United States v. Joseph Pritchard ( 2012 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 29 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-50438
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 8:08-cr-00267-R-2
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JOSEPH GRANSON PRITCHARD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-50459
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 8:08-cr-00267-R-3
    v.
    RONNIE JOSEPH JOHNSON, AKA
    Ronnie Johnson,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-50490
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:99-cr-01214-R-1
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    v.
    RONNIE JOSEPH JOHNSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before: THOMAS, WARDLAW, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    Joseph Granson Pritchard and Ronnie Joseph Johnson appeal their
    convictions for conspiracy to commit bank robbery (
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ), armed bank
    robbery (
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a); (d)), and using a firearm during a crime of violence
    (
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)). We reverse. Because the parties are familiar with the factual
    and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.
    Appellants contend that the trial judge interfered with the trial so extensively
    as to render it unfair. After a thorough review of the record, we agree.
    Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial before a different
    judge.
    While a district court judge has considerable discretion in the management
    of his courtroom, the judge “must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [he] plays
    -2-
    in a jury trial and avoid even the appearance of advocacy or partiality.” United
    States v. Harris, 
    501 F.2d 1
    , 10 (9th Cir. 1974). A trial court’s participation in the
    proceedings warrants reversal “if the record ... leaves the reviewing court with an
    abiding impression that the judge’s remarks and questioning of witnesses projected
    to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality.” United States v. Mostella, 
    802 F.2d 358
    , 361 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The trial judge interrupted the defense over 70 times, but he interrupted the
    government only once. His interruptions of the defense’s cross-examination of a
    cooperating witness effectively prevented the defense from presenting its theory of
    impeachment. He referred to “gang members” in front of the jury; although the
    statement was ambiguous, the jury could well have understood it as applying to the
    defendants. We have criticized some of the trial judge’s statements in the past, and
    he repeated them here, almost verbatim. Compare United States v. Scott, 
    642 F.3d 791
    , 799 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the trial judge’s criticism of defense counsel for
    “failing to ‘give th[e] jury [ ] credit for brains’”) with the judge’s statement in this
    case (“THE COURT: Counsel, the jury can see it. Please. Give them some
    principles of brains.”). He also accused defense counsel of “playing games” for
    legitimately cross-examining a witness. During Johnson’s closing argument, the
    trial judge sua sponte instructed the jury that “[t]he investigation [of the
    -3-
    government] is not on trial here; the defendants are” – erroneously implying that
    the jury was not to scrutinize the government’s investigation or consider the
    absence of evidence in reaching its verdict.
    Considered in isolation, these errors might not warrant reversal. However,
    considered cumulatively, they lead us to conclude that the trial judge “created an
    atmosphere in which an objectively fair trial could not be conducted.” Harris, 
    501 F.2d at
    11 n. 20. “[T]he cumulative effect was so pervasive and prejudicial as to
    require a new trial.” United States v. Pena–Garcia, 
    505 F.2d 964
    , 967 (9th Cir.
    1974).
    We therefore REVERSE Appellants’ convictions, VACATE their sentences,
    and REMAND for a new trial with instructions that the Clerk of the Court for the
    Central District of California reassign this case to a different judge.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-50438, 10-50459, 10-50490

Judges: Thomas, Wardlaw, Berzon

Filed Date: 6/29/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024