Stephen Greel v. Michael Martel , 472 F. App'x 503 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN W. GREEL, No. 10-16847
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:08-cv-04474-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL MARTEL, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia A. Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2012 **
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN, District
Judge***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein, Senior United States District
Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
Stephen Greel appeals an order from the district court denying his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that the trial court improperly admitted
propensity and other prejudicial evidence and that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of kidnapping to commit rape, both alleged errors in violation of his
due process rights. A court reviewing a habeas petition considers the last reasoned
opinion of the state court, in this case that of the California Court of Appeal. See
Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. The facts of this case are known to the
parties. We need not repeat them here.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a writ of habeas
corpus and may affirm the judgment on any ground supported in the record.
Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Greel
filed his petition after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies. See Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797 (9th
Cir. 2011). Under AEDPA, a reviewing court considers whether the state court’s
adjudication of a claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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Ninth Circuit precedent “squarely forecloses [the] argument” that admission
of evidence of sexual misconduct to show propensity violates due process. See
Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008). Greel is unable to identify
Supreme Court case law clearly establishing this principle such that would justify
issuing the writ.
There is likewise no clearly established federal law that admitting prejudicial
evidence violates due process. See Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101
(9th Cir. 2009). Greel argues that we should infer this specific protection for
criminal defendants from the Supreme Court’s cases holding that errors that
undermine the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial justify granting the writ.
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000); Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 70 (1991). But “[u]nder AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of
evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of
federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as
laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)). The Supreme Court has made no such ruling with regard to prejudicial
evidence, id., and thus we may not issue the writ.
We construe the briefed but uncertified claim that insufficient evidence
supports Greel’s conviction of kidnapping to commit rape as a motion to expand
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the certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R.
22–1(e).
AFFIRMED.
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