Cheri L. Esslinger v. Michael Astrue , 479 F. App'x 59 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 13 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    CHERI L. ESSLINGER,                              No. 11-35159
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05760-KLS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Karen L. Strombom, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 6, 2012**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and HALL, District
    Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge for the
    District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    Appellant Cheri Esslinger appeals the denial of her deceased father’s,
    Randall Esslinger’s, application for Social Security Disability Insurance and
    Supplemental Security Income. Appellant argues that substantial evidence does
    not support the Commissioner’s decision that Esslinger was not disabled. We
    reverse and remand.
    Appellant contends that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed
    legal error by taking into consideration the impact of alcohol and drug abuse on
    Esslinger’s limitations during the initial five-step sequential evaluation. We agree.
    Bustamante v. Massanari, 
    262 F.3d 949
    , 955 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, the ALJ
    should have considered the impact of substance abuse on Esslinger’s impairments
    only after completing the five-step sequential evaluation and finding Esslinger
    disabled. 
    Id.
    Next, we hold that the ALJ’s physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
    assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ provided valid
    reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Lee and McGrath. However, the ALJ
    committed legal error by failing to address or evaluate Dr. Amin’s opinion. 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.927
    (c); see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1041 (9th Cir.
    2008) (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (b)). Because the ALJ did not provide a
    statement of reasons for rejecting Dr. Amin’s opinion, we cannot say it was
    2
    “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    454 F.3d 1050
    , 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the ALJ failed
    to provide either specific and legitimate or clear and convincing reasons for
    rejecting the opinions of Drs. Smith,1 Takaro, and Subramanian. Ryan v. Comm’r
    of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    528 F.3d 1194
    , 1198 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Finally, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s assessment of
    Esslinger’s mental RFC because the ALJ improperly discounted the severity of
    Esslinger’s mental health issues due to substance abuse, Bustamante, 
    262 F.3d at 955
    , and failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the
    opinions of Drs. Brzezinski-Stein, Hwang, and Price. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. The
    ALJ did not, however, err in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Worrell because he is not
    a psychiatrist. Lombardo v. Schweiker, 
    749 F.2d 565
    , 566 (9th Cir. 1984).2
    In light of these errors, we reverse and remand so that the ALJ can complete
    the five-step sequential evaluation giving full credit to the opinions of Drs. Amin,
    Smith, Takaro, Subramanian, Brzezinski-Stein, Hwang, and Price and without
    1
    All references to “Dr. Smith” refer to Dr. Douglas Smith.
    2
    Appellant also argues the ALJ erred in discrediting Essligner’s subjective
    complaints about pain. However, the ALJ was entitled to discredit these
    complaints based on Esslinger’s testimony about his daily activities. Stubbs-
    Danielson v. Astrue, 
    539 F.3d 1169
    , 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
    3
    considering the impact of substance abuse on Esslinger’s mental and physical
    impairments. Bustamante, 
    262 F.3d at 955
    . If the ALJ concludes that Esslinger
    was disabled, he must then determine whether each limitation entitling him to
    disability would remain in the absence of drug and alcohol abuse. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1535
    (b). If the ALJ ultimately finds that Esslinger was disabled, he must then
    calculate the disability onset date.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-35159

Citation Numbers: 479 F. App'x 59

Judges: Silverman, Murguia, Hall

Filed Date: 6/13/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024