Christine Johnson v. Michael Astrue , 473 F. App'x 799 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 14 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE JOHNSON, No. 11-15276
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01509-PMP-
PAL
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2012 **
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, N.R. SMITH and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Real-party-in-interest Richard E. Donaldson appeals the district court’s order
granting a reduced attorney’s fees award after he successfully represented Christine
Johnson in her claim for Social Security benefits. We have jurisdiction over this
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s award of
attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142,
1146–47 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Having reviewed the record and the parties’
briefs on appeal, we vacate the district court’s fee award and remand.
District courts are authorized to order payment of “a reasonable fee for . . .
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of past-due benefits”
following successful representation of Social Security benefit claimants. 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1)(A). When awarding fees, district courts are to look first to the
contingent-fee agreement, and then independently “review for reasonableness [the]
fees yielded by those agreements.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808–09
(2002) (directing lower courts to consider “the character of the representation and
the results the representative achieved” when reviewing for reasonableness).
Pursuant to the express terms of his contingent-fee agreement, Donaldson
was entitled to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to Johnson and her children.
The district court reduced the requested fee award below this amount, but did not
provide an explanation. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (the district court must
provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). As such, we are unable to engage in a meaningful
review of either the basis for the award or the award itself. See Tutor-Saliba Corp.
v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (without reasoning to
support fee award, “it is simply not possible for this court to review [the] award in
a meaningful manner.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The total past-
due benefits paid to Johnson and her children is $205,502.50. But the amount the
district court awarded to Donaldson ($34,263.12) is 25 percent of the past-due
benefits paid to Johnson only (25 percent of $137,052.50 is $34,263.12). We infer
that the district court excluded the children’s awards ($68,450) from the fee
calculation. We see no basis in the record for doing so. Accordingly, we vacate
the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand this case to the district
court for reassessment of an appropriate fee.
VACATED and REMANDED.