Krishna Reddy v. Cbay Systems Holdings, Ltd. ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 31 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISHNA REDDY, No. 13-16658
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:12-cv-01324-PSG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CBAY SYSTEMS HOLDINGS, LTD.; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Paul S. Grewal, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 22, 2014***
Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Krishna Reddy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her employment action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
dismissal for failure to serve, Oyama v. Sheehan (In re Sheehan), 253 F.3d 507,
511 (9th Cir. 2001), and de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Reddy’s action
against the individual defendants because Reddy failed to serve them properly, and
failed to establish good cause for the lack of service when the court gave her notice
and an opportunity to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (district court may sua
sponte dismiss an action for failure to serve “after notice to the plaintiff”); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (requirements for proper service on an individual); In re Sheehan,
253 F.3d at 511 (good cause showing to extend time to effect proper service).
The district court properly dismissed Reddy’s action against the remaining
defendants as precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because Reddy alleged
nearly identical claims related to the same employment relationship against these
defendants, or parties with whom they are in privity, in two prior actions in which
there were final judgment on the merits. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d
953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of res judicata, and noting that
it bars subsequent litigation of claims that were raised and that could have been
raised in the prior action); United States v. Schimmels (In re Schimmels), 127 F.3d
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875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (privity exists for purposes of res judicata where the
interests of a non-party were represented adequately by a party in the original suit).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declaring Reddy a vexatious
litigant after giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard, developing an
adequate record, making findings regarding her previous frivolous actions against
these and other parties, and narrowly tailoring the pre-filing order. See Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(setting forth standard of review and factors that district courts must examine
before entering a pre-filing review order against a vexatious litigant).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Reddy’s motion for
disqualification because Reddy failed to establish grounds for such relief, and by
denying as moot Reddy’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis because Reddy
already paid the filing fee. See Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995)
(setting forth standard of review and factors warranting judicial disqualification
under 28 U.S.C. § 455); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990)
(setting forth standard of review from the denial of an application to proceed in
forma pauperis); Lipscomb v. Madigan, 221 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955) (dismissing
as moot an appeal from the denial of an application to proceed in forma pauperis
because appellant subsequently paid the filing fee).
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We reject Reddy’s contentions regarding the district court’s allegedly
erroneous grant of defendants’ motion for judicial notice and denial of her motion
for default judgment; the recusal of all “Republican President-nominated” judges
on this court; and the reassignment of this case to a different district court judge.
Reddy’s request for an order requiring defendants to pay the filing fees we
waived for her appeal, set forth in her opening and reply briefs, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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