Richard Pruitt v. Jackie Crawford , 475 F. App'x 102 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD HOLLEN PRUITT, No. 09-17163
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00685-RLH-
VPC
v.
JACKIE CRAWFORD; DON HELLING; MEMORANDUM *
BRIAN SANDOVAL,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 13, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Richard Hollen Pruitt appeals from the denial of his habeas
petition on the merits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
We review the denial of Pruitt’s habeas petition de novo. Brown v. Horell,
644 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2011). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”) governs this matter. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322
(1997). We cannot grant federal habeas relief absent a showing that the Nevada
Supreme Court’s denial of Pruitt’s claims (1) was contrary to clearly established
Supreme Court case law, (2) involved an unreasonable application of that law or
(3) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record
before the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Pruitt has failed to establish such an error.
The Nevada Supreme Court did not contravene clearly established Supreme
Court case law when it upheld the exclusion of the victim’s prior sexual activity as
harassing. Cf. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (noting trial judges
retain wide latitude to limit a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness
based on harassment). In addition, the victim’s sexual experiences with her
boyfriend post-dated both the first incident of sexual abuse involving Pruitt and the
victim’s first report of abuse to a girl her age. The chronology of these events
diminishes the relevance of the victim’s prior sexual experiences to Pruitt’s claims
of retaliation and to Pruitt’s theory that the victim gained sexual knowledge from a
source other than him.
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Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply the
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Counsel’s decision not to
interview three people on a 44-person list of those who knew the victim and Pruitt,
where neither Pruitt nor counsel knew that these three people had relevant
information before trial, was not outside “the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689.
Finally, we deny Pruitt’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability.
Pruitt has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and has not “‘demonstrate[d] that the issues are debatable
among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different
manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.’” Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). We dismiss Pruitt’s uncertified claim
that counsel inadequately opposed the admission of prior bad acts evidence for lack
of jurisdiction. Doe, 508 F.3d at 569.
AFFIRMED.
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