Emerenciana Peter-Palican v. Government of the Commonwealth ( 2012 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EMERENCIANA PETER-PALICAN,             
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    GOVERNMENT OF THE                           No. 10-17153
    COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN
    MARIANA ISLANDS; BENIGNO R.                   D.C. No.
    1:07-cv-00022
    FITIAL, Governor of the
    OPINION
    Commonwealth of the Northern
    Mariana Islands, in his official
    capacity,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands
    John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued February 16, 2012
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Submission Deferred March 12, 2012
    Resubmitted August 15, 2012
    Filed August 22, 2012
    Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Stephen S. Trott, and
    Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Trott
    9607
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS          9609
    COUNSEL
    Gilbert J. Birnbirch, Office of the Attorney General, Saipan,
    MP, for the defendants-appellants.
    Douglas F. Cushnie, Saipan, MP, for the plaintiff-appellee.
    OPINION
    TROTT, Circuit Judge:
    The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and
    Governor Benigno R. Fitial (collectively, “the Common-
    wealth”) appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of plain-
    tiff Emerenciana Peter-Palican. Peter-Palican alleges that she
    was terminated without cause from her position as Special
    Assistant to the Governor for Women’s Affairs in violation of
    Article III, section 22 of the Commonwealth Constitution.
    The district court agreed, determining that Peter-Palican had
    a property interest in continued employment as the Special
    Assistant and was terminated without due process by the
    incoming governor.
    Because the resolution of this case requires an interpreta-
    tion of the Commonwealth Constitution, we certified ques-
    tions to the Commonwealth Supreme Court and have now
    received its answer. Based on the meaning of Article III, sec-
    tion 22 as determined by the final arbiter of Commonwealth
    law, we hold that Peter-Palican did not have a protected inter-
    est in continued employment beyond the term of the governor
    who appointed her. Therefore, her termination without cause
    did not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court’s
    judgment cannot stand.
    I
    The relevant facts of this case are set forth in our certifica-
    tion order, Peter-Palican v. Government of Northern Mariana
    9610       PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    Islands, 
    673 F.3d 1013
    (9th Cir. 2012). In brief, Peter-Palican
    was appointed as Special Assistant to the Governor for
    Women’s Affairs in April 2002 by then-Governor Juan
    Babauta. 
    Id. at 1015. Governor
    Fitial defeated Babauta in the
    2005 gubernatorial race, and shortly thereafter Acting Gover-
    nor Timothy Villagomez informed Peter-Palican that her
    employment had ended upon the change in administration and
    asked her to leave; there was no allegation that Peter-Palican
    had done anything wrong or had engaged in conduct consti-
    tuting “cause” for her termination. 
    Id. II Article III,
    section 22 of the Commonwealth Constitution
    describes the position of the Special Assistant for Women’s
    Affairs and states, “The special assistant may be removed
    only for cause.” N. Mar. I. Const., art. III, § 22 (“section 22”).
    Peter-Palican sued the Commonwealth under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983, arguing that section 22 protected her against termina-
    tion without cause even by a new administration. Peter-
    Palican also asserted claims of retaliation, breach of contract,
    and estoppel.
    After granting partial summary judgment to Peter-Palican
    and presiding over a bench trial, the district court entered
    judgment in favor of Peter-Palican, holding that (1) under sec-
    tion 22, Peter-Palican had a property interest in continued
    employment even beyond the term of the governor who
    appointed her, and (2) her termination without cause therefore
    violated the Due Process Clause. 
    Peter-Palican, 673 F.3d at 1017
    . The district court ordered the Commonwealth to rein-
    state Peter-Palican “to a Commonwealth government position
    at a salary equal to or greater than that she had as Special
    Assistant for Women’s Affairs.” 
    Id. Recognizing that Peter-
    Palican could not recover monetary damages under 42 U.S.C.
    § 1983,1 the district court also implied a private right of action
    1
    Only “persons” are subject to suit under § 1983, and the Common-
    wealth and its officials acting in their official capacity are not considered
    “persons” when sued for damages. 
    Peter-Palican, 673 F.3d at 1017
    .
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS           9611
    against the Commonwealth for violation of section 22 — a
    claim Peter-Palican had not pleaded — and awarded her
    approximately $216,000 in damages. 
    Id. The district court
    did
    not rule on Peter-Palican’s other claims. The Commonwealth
    appealed.
    On March 12, 2012, we certified to the Supreme Court of
    the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands the fol-
    lowing questions:
    1.   Does Article III, section 22 of the Common-
    wealth Constitution, which states that “[t]he
    Special Assistant may be removed only for
    cause,” mean that the Special Assistant may
    never be removed from that position without
    cause—even beyond the term of the appointing
    governor—or does it mean that the Special
    Assistant is protected against termination with-
    out cause only during the term of the appointing
    governor?
    2.   If the answer to the above question is that Arti-
    cle III, section 22 of the Commonwealth Consti-
    tution means the Special Assistant may never be
    removed for cause even beyond the term of the
    appointing governor, does Commonwealth law
    imply a private right of action for monetary
    damages against the Commonwealth or its offi-
    cials for violation of that section?
    
    Id. at 1014. The
    Supreme Court graciously accepted certifica-
    tion and, on June 29, 2012, issued its opinion in Peter-Palican
    v. Government of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mari-
    ana Islands, 2012 MP 7 (N. Mar. I. 2012).
    The Commonwealth Supreme Court answered the first cer-
    tified question as follows:
    9612     PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    [W]e hold that article III, section 22 of the Common-
    wealth Constitution . . . which states that “[t]he spe-
    cial assistant may be removed only for cause,”
    means that the Special Assistant to the Governor for
    Women’s Affairs . . . is protected against termination
    without cause only during the term of the appointing
    governor.
    
    Id. at ¶ 2.
    Because the answer to the first question is disposi-
    tive of the issues in this appeal, the Supreme Court declined
    to address the second certified question. 
    Id. III [1] The
    Commonwealth Supreme Court’s authoritative
    interpretation of Commonwealth law conclusively establishes
    that Peter-Palican did not have a property interest in contin-
    ued employment once the new governor took office. There-
    fore, although she was protected from termination without
    cause during the term of Governor Babauta — the governor
    who appointed her — incoming Governor Fitial and Acting
    Governor Villagomez were constitutionally allowed to termi-
    nate her without cause.
    The Commonwealth Supreme Court’s prompt decision is
    attached to this opinion as the Appendix, and we adopt its rea-
    soning and its conclusions. Because Peter-Palican no longer
    possessed a property interest in continued employment once
    the new governor took office, her due process claims fail. And
    because the Commonwealth did not violate section 22 or the
    Due Process Clause by terminating her without cause, any
    implied constitutional tort claim fails as well.
    [2] Therefore, we vacate the district court’s judgment in
    favor of Peter-Palican, including its award of damages and
    injunctive relief. Because the district court did not address
    Peter-Palican’s retaliation, breach of contract, or estoppel
    claims, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS    9613
    opinion as well as that of the Commonwealth Supreme Court,
    set forth in the Appendix.
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    9614   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    APPENDIX
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9615
    9616   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9617
    9618   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9619
    9620   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9621
    9622   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9623
    9624   PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
    PETER-PALICAN v. NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS   9625
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-17153

Filed Date: 8/22/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014