Tyreece Reynolds v. A. Hedgpeth ( 2012 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 28 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
TYREECE REYNOLDS, No. 08-56935
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00905-VAP-AN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
A. HEDGPETH, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
TYREECE REYNOLDS, No. 09-55409
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:08-cv-00905-VAP-AN
v.
A. HEDGPETH, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge
Arthur Nakazato, Magistrate Judge
Argued and Submitted May 2, 2011
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Tyreece Reynolds (“Reynolds”), a California state
prisoner, appeals the district court’s holding that his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A). The court found that Reynolds’ 200-day delay between his first
and second state habeas filings, and Reynolds’ 86-day delay between his second
and third state habeas filings were unreasonable. The court therefore found that
Reynolds was not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-
year statute of limitations for the time periods between his state court filings. See
id. § 2244(d)(2); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 738 (Cal. 1993) (“It has long been
required that a petitioner explain and justify any significant delay in seeking
habeas corpus relief.”). We vacate and remand.
1. The court did not afford Reynolds adequate notice and the opportunity to
explain his 86-day delay in filing his third state habeas petition.
It is a “well-established principle that a person is entitled to notice before
adverse judicial action is taken against him.” Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039,
1043 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2000))
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(emphasis in original). A court has the authority to sua sponte raise the issue of a
federal habeas petition’s timeliness under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations,
but “that authority should only be exercised after the court provides the petitioner
with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hen
dealing with a pro se petitioner, the court must make clear the [grounds for
dismissal] and the consequences for failing to respond.” Id. (quoting Boyd v.
Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Reynolds, a pro se litigant during the § 2254 proceedings,1 was misled by
the magistrate court’s Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) because it did not refer to the
86-day delay between Reynolds’ filing of his second and third state habeas
petitions; it referred only to the 200-day delay between his first and second state
habeas filings. The OSC stated that, unless there was a reasonable explanation,
Reynolds was not entitled “to statutory tolling for the unexplained and unjustified
200 day (over six months) delay.” Accordingly, there was no reason for Reynolds
to believe that he was expected to explain the 86-day delay, because such an
explanation was never requested of him. Because the OSC’s sole focus was on
1
Reynolds was pro se during his state and federal district court habeas
proceedings, but is represented on appeal by court-appointed counsel, R. Shanti
Brien.
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examining the 200-day delay, Reynolds justifiably believed it was not necessary
for him to explain the 86-day delay.
As a result, there is an unresolved factual dispute regarding if and when
Reynolds was denied access to the prison library. When, as here, there is an
unresolved factual dispute because a habeas petitioner did not have adequate notice
and an opportunity to respond, remand is appropriate. Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1044(“[T]he district court is in a better position to develop the facts and assess their
legal significance in the first instance . . . . [Thus,] the best course is to remand to
the district court for appropriate development of the record.” (quoting
Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
2. The court exercised its discretion improperly by taking judicial notice of
facts contained in prison library records, and by failing to give Reynolds notice of
and the opportunity to respond to the court’s intention to use that factual
information as the basis for dismissing Reynolds’ habeas petition.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “a court may take judicial notice of
‘matters of public record.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)).
In addition, a court only has authority to take judicial notice of facts “not subject to
4
reasonable dispute in that [they are] either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-90.
Reynolds first realized there was an issue with the 86-day delay when the
court dismissed Reynolds’ § 2254 habeas claim as untimely. Reynolds then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s dismissal. While considering Reynolds’
motion, the magistrate judge became suspicious of the authenticity of the library
access request and denial forms Reynolds submitted. Because of his suspicions,
the magistrate judge asked his courtroom deputy clerk to contact the Kern Valley
State Prison to obtain information and records from the prison law library pertinent
to determining whether Reynolds in fact had access to the library or legal materials
during the time periods in question. In response to the magistrate judges’s deputy
clerk’s request, the prison’s litigation coordinator sent prison library records to the
court, including library sign-in sheets purportedly showing when prisoners had
access to the library. The court did not notify Reynolds or the state Attorney
General’s office that it required more information before making a decision on the
Motion for Reconsideration. Moreover, the court did not request additional
briefing or hold an evidentiary hearing.
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Instead, the district court considered the unauthenticated, unexplained prison
library records and determined that the new information obtained from the prison
litigation coordinator discredited Reynolds’ contrary evidence. Citing Smith v.
Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that it had authority
to “take judicial notice of [] relevant state records in federal habeas proceedings,”
the court found that it had authority to take judicial notice of the prison library
records.2 The court then denied Reynolds’ Motion for Reconsideration based on
the prison library records the court obtained from the prison litigation coordinator.
The court abused its discretion as follows.
First, the court abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of
documents that had not been “made publicly available by [a] government entit[y],”
Daniels-Hall v. Nat. Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of
public record.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quoting Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798
2
We note that, contrary to the court’s conclusion, Smith v. Duncan does not
stand for the proposition that a court can take judicial notice of “all relevant state
records.” Rather, in Smith v. Duncan we recognized courts’ authority to take
judicial notice of “relevant state court documents” – in that particular case, the
dates on which previous state habeas petitions had been publicly filed in state
court. 297 F.3d at 815 (emphasis added). There is no indication, nor does the state
argue, that the prison library records are the equivalent of a publicly filed court
document.
6
F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added). The library records obtained
from the prison litigation coordinator, which included such information as dates
when Reynolds was given library access or was provided with requested legal
materials, appear to be internal documents accessible only to prison personnel.
The records were therefore not judicially noticeable, even though they were
maintained by a public entity. See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,
908-09 (9th Cir. 2003); 21B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 5106.1 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that “the requirement that the source provide a
‘ready determination’” means that “the source must be ‘readily accessible’”); id.
(“[I]f citizens who wanted to check up on the court had to convince some
bureaucrat to let them rummage through his files, the fact should not be noticed.”).
Second, even if the prison library records could be considered “matters of
public record,” the court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of facts
subject to reasonable dispute. Judicial notice extends only to facts that are “not
subject to reasonable dispute” because they are either (a) “generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or (b) “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Here, information about when the library was
open and closed and when Reynolds was able to use the library’s services are not
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“generally known” facts. Nor are the facts that the court derived from the library
records “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” They are handwritten records that
require interpretation before their meaning can be discerned. See 21B Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.1 (2d ed. 2011) (“If the source can
only be used through an intermediary such as an expert witness or an interpreter,
the court does not really rely on the source but on the intermediary.”). The
handwritten library records also are not “sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Such records are very likely to contain errors.
Finally, rather than test the validity of the information in the prison library
records in an adversarial proceeding in which Reynolds could challenge the
records, the court decided, without the benefit of the parties’ arguments, that
Reynolds’ evidence was not to be accorded any weight. By failing to provide
Reynolds with notice that the court intended to deny the Motion for
Reconsideration based on the newly obtained prison library records, and by failing
to give Reynolds an opportunity to respond to that evidence, the court deprived
Reynolds of his right to request an “opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of
taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(e).
***
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For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the court’s order dismissing
Reynolds’ federal habeas petition as untimely and REMAND for an evidentiary
hearing to determine if, and to what extent, Reynolds’ access to the prison library
was limited, and if, as a result of limited access, he was entitled to statutory tolling
or equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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