alaska.
    Linda R. Larson (argued) and Jessica K. Ferrell, Marten Law
    PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Alaska
    Seafood Cooperative, et al.
    Ryan P. Steen and Jeffrey W. Leppo, Stoel Rives LLP,
    Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellant Freezer Longline
    Coalition.
    Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, Dean
    Dunsmore, John H. Martin, Daniel Pollak, Joan M. Pepin,
    and J. David Gunter II (argued), United States Department of
    Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
    Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees Jane
    Lubchenco, et al.
    Colin C. O’Brien (argued), Earthjustice, Anchorage, Alaska;
    Shawn Eisele and Eric P. Jorgensen, Earthjustice, Juneau,
    Alaska, for Intervenor-Appellees Oceana, Inc. and
    Greenpeace, Inc.
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                     9
    OPINION
    SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
    The western Distinct Population Segment of the Steller
    sea lions (“wDPS”) live in the great northern Pacific Ocean
    region off Alaska, and they were declared endangered in
    1997. More recently, in two of the seven sub-regions they
    inhabit, they have been experiencing population declines
    because they have been showing signs of nutritional stress.
    In 2010, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS” or
    “the agency”) therefore limited commercial fishing in those
    waters, causing representatives of the fishing industry and the
    State of Alaska (“Plaintiffs”) to file this action challenging
    the limitations.
    The plaintiffs’ principal argument is that the NMFS
    violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) because it
    based the fishing restrictions on declines in sub-regions rather
    than in the entire population of the endangered species.
    Plaintiffs also contend the agency utilized the wrong
    standards in measuring the effects of continued fishing and
    failed to find a sufficient causal link between authorizing
    fisheries and the population decline. We hold that use of sub-
    regions did not violate the ESA and that the agency utilized
    appropriate standards to find that continuing previous fishing
    levels in those sub-regions would adversely modify the
    critical habitat and jeopardize the continued existence of the
    entire population. We therefore affirm the district court’s
    judgment rejecting plaintiffs’ claims.
    10           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Statutory Framework
    This case involves the interaction of three statutes: the
    Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act (“MSA”), the
    ESA, and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
    The first concerns management of fisheries, and the others
    concern more generally the environmental consequences of
    government actions. Plaintiffs claim NMFS violated all three
    in its promulgation of a 2010 Biological Opinion (“BiOp”)
    reducing commercial fishing in wDPS habitat.
    The MSA governs the federal management of fisheries in
    various waters off the United States and establishes regional
    councils that are responsible for the sustainable management
    of fisheries. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1852
    (h). These councils create
    fishery management plans, which are prepared using
    scientific evidence and are geared toward ensuring
    conservation of the fisheries. 
    Id.
     § 1853. The Secretary of
    Commerce must approve the management plans, which can
    include, among other things, limitations on or closure of
    fishing in designated zones. Id.
    The ESA requires the Secretaries of Interior and
    Commerce to list endangered species and designate their
    critical habitats. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1533
    (c). Section 4(f) of the
    ESA requires the Secretary of Commerce to design and carry
    out “recovery plans” and to implement programs to conserve
    the species under section 7(a)(1). 
    16 U.S.C. §§ 1533
    (f),
    1536(a)(1). Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA mandates that federal
    agencies ensure that actions they take will not “jeopardize the
    continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                   11
    species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
    habitat of such species.” 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    (a)(2).
    Under the ESA, when a governmental entity plans to take
    action that may impact an endangered species, it must consult
    with the agency that has authority over the species. The
    consulted agency must then prepare a BiOp to determine
    whether the planned action will either likely jeopardize the
    species’s continued existence or adversely modify its critical
    habitat. See id.; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
    Fisheries Serv., 
    524 F.3d 917
    , 924 (9th Cir. 2008). If either
    of those criteria is met, the agency may suggest a “reasonable
    and prudent alternative” (“RPA”), which is designed to avoid
    jeopardy or adverse habitat modification. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    (b)(3)(A); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
    524 F.3d at 925
    .
    The NMFS in this case stands at the intersection of the
    MSA and the ESA. Its duty is to ensure that actions taken by
    the regional councils, including fishery management plans, do
    not jeopardize the continued existence of a threatened or
    endangered species or adversely modify critical habitat of an
    endangered species. See Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine
    Fisheries Serv. (“Greenpeace IV”), 
    237 F. Supp. 2d 1181
    ,
    1185 (W.D. Wash. 2002). In this case it must evaluate the
    effect of the fishing plans on the wDPS and its habitat.
    The third statute, NEPA, requires study of the
    environmental effects of any government action. 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (C). Under NEPA, an agency planning an action may
    use an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) to determine
    whether the proposed action, including an RPA, would have
    a significant environmental impact. 
    40 C.F.R. § 1501.4
    . If
    the action would have such an effect, the agency must prepare
    an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). 
    Id.
     If it would
    12            STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    not, no EIS is required. An EIS must describe the
    environmental consequences of the governmental action and
    the alternatives that were considered by the agency. When an
    agency makes a decision after preparation of an EIS, it must
    prepare a Record of Decision (“ROD”), stating its decision,
    the alternatives it considered, and how its decision minimizes
    environmental harms. 
    40 C.F.R. § 1505.2
    .
    In this case, the operation of these statutes has a profound
    impact on both the Steller sea lions and on fishing interests
    because the statutes deal with the habitat in which sea lions
    live. This habitat includes their food sources, and, as a result,
    the resources available for commercial fishing.
    Environmental groups, the State of Alaska, and fishing
    industries, therefore, have all long been concerned about how
    the federal government applies these statutes in the waters off
    Alaska, and their concerns have led to a decade of litigation
    concerning the scope of federal regulation of these fisheries.
    B. History of Regulation of Fisheries and wDPS
    The regulation at issue in this case has centered on the
    Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands and Gulf of Alaska regions,
    which are home to Steller sea lions and to commercial
    fisheries that are governed by the MSA. See Greenpeace v.
    Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (“Greenpeace I”), 
    55 F. Supp. 2d 1248
    , 1252 (W.D. Wash. 1999). By 1990, there had been
    a decline in the sea lion population over a thirty-year period,
    so the NMFS listed the entire Steller sea lion population as
    “threatened” under the ESA. 
    Id. at 1254
    . Seven years later,
    because of new research, the agency divided the population
    of the Steller sea lions into the eastern Distinct Population
    Segment and the wDPS. 
    Id.
     The new research revealed
    genetic differences between the two populations. 
    Id.
     There
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                    13
    were also markedly different survival rates in the two
    populations. Therefore, the agency changed the wDPS’s
    status to “endangered,” because of the “precipitous, large
    population decline” among this segment, contrasted with the
    more stable population trend among the eastern population
    segment. 
    62 Fed. Reg. 24,345
    , 24,354 (May 5, 1997).
    The regional council responsible under the MSA for the
    areas affected by the agency actions in this case is the North
    Pacific Fishery Management Council. It has been preparing
    fishery management plans on an annual basis since the MSA
    was passed in 1976. These plans set limits on the total
    amount of fishing permitted as well as times and areas of
    fishery closure, and they allocated the allowable catch among
    vessels. Pursuant to the ESA, the Council consulted with
    NMFS on the plans, and NMFS prepared BiOps. Up until
    1998, NMFS had found that the Council’s fishery
    management plans adequately took into account the needs of
    the Steller sea lions and that there was no jeopardy to the
    species or adverse modification of its habitat as a result of the
    fisheries.
    In 1998, however, NMFS issued a BiOp that concluded
    that the fishing was causing some jeopardy to the species and
    adversely modifying its critical habitat. This led to a first
    round of litigation concerning regulation of fishing in the
    Alaskan waters. Environmental groups, including groups
    who are intervenor-defendants in this case, and fishing
    industry interests all challenged NMFS’s conclusions
    contained in the 1998 BiOp. That earlier litigation resulted
    in several district court opinions, Greenpeace I, 
    55 F. Supp. 2d at 1276
    ; Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
    (“Greenpeace II”), 
    80 F. Supp. 2d 1137
    , 1152 (W.D. Wash.
    2000); Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.
    14           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    (“Greenpeace III”), 
    106 F. Supp. 2d 1066
    , 1080 (W.D. Wash.
    2000); Greenpeace IV, 
    237 F. Supp. 2d at 1204
    , which led to
    revisions of the BiOp with respect to fishery management.
    In addition to reviewing fishery management pursuant to
    the ESA and MSA, NMFS was also required by the ESA to
    plan for sea lion population recovery. In 1992, NMFS
    promulgated a recovery plan for Steller sea lions pursuant to
    section 4 of the ESA. The agency did so using scientific
    experts working with interested parties, including fishing
    interests.
    When, in 1997, NMFS divided the sea lion population
    into eastern and western distinct population segments,
    separate recovery plans were required for each of the two
    species. The most recent Recovery Plan for the wDPS was
    published in 2008 and divided the wDPS into seven sub-
    regions to monitor the species’s progress. NMFS concluded
    in the Plan that “it was important to consider sub-population
    vital rates and demographic characteristics when considering
    the status of recovery of the western DPS” because sub-
    regional impacts “could indicate that extinction risk may still
    be high.”
    The Plan further established specific criteria that had to be
    met before the wDPS could be downlisted or delisted. To
    downlist the wDPS to “threatened” or to delist it entirely, the
    Plan required progress in growth of the wDPS population as
    a whole, and stable or increasing populations in five of the
    seven sub-regions. The Plan further mandated that the
    species could not be delisted if the wDPS population in any
    two adjacent sub-regions declined “significantly” or if the
    population in a single sub-region declined more than 50%.
    The Recovery Plan itself is not challenged here, nor is there
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                  15
    any dispute that the wDPS as a whole is not meeting the
    recovery criteria set forth in the Plan and therefore remains
    endangered.
    The decline in the wDPS population and the lack of
    robust recovery, despite the extensive efforts since 1990, has
    led to concerns about the health of the species and hence to
    federally funded research studying possible causes of the
    decline, including fishing. The North Pacific Fishery
    Management Council, in 2005, cited this new research in
    requesting that the NMFS initiate a new consultation pursuant
    to the ESA to determine the impact of continued fishing at the
    rates authorized by the then-existing fishery management
    plans. The Protected Resources Division of NMFS
    conducted the study using the new research on the impact of
    commercial fishing and other factors on the wDPS
    population. During its study, it took into account the 2008
    Recovery Plan to determine whether continued fishing would
    jeopardize the wDPS or adversely modify the species’s
    critical habitat.
    This consultation process culminated in NMFS’s
    promulgation of a new BiOp in 2010. That BiOp concluded
    that continued fishing would have deleterious impacts on the
    species and the habitat in which it lives and that, therefore,
    greater limitations on commercial fishing were required. The
    plaintiffs challenge that BiOp in this action.
    C. The Challenged Agency Actions: The 2010 BiOp,
    EA and Interim Final Rule
    In November 2010, after surveying the new research on
    the causes of wDPS’s lack of recovery, NMFS issued the
    BiOp pursuant to the ESA and an EA pursuant to NEPA. The
    16           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    BiOp was promulgated after review by the Council and
    public comment, including feedback from the fishing industry
    plaintiffs here. The BiOp concluded that continuing to
    authorize fisheries at the levels previously authorized in the
    fishery management plans would both jeopardize the
    continued existence of the wDPS and adversely modify its
    critical habitat. Relying on the Plan’s geographic divisions,
    the BiOp found that the wDPS was experiencing population
    declines in two of the sub-regions, although the population
    was increasing in four others. The BiOp concluded that these
    sub-regional declines caused the entire wDPS population to
    fall short of the Recovery Plan’s goal of a statistically
    significant increase of the species’s population as a whole.
    The agency’s critical finding was that natality rates were
    lower for the wDPS than for the eastern population, and that
    the most likely explanation for the difference was that
    portions of the wDPS were experiencing nutritional stress.
    The BiOp concluded that nutritional stress had directly or
    indirectly contributed to the reduction in population growth.
    It observed that although the nutritional stress hypothesis had
    been questioned by some experts, fishery presence in the two
    wDPS sub-regions was nevertheless negatively correlated
    with population numbers. In other words, as fishing
    increased, the wDPS population fell.
    With respect to the standard for measuring or determining
    adverse habitat modification, the BiOp noted that we had
    previously held part of the agency’s regulatory definition of
    adverse modification conflicted with the statute. See Gifford
    Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
    378 F.3d 1059
    , 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). The agency therefore relied on
    the statutory language of the ESA, 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    (a)(2),
    framing the critical question to be whether “the action
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                    17
    reduces the value of critical habitat for the conservation of the
    species.” Applying this standard, the BiOp found the weight
    of evidence suggested that continued authorization of the
    fisheries was likely to adversely modify the critical habitat of
    the wDPS and jeopardize its continued existence. The BiOp
    acknowledged there were potentially multiple factors
    contributing to the decline in the wDPS population, but it
    found nutritional stress was one contributing cause. Thus the
    agency concluded it was mandated by the ESA to take steps
    to prevent continued fishing from likely reducing or
    negatively affecting the survival and recovery of the wDPS.
    The BiOp therefore proposed an RPA that restricted the
    activity of several fisheries and closed other fisheries in the
    Aleutian Islands region. The RPA recommended closure of
    all mackerel and cod fishing in one part of the region and
    reducing the catch allowed in others. The RPA recommended
    swift implementation to “support the recovery of” the wDPS
    population, which so far had not met the criteria outlined in
    the Recovery Plan.
    Pursuant to NEPA, NMFS also prepared an EA, which
    considered various alternatives. NMFS found that of the
    various legally permissible alternatives, the RPA was the
    least likely to disrupt fishing or reduce the number of jobs
    and that the RPA’s fishing restrictions would have no
    significant impact on the environment. NMFS therefore
    promulgated an interim final rule, implementing the new
    restrictions, as described in the RPA. The likelihood of
    adverse economic consequences to the fishing industry,
    however, prompted this litigation.
    18           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    D. District Court Proceedings
    The plaintiffs challenged the agency’s actions under the
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), contending that the
    BiOp, EA, and finding of no significant impact ran afoul of
    the MSA, ESA, and NEPA. The district court granted a
    motion by non-profit environmental groups Oceana, Inc. and
    Greenpeace, Inc., who had participated in the previous
    litigation, to intervene as defendants.
    The district court held that the agency applied the correct
    standards under the ESA. It ruled that the agency’s
    consideration of population declines in two sub-regions was
    permissible because these declines implicated the survival
    and recovery of the species as a whole. It further held that the
    agency properly relied on the statutory definition of adverse
    modification and that the agency’s consideration of the
    impact of continued fishing on the wDPS’s recovery was
    appropriate. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ other ESA
    contentions as well, concluding that the RPA was supported
    by the record and that the agency was not required to show a
    definitive causal connection between authorization of
    fisheries and harm to the wDPS.
    With respect to NEPA, however, the district court found
    that the agency should not have summarily concluded the
    restrictions would cause no significant impact, and it ordered
    the agency to prepare an EIS. The court refused to enter a
    broader injunction that would have also required the agency
    to suspend the new restrictions or prepare a ROD.
    In this appeal, plaintiffs argue the agency violated the
    ESA and that the district court’s NEPA injunction was too
    narrow. Plaintiffs contend that the BiOp violated the ESA in
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                  19
    relying on trends in two sub-regions rather than considering
    population trends of the whole species. They further contend
    that the agency should have applied the regulatory definition
    of adverse habitat modification that this court has partially
    rejected. They additionally argue the agency should have
    limited its consideration to possible affirmative harm to the
    existing population rather than focusing on the adverse effect
    of fishing on the species’s recovery. Plaintiffs also contend
    there must be a definitive causal link shown between
    authorization of commercial fishing and injury to the wDPS
    population or habitat. Plaintiffs finally contend the court
    abused its discretion under NEPA by not requiring the agency
    to prepare a ROD in addition to requiring an EIS.
    Our review of agency actions, including the promulgation
    of a BiOp, is narrow. Under the APA, we must determine
    only if the agency’s action was arbitrary or capricious—that
    is, whether the agency based its decision on the relevant
    factors and stated a rational connection between its factual
    findings and conclusions. 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A); Gifford
    Pinchot Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at 1065
    .
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. The Agency’s Reliance on Data in Two of the
    Recovery Plan’s Sub-regions Was Not Contrary to
    the ESA Because That Data Implicated Recovery
    and Survival of the Species as a Whole.
    NMFS found in the BiOp that the wDPS population was
    declining in two of the Recovery Plan’s seven sub-regions
    and that while the population as a whole had experienced
    some increase between 2000 and 2008, that increase was not
    statistically significant. Plaintiffs challenge the agency’s
    20           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    reliance on population trends in two sub-regions rather than
    in the species as a whole.
    We have consistently held that the ESA permits agencies
    to consider the impact of actions on sub-populations, as long
    as such impact would affect the population as a whole. Wild
    Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 
    628 F.3d 513
    , 529 (9th Cir.
    2010); Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at 1075
    . We
    recognized that trends with regard to a subset of a species can
    provide important indicators about the health of the entire
    species. Wild Fish Conservancy, 
    628 F.3d at 529
    . Our law
    thus supports the agency’s looking to sub-regional declines in
    reaching its conclusions that continued fishing would
    jeopardize the survival of the wDPS and adversely modify the
    wDPS’s critical habitat.
    Wild Fish Conservancy illustrates the importance of
    considering declining sub-populations. We there held that a
    Fish and Wildlife Service BiOp that did not consider the
    impact of sub-populational decline on a species as a whole
    was inadequate, and therefore arbitrary. The BiOp in that
    case dealt with the impact of the Leavenworth National Fish
    Hatchery on endangered bull trout population. 
    Id. at 516
    .
    We held that the agency contradicted itself when it suggested
    that the declining Icicle Creek sub-population was of
    particular importance due to its separation from other parts of
    the species but nevertheless found that the decline of this sub-
    population would not jeopardize the survival or recovery of
    the species as a whole. 
    Id. at 529
    . Where trends in a sub-
    population may affect the entire population, the ESA requires
    the agency to consider the effects of the declining sub-
    population. 
    Id.
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                   21
    We also stressed the importance of analysis of the sub-
    regional impacts of agency actions in Gifford Pinchot. In that
    case, environmental groups objected to three Fish and
    Wildlife Service BiOps analyzing the effects of timber
    harvests on the Northern Spotted Owl, arguing that the BiOps
    did not sufficiently consider local impacts. Gifford Pinchot
    Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at 1075
    . We held the agency had
    adequately taken the local impacts into account. 
    Id.
     Far from
    suggesting that local impacts were irrelevant, we emphasized
    the importance of considering such impacts when they are
    relevant to the species or habitat as a whole. We stated,
    “[f]ocusing solely on a vast scale can mask multiple
    site-specific impacts that, when aggregated, do pose a
    significant risk to a species.” 
    Id.
     Plaintiffs’ contention that
    the agency should not have considered sub-regional declines
    of wDPS is fundamentally at odds with our holding in Gifford
    Pinchot.
    Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the agency did not
    establish any nexus between the two sub-regions in which
    there was population decline and the species as a whole to
    justify analysis based on sub-regions. Yet, agency findings
    in the BiOp and Recovery Plan provide a clear basis for the
    conclusion that sub-regional declines have a profound effect
    on the future of the entire species. The Plan explained that
    the wDPS’s viability depended on the maintenance of healthy
    populations in each of the seven sub-regions in order to
    prevent concentration in a smaller area where a single
    isolated destructive force could endanger the entire
    population. The Recovery Plan concluded that maintaining
    independently viable populations is vital because it ensures
    that the species will “persist through normal population
    variations, as well as through unexpected catastrophic
    events.” The Recovery Plan additionally stressed the
    22           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    importance of monitoring on a sub-regional basis because a
    declining sub-population could indicate an unpredicted threat
    to the species that could spread to other sub-regions. The
    Recovery Plan therefore established a goal of no more than
    50% decline in any single sub-region before the species could
    be delisted.
    The analysis of sub-regions in the BiOp yielded
    significant information that, in light of the Recovery Plan’s
    concerns, led to the conclusion that sub-regional declines
    indicated that the entire species was in jeopardy. The agency
    found that between 2001 and 2009, there had been a 7%
    decline in wDPS’s pup population in the central Aleutian
    Islands sub-region and a 43% decline in the western sub-
    region. These declines in two sub-regions explained the lack
    of a statistically significant increase in the overall wDPS
    population and led to the BiOp’s finding that if current
    declines in pup population were to continue, wDPS would be
    extirpated in these sub-regions. Such extirpation would
    render the Recovery Plan’s goals unattainable.
    The Recovery Plan thus set a goal of a stable population
    to be accomplished through sub-regional monitoring. The
    BiOp furnished the supporting statistical analysis, thereby
    establishing a nexus between population trends in the sub-
    regions and the health of the species as a whole. Therefore
    the agency was not arbitrary or capricious in relying on sub-
    regional declines to determine whether continued fishing
    would jeopardize the species as a whole or adversely modify
    its critical habitat.
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                    23
    B. The Agency Was Not Required to Utilize a
    Partially Discredited Regulatory Standard.
    Plaintiffs contend that the agency used the wrong
    definition of adverse habitat modification and should have
    applied its regulation stating that there is an adverse habitat
    modification where there is a “direct or indirect alteration that
    appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both
    the survival and recovery of a listed species.” 
    50 C.F.R. § 402.02
    .
    The agency did not apply the regulatory definition,
    however, because in Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at
    1069–72, we held that a portion of the regulation was invalid
    as contrary to the statutory language. NMFS stopped using
    the regulatory definition after our opinion in 2004 and began
    relying on the statute itself. As the agency explained in the
    BiOp, “NMFS does not rely on the regulatory definition of
    ‘destruction or adverse modification’ of critical habitat at 50
    CFR 402.02. Instead, we have relied upon the statutory
    provisions of the ESA to complete the analysis with respect
    to the critical habitat.” We have previously considered and
    specifically upheld an agency’s reliance on the statutory
    language of the ESA itself when faced with uncertainty about
    the vitality of the regulatory definition in light of Gifford
    Pinchot. See Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of
    Eng’rs., 
    620 F.3d 936
    , 947–48 (9th Cir. 2010). There is no
    reason to hold the agency should have gone back to the
    questionable regulation here. NMFS asked and answered the
    critical question under both the statute and the portion of the
    regulation that was not at issue in Gifford Pinchot: whether
    reauthorization of the fisheries would adversely modify the
    habitat.
    24           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    C. The Agency Properly Considered the Prospects for
    the Species’s Recovery in Determining Whether
    the wDPS Would be Jeopardized by Continued
    Fishing.
    Plaintiffs contend that the agency, in the BiOp and RPA,
    should not have considered the impact of the proposed action
    on the wDPS’s prospects of recovery, and instead should
    have focused exclusively on whether continued fishing would
    affirmatively harm the existing species and its likelihood of
    survival. Under the ESA, the agency must ensure against
    government action jeopardizing the continued existence of an
    endangered species or harming its habitat. 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    (a)(2). We have held that recovery considerations are
    an important component of both the jeopardy and adverse
    habitat modification determinations. See Gifford Pinchot
    Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at 1070
    ; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
    524 F.3d at
    931–33. The goal of the ESA is not just to ensure survival,
    but to ensure that the species recovers to the point that it can
    be delisted. Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 
    378 F.3d at 1070
    .
    Survival and recovery are intertwined and are the
    complementary goals of the consultation process. Id.; Nat’l
    Wildlife Fed’n, 
    524 F.3d at 932
    .
    NMFS therefore had to consider whether the proposed
    action, continued fishing, could prevent the species from
    achieving the Recovery Plan’s goals for delisting. That is
    what NMFS did. Relying on the Recovery Plan, the agency
    concluded that the fishery reauthorizations would appreciably
    diminish the wDPS’s chances of recovery as the fishery could
    fully extirpate the species in at least one sub-region. The
    agency found that “the extirpation of Steller sea lions in the
    western Aleutians would be significant to the western DPS,
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                 25
    and is expected to appreciably reduce the likelihood of both
    their survival and recovery in the wild.”
    D. Plaintiffs’ Specific Criticisms of the Agency’s
    Analysis Lack Support in the Record.
    Plaintiffs raise a number of criticisms with the agency’s
    analytical methodology, claiming each demonstrates the
    agency conclusions in the RPA lacked a rational basis. None
    of these criticisms is supported by the record.
    The first criticism is that the agency used forage
    ratios—the ratio of prey required by sea lions to available
    fish—to determine the areas in which fishing should be
    closed. The use of forage ratios would have been
    problematic, because such ratios were already higher in the
    areas that were to be affected by the RPA. The agency,
    however, did not rely on such ratios, finding that they were
    “very difficult to interpret.” The agency instead determined
    fishery closures and limitations based on actual population
    decline in two sub-regions.
    Plaintiffs’ second criticism is that the agency failed to
    account for the fact that restrictions on cod fishing could
    decrease the number of mackerel, since cod prey on
    mackerel, and mackerel are a food source for the wDPS. In
    essence, plaintiffs contend the agency should have used a
    “multi-species” model in its analysis. The agency, however,
    looked to studies that relied on multi-species models, which
    took into account this inter-species predation, and single-
    species models, which did not. The agency concluded that
    the multi-species models were theoretically more accurate but
    that they introduced more variables leading to uncertainty.
    Faced with competing interests of theoretical accuracy and
    26           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    analytical uncertainty, the agency made a rational choice.
    This court will not second guess the agency’s determination,
    which is supported by the record. See Ariz. Cattle Growers’
    Ass’n v. Salazar, 
    606 F.3d 1160
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Third, plaintiffs contend that the fact that the areas with
    more fishing have had slower wDPS growth does not show
    that further fishery restrictions can cause growth to increase.
    Yet, the agency did not point to the slower growth in fishing
    areas in order to establish causation, but instead used it as an
    illustrative example of the correlation between fishing and
    population decline. The plaintiffs nevertheless suggest that
    even if there is a correlation between increased fishing and
    slowing wDPS growth, there is no correlation between the
    authorization of increased fishing and slower wDPS growth.
    The agency, however, appropriately pointed to the correlation
    between areas with more fishing and slower wDPS
    population growth to illustrate its larger theory that the
    fisheries and the wDPS were in competition for the same
    prey.
    Plaintiffs’ final criticism is that the agency did not
    properly account for killer whale predation. The agency,
    however, considered the effect of killer whales, but did not
    find it strong enough to outweigh the effect of fishing. Citing
    a number of studies regarding killer whales, the agency
    specifically looked to the long-term historical trends and
    concluded that the studies “argue against the hypothesis that
    killer whale predation alone was responsible for the decline”
    in population.
    Plaintiffs’ specific criticisms of the RPA are therefore not
    well taken. They do not undermine the RPA’s analysis in any
    way.
    STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO                   27
    E. NMFS Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious in
    Concluding the Removal of Sea Lion Prey was an
    Indirect Effect of Fishery Reauthorization.
    Plaintiffs fault the agency denying the reauthorizations
    without finding that fisheries were the direct cause of wDPS
    nutritional stress. They point to the BiOp’s statement that the
    agency did not have the data to demonstrate the extent of
    nutritional stress or that such stress was caused by the
    fisheries.
    The agency was required to ensure that its actions would
    not have direct or indirect effects that would jeopardize the
    wDPS or adversely modify its critical habitat. 
    50 C.F.R. § 402.02
    . Applying its regulation, the agency indisputably
    found that the fisheries were removing prey species of the
    wDPS. It also found evidence of nutritional stress. While the
    agency admitted it could not find a direct link between the
    fisheries and the species’s decline, it found that the indirect
    effect of the fisheries was the removal of wDPS’s food. The
    agency was not required to find that the fisheries were the
    direct cause of the species’s decline.
    F. The District Court Did Not Need to Require a
    ROD In Its NEPA Injunction.
    The district court granted summary judgment to the
    plaintiffs on their claim that the agency violated NEPA by not
    issuing an EIS. The district court entered an injunction
    requiring the agency to prepare an EIS. On appeal, plaintiffs
    seek a broader injunction ordering the agency to also prepare
    a ROD. Plaintiffs argue that the ROD is necessary to ensure
    that the agency actually considers the information in the EIS.
    28           STATE OF ALASKA V. LUBCHENCO
    The problem is that because the agency has not yet
    prepared the EIS, we do not yet know what final action, if
    any, it will propose to take. An injunction ordering a ROD
    would be premature in the absence of the agency’s proposed
    action based on the EIS record it develops. 
    40 C.F.R. § 1505.2
    ; Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 
    586 F.3d 1109
    , 1140 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (requiring injunctions to be narrowly tailored).
    The district court did not err in refusing to order a ROD at
    this stage.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court’s order granting summary judgment to
    the defendants on the ESA claims and injunction on the
    NEPA claims are AFFIRMED.