Lopez v. Madera County Department of Corrections ( 2012 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 15 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    OMAR MIRAMONTES LOPEZ,                           No. 10-56689
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:10-cv-06399-UA-OP
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MADERA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Audrey B. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 8, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before: THOMAS, WARDLAW, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Omar Lopez brought § 1983 claims against five
    individual unnamed defendants at the Madera County Department of Corrections
    (collectively, “MCDC”), alleging that MCDC violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
    Amendment rights by serving him rotten food and by delaying treatment for his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    deteriorating eye condition. The district court denied Lopez leave to file without
    prepayment of the full filing fee, on the ground that Lopez’s complaint failed to
    state a claim on which relief could be granted. We vacate, reverse, and remand.
    1. Although the magistrate’s recommendation states that Lopez “requested
    leave to proceed in forma pauperis,” the record does not indicate that Lopez ever
    made such a request. We therefore vacate the district court’s order denying Lopez
    leave to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.
    2. The district court may have intended to dismiss Lopez’s complaint,
    pursuant to mandatory screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
    (“PLRA”), for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. So construing the
    district court’s denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see O’Neal v. Price,
    
    531 F.3d 1146
    , 1153 (9th Cir. 2008), we conclude that the court erred in
    dismissing the complaint.
    Lopez’s complaint, as it now stands, may satisfy the relaxed pleading
    standards applied to pro se plaintiffs. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 342 & n.7
    (9th Cir. 2010). But even if it does not, the district court should have granted
    Lopez leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 
    203 F.3d 1122
    , 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000)
    (en banc).
    2
    Lopez may well be able to cure the complaint’s deficiencies by alleging
    additional facts. Lopez could, for example, amend his complaint to clarify: (1)
    which MCDC staff members he informed of his toxoplasmosis diagnosis and need
    for surgery; and (2) whether any defendants either acquiesced or were directly
    involved in the alleged provision of rotten food. With such amendments, the
    complaint would most likely render Lopez’s allegations adequate to support his
    constitutional claims. See Jett v. Penner, 
    439 F.3d 1091
    , 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir.
    2006) (holding that a prison physician’s months-long delay in scheduling a medical
    consultation ordered by the prisoner’s prior physician could constitute deliberate
    indifference, where the record showed that the delay was harmful); Keenan v. Hall,
    
    83 F.3d 1083
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the provision of spoiled food
    violates the Eighth Amendment); see also Snow v. McDaniel, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-
    16951, 
    2012 WL 1889774
    , at *8 (9th Cir. May 25, 2012) (holding that a prison
    warden and associate warden could be held liable for deliberate indifference to a
    prisoner’s medical needs, “[b]ecause they were aware [the prisoner] needed
    surgery and failed to act to prevent further harm”). We therefore reverse the
    dismissal of Lopez’s complaint.
    3. MCDC argues that Lopez’s complaint is time-barred. Because the
    district court did not address MCDC’s fact-bound statute of limitations defense, we
    3
    decline to reach it here. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    403 F.3d 683
    , 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
    4. Lopez concedes that the Central District of California is an improper
    venue. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (b). On remand, the district court should consider
    whether to transfer the case pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1406
    (a).
    VACATED, REVERSED, and REMANDED.
    4