Janetra Johnson v. Departement of the Army and Ai , 465 F. App'x 644 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JAN 06 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JANETRA JOHNSON,                                 No. 10-16450
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00281-LJO-DLB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND
    AIR FORCE; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 19, 2011 **
    Before:        GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    Janetra Johnson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    her action arising out of her dual status military and civilian employment with the
    National Guard and the United States Air Force Reserve. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo both a district court’s dismissal under
    the Feres intra-military immunity doctrine, Jackson v. United States, 
    110 F.3d 1484
    , 1486 (9th Cir. 1997), and a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Webb v.
    Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 
    499 F.3d 1078
    , 1082 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
    The district properly dismissed Johnson’s employment discrimination and
    tort claims as precluded by the Feres intra-military immunity doctrine. See Zuress
    v. Donley, 
    606 F.3d 1249
    , 1250, 1252-55 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that Feres
    doctrine applies “whenever a legal action would require a civilian court to examine
    decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of members
    of the armed forces of the United States[,]” and affirming that Feres doctrine
    precluded dual status military and civilian employee’s Title VII claims (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted)); Stauber v. Cline, 
    837 F.2d 395
    , 399-401
    (9th Cir. 1988) (Feres doctrine precluded dual status military and civilian
    employee’s common law tort claims arising from workplace conduct); see also
    Jackson, 
    110 F.3d at 1489
     (“Feres bars suits for medical malpractice even when
    the treatment was not for military-related injuries.”).
    The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims under the Health
    Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and the Family and
    Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) because Johnson did not have a private right of
    2                                     10-16450
    action. See Webb, 
    499 F.3d at 1082
     (“HIPAA . . . does not provide for a private
    right of action[.]”); Russell v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
    191 F.3d 1016
    , 1018-19 (9th
    Cir. 1999) (no private right of action under the FMLA for federal employees with
    more than twelve months of service).
    The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Johnson’s
    Rehabilitation Act claim and her Privacy Act claim arising from the alleged
    disclosure of her medical information. See 
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1
    (establishing two year statute of limitation for personal injury claims); Douglas v.
    Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 
    271 F.3d 812
    , 823 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (forum state’s
    statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to Rehabilitation Act claim),
    abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
     (2002); Rose v. United States, 
    905 F.2d 1257
    , 1259 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The
    Privacy Act provides a two year statute of limitation, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5), which
    commences when the person knows or has reason to know of the alleged
    violation.”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Johnson’s third
    amended complaint without leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 
    627 F.3d 1092
    , 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and noting that
    leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).
    3                                     10-16450
    Johnson’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    Johnson’s request to file a late supplemental excerpts of record is granted.
    Defendants’ motion to strike those portions of Johnson’s supplemental
    excerpts of record that were not part of the district court record is granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                     10-16450