United States v. Miguel Martinez , 484 F. App'x 177 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                 JUN 15 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-10489
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 4:08-cr-00878-JMR-
    JCG-8
    v.
    MIGUEL E. MARTINEZ, AKA Indio,                   MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 12, 2012**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    The district court did not plainly err in denying Martinez’s motion for a new
    trial because the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument did not constitute
    impermissible vouching: they neither bolstered the credibility of a government
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    witness nor suggested that there was additional evidence the jury was not being
    shown. See United States v. Hermanek, 
    289 F.3d 1076
    , 1098 (9th Cir. 2002). The
    prosecutor’s “we know” statements did not depict the prosecutor as part of the
    investigatory team but rather were a rhetorical device used to summarize the
    evidence and describe permissible inferences. See 
    id.
     Moreover, given the
    overwhelming evidence of guilt, there is no reason to think that these claimed
    improprieties “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings, or . . . would result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States
    v. Geston, 
    299 F.3d 1130
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Tanh Huu
    Lam, 
    251 F.3d 852
    , 861 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The district court did not clearly err in determining that Martinez was
    responsible for more than 10,000 kilograms of marijuana. Assuming that the
    relevant drug quantity had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, see
    United States v. Lynch, 
    437 F.3d 902
    , 916 (9th Cir. 2006), the government met its
    burden providing, among other things, the testimony of Martinez’s co-conspirators,
    given under oath and pursuant to a plea agreement, see United States v. Alvarez,
    
    358 F.3d 1194
    , 1213 (9th Cir. 2004), that Martinez was the primary supplier of an
    operation that transported approximately that amount of marijuana over a six-year
    period. See United States v. Culps, 
    300 F.3d 1069
    , 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).
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    Moreover, any error in approximation was harmless because a calculation error had
    mistakenly given Martinez a base offense level of 40 instead of 43; even if we
    were to hold that the evidence did not support 10,000 kg of marijuana, on remand
    the properly calculated base offense level would be no lower than 41. See United
    States v. Ali, 
    620 F.3d 1062
    , 1074 (9th Cir. 2010).
    The district court did not clearly err in applying a sentencing enhancement
    for possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug offense. The district
    court could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm with a unique
    canister discovered at Martinez’s home was the same firearm used in connection
    with the conspiracy. Moreover, the record established that Martinez had
    supervisory responsibility over the armed individuals protecting his drug loads,
    and thus had constructive possession of those firearms. See United States v.
    Cazares, 
    121 F.3d 1241
    , 1245 (9th Cir. 1997).
    Finally, the district court did not clearly err in applying an enhancement for
    reckless endangerment based on the high-speed car chase. Even assuming that a
    nexus is required between the reckless endangerment and the crime of conviction,
    see United States v. Duran, 
    37 F.3d 557
    , 559–60 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on
    other grounds by Tapia v. United States, 
    131 S. Ct. 2382
     (2011), the evidence was
    overwhelming that Martinez’s flight in the Dodge Ram was connected to his role
    3
    in the drug conspiracy because he was fleeing with a shoe box containing
    thousands of dollars in drug proceeds.
    AFFIRMED.
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