Michael Kaye v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego County Public Law Library , 446 F. App'x 903 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 11 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL KAYE, No. 08-56919
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00921-WQH-
WMC
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN MEMORANDUM *
DIEGO COUNTY PUBLIC LAW
LIBRARY; ROBERT RIGER,
individually and in his official capacity as
Director of the San Diego County Public
Law Library; SAN DIEGO COUNTY
PUBLIC LAW LIBRARY, a local public
agency,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 2, 2011
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: REINHARDT and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, District
Judge.**
Michael Kaye appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, the San Diego County Public Law Library,
and its director and Board of Trustees. He also appeals from the district court’s denial
of his motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(a). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court properly entered summary judgment for the defendants on
Kaye’s federal due process claims. According to a state statute, Kaye served at the
“pleasure” of the library board. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6345. Even if this statute is
not determinative, Kaye has presented no evidence upon which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the library made “an express or an implied in fact promise for
some form of continued employment absent cause for firing,” Walker v. Northern San
Diego County Hospital District, 135 Cal. App. 3d 896, 905 (1982). That the Library
routinely provided hearings for discharged employees does not suffice to demonstrate
such a promise. Kaye therefore had no constitutionally protected property interest in
his job.
**
The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, U.S. District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
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By declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kaye’s state claims, the
district court effectively dismissed those claims. As the California Court of Appeal
subsequently found, nothing would have prevented the state trial court from assuming
jurisdiction over Kaye’s remaining claims had he amended his complaint to include
them. Kaye v. Board of Trustees, No. D055268, 2010 WL 2978082, at *9-11 (Cal.
App. July 31, 2010, as modified on denial of rehearing, Aug. 25, 2010). Under these
circumstances, although a remand would, as almost always, have been preferable, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand Kaye’s state claims
rather than dismissing them. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2001). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Kaye’s motion
to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(a), because Kaye
identified no proper ground for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty.,
Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993); Blanton v. Anzalone, 813
F.2d 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1987).
The parties’ requests for judicial notice are granted.
AFFIRMED.
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