United States v. Ruben Ramirez-Ventura , 484 F. App'x 146 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUN 12 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-30122
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00055-RSL-4
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    RUBEN RAMIREZ-VENTURA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 7, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,
    District Judge.**
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for
    the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
    Defendant Ruben Ramirez-Ventura appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
    distribute cocaine, challenging the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, United States v.
    Jones, 
    286 F.3d 1146
    , 1150 (9th Cir. 2002), and review a district court’s factual
    findings for clear error. United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 
    510 F.3d 1083
    , 1087 (9th
    Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See United
    States v. Miller, 
    822 F.2d 828
    , 833 (9th Cir. 1987).
    All parties agree that, because Ramirez was speeding, the troopers had an
    independent valid basis to conduct a pretextual traffic stop, see Whren v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 812-13 (1996), and that the troopers could ask questions
    unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, so long as the questioning did “not
    prolong an initially lawful stop.” United States v. Turvin, 
    517 F.3d 1097
    , 1100
    (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, the troopers could
    prolong the traffic stop if they had reasonable suspicion to justify their questioning.
    United States v. Mendez, 
    476 F.3d 1077
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2007).
    The “collective knowledge” doctrine should have been applied in this case.
    This doctrine “allows courts to impute police officers’ collective knowledge to the
    officer conducting a stop, search, or arrest.” See United States v. Villasenor, 608
    
    2 F.3d 467
    , 475 (9th Cir. 2010). Where one officer knows facts constituting
    reasonable suspicion, “and he communicates an appropriate order or request,
    another officer may conduct a warrantless stop” without having been told the facts
    justifying the suspicion. See United States v. Ramirez, 
    473 F.3d 1026
    , 1036-37
    (9th Cir. 2007). Because the DEA communicated with the Oregon troopers, the
    doctrine applies to “aggregate the facts known to each of the officers involved,”
    regardless of whether the information giving rise to probable cause was actually
    communicated to the troopers. 
    Id. at 1032
    ; see also United States v. Sutton, 
    794 F.2d 1415
    , 1426 (9th Cir. 1986).
    Applying the collective knowledge doctrine, the DEA and troopers had
    knowledge that: (1) in a previous investigation, an informant had reported that his
    “boss,” later identified as Ramirez, drove a tan Chevy Tahoe that had a secret
    compartment in its seat for drugs; (2) Ramirez met with an informant before and
    after a drug transaction with an undercover officer; (3) Ramirez was seen driving
    to the same spot as another cocaine distributor (and informant) drove to meet his
    supplier; (4) Ramirez and his co-defendant drove the Tahoe from Washington to
    California, met briefly with a man at a hotel, and were seen leaving the hotel with
    packages in hand traveling back to Washington; and (5) the troopers were faced
    with an “overwhelming scent of air freshener” emanating from the Tahoe. These
    3
    facts, taken together, easily establish reasonable suspicion to prolong Ramirez’s
    detention for further investigation.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    4