Ramirez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration , 463 F. App'x 640 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 22 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIE RAMIREZ, No. 10-36166
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00684-KI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: GUY,*** McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Plaintiff Julie Ramirez appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial
of her application for social security disability benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act. The district court’s judgment is reviewed de novo, and the court “‘may
set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222
(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir. 1999). We affirm.
The ALJ concluded, after remand, that through the date last insured plaintiff
had a combination of impairments that was severe, including: fibromyalgia, asthma,
residuals of spinal surgery, obesity, sleep disorder, and depression. Taking the
impairments that were found to be severe and the resulting limitations, the ALJ
concluded that plaintiff had a residual functional capacity to perform light work,
except climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling were limited
to an occasional basis, with a “sit/stand option.” Also, plaintiff was capable of
understanding, remembering, and carrying out both simple and detailed tasks on a
sustained basis. The administrative record in this case, although lengthy, is not
disputed and the district court opinion has provided a chronology of the evidence that
need not be repeated. Further, the administrative record was not ambiguous or
inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the alleged disability from the onset date
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in October 2002 through the date last insured in December 2007. See Mayes v.
Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001).
First, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the medical opinion of JaNahn Scalapino,
M.D., regarding plaintiff’s claims of disabling bilateral hand impairment because it
was not supported by objective medical findings, was contradicted by the opinion of
Ronald Wolfson, M.D., and was inconsistent with the observations of psychological
examiner Michelle Whitehead, Ph.D. Likewise, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the
assessment of examining physician John Kofoed, M.D., who noted that there were no
objective factors of disability and only subjective factors of “slight intermittent
bilateral hand pain, occasionally becoming moderate with increased use.” The ALJ
provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs.
Scalapino and Kofoed concerning the alleged bilateral hand impairment. See Lester
v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, the ALJ’s assessment of
plaintiff’s physical impairments through the date last insured—including the
unchallenged adverse credibility determination—was supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1226-27; Batson v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
Second, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s conclusion that aggravation of plaintiff’s preexisting
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mood disorder arose in connection with the commission of the felony for which she
pleaded guilty. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1506; SSR 83-21. Evidence from plaintiff’s
treating physician, William Klas, M.D., reflected treatment for mood disorder as early
as March 2001, resolution in June 2001, and returning symptoms days after being
arrested in August 2001. In May 2002, plaintiff reported to Dr. Klas that she had
entered a guilty plea and had depression over the last nine months secondary to the
arrest and resulting threat of job loss. Moreover, even if the period of aggravation is
not disregarded, the ALJ did not err in finding that plaintiff’s mental impairment was
fairly well controlled by medication or in relying on the state agency’s assessment that
plaintiff’s psychological condition created only mild restriction of activities of daily
living, mild difficulties in social functioning, and no episodes of decomposition.
Finally, as the district court fully explained, the ALJ made adequate findings
regarding the transferability of skills from past relevant work as required by Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 82-41. Cf. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1223-25. Further, despite the
ALJ’s lack of explanation for not relying on the testimony of the unavailable
vocational expert from the first hearing, the ALJ properly relied on the vocational
expert’s testimony at the second hearing concerning plaintiff’s past relevant work, the
transferability of skills to the semiskilled position of “information clerk,” and her
ability to perform unskilled work as an “interviewer.” Nor did the vocational expert’s
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testimony about “basic interviewing skills” create a conflict the resolution of which
was required to support the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff could perform alternate
work. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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