Jimmy Lazo v. Ken Clark ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 15 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JIMMY A. LAZO, No. 08-16838
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:06-cv-02732-JF
v.
KEN CLARK, Warden
MEMORANDUM *
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeremy Fogel, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 14, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and PANNER,** District Judge.
Jimmy A. Lazo appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. We
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Owen M. Panner, Senior United States District Judge
for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
Lazo argues his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by declaring in his
opening statement that a witness would testify when it was far from certain that the
witness would actually testify. Despite not submitting any affidavits explaining why
the potential witness failed to testify, Lazo essentially asks us to create a new rule of
law mandating that such “broken promises” are necessarily objectively unreasonable
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). However, Lazo has
not met the “heavy burden” of establishing that counsel’s promise was neither
reasonable nor sound trial strategy. See Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1091-
92 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir.
2001)). Additionally, considering the overwhelming adverse evidence at trial, Lazo
cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from the broken promise. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695. Thus, Lazo ’s claim of ineffective assistance fails.
Lazo also argues the prosecutor committed misconduct, violating Lazo ’s due
process rights. As our review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, we may grant Lazo ’s habeas petition only if the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Christian v. Frank,
595 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (internal citation
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omitted). The state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s remarks simply reminded
the jury that Lazo had presented a very narrow defense was neither contrary to clearly
established federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. Additionally,
Lazo has not demonstrated that any alleged misconduct “so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
Finally, Lazo argues the trial court’s incorrect instruction that assault was a
lesser included offense to grand theft violated due process. However, viewed in
context, the instructions here were adequate to guide the jury’s deliberations. See
United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1465 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The three
charges involved were simple. The jury received correct instructions on the elements
of the charges. In short, Lazo has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the
jury applied the instruction in a way that violated his constitutional rights. Carriger
v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
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