United States v. Nathaniel Newhouse ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                  FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              AUG 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 10-50565
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01147-DDP-1
    Central District of California,
    v.                                              Los Angeles
    NATHANIEL NEWHOUSE,
    ORDER
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    The Memorandum disposition filed on June 15, 2012 is amended as follows:
    On Page 4, line 16, insert the following text:
    <514 U.S. 765
    ,
    768 (1995).>>
    An amended Memorandum disposition is filed concurrently with this order.
    With this amendment, all judges have voted to DENY the petition for panel
    rehearing. The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No further petitions shall
    be entertained.
    FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                  AUG 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 10-50565
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D.C. No. 2:08-cr-01147-DDP-1
    v.
    AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
    NATHANIEL NEWHOUSE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 10, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-appellant Nathaniel Newhouse (“Newhouse”) was convicted
    following a jury trial of possession with intent to distribute the prescription street
    drugs oxycodone, hydromorphone, and hydrocodone in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
     (a)(1). On appeal, Newhouse challenges the district court’s denial of his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    motion to suppress evidence and his Batson motion. We have jurisdiction under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1291
     and we AFFIRM.
    We review the district court’s denial of Newhouse’s motion to suppress de
    novo. United States v. Forrester, 
    512 F.3d 500
    , 506 (9th Cir. 2008). Newhouse
    argues that he was arrested when Drug Enforcement Agents (“DEA”) positioned
    their vehicles to block his vehicle from exiting the parking lot, and approached his
    vehicle with their weapons drawn while one agent stated “stop.” We agree.
    Newhouse’s freedom of movement was restricted entirely at the moment the agents
    approached his vehicle at gunpoint and subjected him to official orders. United
    States v. Strickler, 
    490 F.2d 378
    , 380 (9th Cir. 1974).
    The arrest did not violate Newhouse’s Fourth Amendment rights, however,
    because it was supported by probable cause. Newhouse was arrested following
    DEA agents’ surveillance of a pharmacy where pharmacists had alerted the DEA to
    an unusual number of prescriptions for oxycodone filled by patients associated
    with Dr. Efrain Sanchez. Agents observed three persons each fill two prescriptions
    for popular street drugs containing oxycodone and hydrocodone prescribed by Dr.
    Sanchez, and depart together with a fourth person who did not fill any
    prescriptions. At least one of the individuals appeared to have multiple, additional
    prescriptions in his possession. Agents followed the individuals to the parking lot
    2
    of a donut shop fourteen miles away where, one hour later, they observed a
    rendezvous with two other vehicles. The individual who did not fill any
    prescriptions delivered a white paper bag that appeared to be a pharmacy bag to
    Mr. Newhouse. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the agents
    collectively possessed “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
    prudent person in believing that [Newhouse] had committed or was committing an
    offense.” United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 
    856 F.2d 1292
    , 1296 (9th Cir.
    1988); see also United States v. Bernard, 
    623 F.2d 551
    , 560-61 (9th Cir. 1979).
    The district court’s denial of Newhouse’s Batson motion is reviewed for
    clear error. Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct 1305, 1307 (2011) (per curium).
    Because Batson challenges turn “largely on [the district court’s] evaluation of
    credibility,” the district court’s “determination is entitled to great deference.” 
    Id.
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district judge found that
    the government’s exercise of a peremptory strike against Juror 27, the sole
    African-American member of the venire, was not motivated by racial animus. This
    finding was not in error.
    The government offered three, race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 27: her
    alleged disorientation, her medical issues, and her statement reflecting potential
    bias against police officers. The district court discredited the first reason, finding
    3
    that Juror 27 was oriented despite her failure to remember her juror number on
    several occasions. Neither of the government’s additional proffered reasons was
    clear pretext, however. Juror 27 admitted to frequently needing powerful
    medications for back pain that could affect her judgment and ability to concentrate.
    The government’s concern about this issue, despite the district court’s proposal
    that Juror 27 could stand whenever her back was bothering her, was not pretextual.
    See Rice v. Collins, 
    546 U.S. 333
    , 341 (2006). In addition, in light of Juror 27’s
    statement that, at some point in the past, she believed that police target young black
    men, the government’s concern that she continued to harbor such bias was not
    pretextual. See Felker, 131 S. Ct. at 1306. Moreover, the government struck all
    three jurors who reported negative experiences with law enforcement, although all
    three averred that they believed they could be fair. See Ali v. Hickman, 
    584 F.3d 1174
    , 1192 (9th Cir. 2009) (employing comparative juror analysis). Considering
    the totality of the circumstances, the district court’s finding that the government
    offered non-pretextual, race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 27 was not clearly
    erroneous. Nor did the district court clearly err at step three of the Batson inquiry.
    The district court properly evaluated “the persuasiveness of the justification[s]”
    offered by the prosecutor and concluded that Newhouse failed to carry his burden.
    Purkett v. Elem, 
    514 U.S. 765
    , 768 (1995).
    4
    AFFIRMED.
    5