J.W. v. Governing Board of East Whittier City School District , 473 F. App'x 531 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 28 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J.W., by and through K.K.W. Guardian Ad No. 10-56356
Litem K.K.W. and W.W.; et al.,
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-02525-ODW-SS
Plaintiffs-counter-defendants
- Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
GOVERNING BOARD OF EAST
WHITTIER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
and EAST WHITTIER CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants-counter-claimants
- Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, WARDLAW, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
J.W. appeals the district court’s affirmance of a California Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision regarding his complaint under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA,” or “the Act”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and we affirm. Because the parties are
familiar with the factual and legal history of the case, we need not recount it here.
I
The district court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the ALJ’s witness
credibility and weight determinations. As the trier of fact, the ALJ is in the best
position to assess witness credibility and the appropriate weight of testimony.
Therefore, “a finder of fact’s determination of credibility receives deference on
appeal, because access to live testimony is important to the credibility finding.”
Ms. S. ex rel. G. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003),
superseded on other grounds by 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). “[C]redibility-based
findings [of the ALJ] deserve deference unless non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence
in the record would justify a contrary conclusion or unless the record read in its
entirety would compel a contrary conclusion.” Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v.
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting and then
adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning).
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The record does not compel the conclusion that the ALJ erred. In fact, the
ALJ analyzed credibility and weighed the evidence in a lengthy and thoughtful
decision. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s
conclusions. Given the deferential standard of review, the district court did not err
in affirming the ALJ.
II
The district court properly concluded that the school district did not commit
a procedural IDEA violation that deprived J.W. of a Free and Appropriate Public
Education (“FAFE”). A procedural violation constitutes a denial of FAPE if the
inadequacy (1) resulted in the student losing educational opportunity; (2)
significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision making
process; or (3) caused a deprivation of educational benefits. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1992).
J.W. claims that he was denied a FAPE when the District’s Director of
Special Education conversed with a third-party speech provider after J.W.’s
individualized education program (“IEP”) team meeting. The District had to make
a written IEP offer after J.W.’s parents and the District staff disagreed at the IEP
meeting. In preparing this offer, the Director sought clarification from the speech
provider regarding one speech goal on which there had been discussion, but no
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agreement, at the meeting. The ALJ found that “the District’s modification of [the
goal] arose directly out of the IEP meeting, and another IEP meeting was not
required.” She also found that the goal alteration was “minor.” Thus, the ALJ
found that the conversation at issue did not “significantly deprive [J.W.’s] [p]arents
of meaningful participation in the IEP process . . . .” The record supports this
conclusion, and the district court did not err in declining to grant relief.
III
The district did not err in concluding that the school district had complied
with the substantive requirements of the IDEA. The record supports the
conclusion that the school district provided an IEP that is “developed through the
Act’s procedures [and] reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982); see also
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), 1401(14), 1414(d); Seattle School District, No.1 v. B.S., 82
F.3d 1493, 1498-99 (9th Cir. 1996)).
The IDEA does not require that a district “maximize the potential of each
handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped
children.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. Rather, the Act requires that districts offer “a
basic floor of opportunity, [that is,] access to specialized instruction and related
services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the
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handicapped child.” Id. at 201. Additionally, the IDEA requires that school
districts offer placements in the “least restrictive environment” available to meet a
student’s unique needs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also Sacramento City
Unified School Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting
test to determine appropriate level of “mainstreaming”). The district court did not
err in determining that the IEP satisfied these requirements. J.W.’s IEP contained
an adequate statement of his present levels of academic achievement and functional
performance, articulated measurable goals, and was reasonably calculated to
provide an educational benefit in the least restrictive environment.
AFFIRMED.
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