Corey v. United States Postal Service ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 13 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLETCHER COREY, No. 11-15891
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00290-LDG-
LRL
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; MEMORANDUM *
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Lloyd D. George, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012 **
San Francisco, California
Before: ALARCÓN, THOMAS, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Fletcher Corey appeals the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction of his action seeking declaratory relief regarding the grievance-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
related documents the United States Postal Service (USPS) is legally required to
keep in its system of records. Because the parties are familiar with the history of
the case, we need not recount it here. We affirm.
The Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, “does not confer
jurisdiction by itself if jurisdiction would not exist on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint.” Janakes v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir.
1985). “If, however, the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought a
coercive action in federal court to enforce its rights,” then the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Id.
Corey concedes that USPS did not have any legal action pending against
him or threatened against him when he filed his complaint, but he argues that
USPS could have brought a hypothetical coercive action against him under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. However, the Privacy Act “creates federal claims
for relief for enumerated violations of the Act’s substantive provisions only to
actions brought by an individual.” Cell Associates, Inc. v. NIH, 579 F.2d 1155,
1157 (9th Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Parties who “are not
individuals . . . lack standing to raise a claim under the Privacy Act. St. Michael’s
Convalescent Hospital v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted). USPS is not an “individual” under the Privacy Act. 5
2
U.S.C. § 552a(2). Thus, the Privacy Act does not confer on USPS any rights that it
could potentially enforce against Corey in a hypothetical coercive action. Because
Corey asserts no other basis for a hypothetical coercive action USPS could bring
against him, the district court correctly dismissed his claim.
AFFIRMED.
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