United States v. Mark Neal ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              MAY 23 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-50003
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00752-JFW-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MARK ANTHONY NEAL, AKA Dwight
    Anthony Alvarez, AKA Anthony Kent
    Jay, AKA Anthony Joy, AKA Anthony
    Kent Joy, AKA Anthony Mark Neal, AKA
    Michael Anthony Pollard,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 2, 2011
    Pasadena, California
    Before: REINHARDT and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, District
    Judge.**
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for Northern Illinois, sitting by designation.
    Mark Anthony Neal appeals his conviction and sentence for unlawful
    reentry after deportation in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    , arguing that the district
    court abused its discretion by rejecting his guilty plea, thereby subjecting him to a
    higher sentence. Because the district court’s basis for rejecting Neal’s plea is not
    entirely clear from the record and may well have been erroneous, we vacate the
    rejection of his plea and remand with directions to hold a new plea hearing.
    1. It is probable that the district court rejected Neal’s guilty plea because it
    believed that Neal’s refusal to affirmatively admit alienage necessarily fatally
    undermined the plea’s factual basis. Such a ground for rejecting the plea would
    constitute error. A court “may conclude that a factual basis exists from anything
    that appears on the record.” United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 
    588 F.3d 677
    , 682
    (9th Cir. 2009). Where a defendant is unable or unwilling to admit an element of
    the crime, “the court must look to other evidence in the record to determine
    whether the plea has a factual basis.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    2. It is also possible that the district court found that the plea lacked factual
    basis on the record before it. Such a conclusion would have been an abuse of
    discretion. As Neal specifically noted during the plea colloquy, the government
    had a copy of Neal’s Belizean birth certificate, which would have established
    2
    alienage. Indeed, it was that birth certificate that was used at the ensuing trial to
    establish alienage.
    3. Finally, it is possible that the district court believed it had discretion to
    reject an Alford plea—a plea by a defendant who maintains his innocence—despite
    there being an adequate factual basis for a guilty plea. North Carolina v. Alford,
    
    400 U.S. 25
    , 36 (1970).
    First, it may well be that Neal’s plea was not an Alford plea. He was not
    maintaining his innocence but, instead, saying that he could not attest to his guilt,
    for lack of knowledge.
    Second, a conflict exists in our case law regarding whether district courts in
    fact have such discretion regarding Alford pleas. Compare United States v.
    O’Brien, 
    601 F.2d 1067
    , 1069 (9th Cir. 1979), with In re Vasquez-Ramirez, 
    443 F.3d 692
    , 695 (9th Cir. 2006). We need not resolve this conflict in the present
    case, because it is not clear that the district court in fact believed that Neal’s was an
    Alford plea, or that it was exercising its discretion to refuse such a plea. See
    Mancinas-Flores, 
    588 F.3d at 682
    . Moreover, even if the district court rejected the
    plea on discretionary grounds because it viewed it as an Alford plea, no valid
    reasons for a discretionary rejection appear on the present record. Without such an
    3
    explanation, we cannot review for abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Carty,
    
    520 F.3d 984
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s rejection of Neal’s plea and
    REMAND for a new plea hearing, with instructions that the district court allow
    Neal to offer his plea under the terms of the original plea agreement. See
    Mancinas-Flores, 
    588 F.3d at 688
    . The district court must either accept the plea
    pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) or clearly state proper reasons for rejecting it.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-50003

Judges: Reinhardt, Berzon, Kennelly

Filed Date: 5/23/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024