Bradley Marshall v. Washington State Bar Associati , 448 F. App'x 661 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 17 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY R. MARSHALL, No. 10-35684
Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00359-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM *
WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; PAULA
LITTLEWOOD; JAMES M.
DANIELSON; TEENA KILLIAN;
SCOTT BUSBY; CHRISTINE GRAY;
ANNE SEIDEL; ROBERT WELDEN;
JEFFERS DANIELSON SONN
AYLWARD P.S.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 4, 2011 **
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: SCHROEDER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District
Judge.***
Appellant Bradley Marshall appeals the district court’s Order dated July 8,
2010, affirming the bankruptcy’s court’s dismissal of Marshall’s civil rights claims
against Appellees Washington State Bar Association and certain individuals and
entities. The factual and procedural background that led to this action, including
the events surrounding Marshall’s disbarment by a unanimous Supreme Court of
Washington, are described in detail in In re Marshall, 217 P.3d 291 (Wash. 2009)
(“Marshall II”)1 and In re Marshall, 157 P.3d 859 (Wash. 2007) (“Marshall I”)
(imposing 18-month suspension). We recite the remaining facts only when
necessary to resolve an issue raised on appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
***
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
1
“Marshall attempted to squeeze his clients for additional fees despite the
flat fee agreement. One of these clients was forced to obtain her own counsel to
defend herself once [] Marshall filed a lawsuit and a lien against her. He tried to
bully his clients into settling their claims, despite their express desire to proceed to
trial. He declined to defend them from that point on, demanding they accept the
settlement or pay him more money. Additionally, [] Marshall committed other
violations supporting the Board’s recommendation to disbar and has a history of
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Marshall II, 217 P.3d at 310.
2
Marshall’s arguments that the Supreme Court of Washington, the State of
Washington, and the Washington State Bar Association violated the automatic
bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), are meritless. “Section 362(b)(4) provides
that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as an automatic stay ‘of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit
. . . to enforce such governmental unit’s . . . police or regulatory power.’” Lockyer
v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)). The proceedings of the Supreme Court of Washington and
the Bar Association fell under the police and regulatory exception. Wade v. State
Bar of Arizona (In re Wade), 948 F.2d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Schatz,
497 P.2d 153, 155 (Wash. 1972) (“[T]he Washington State Bar Association acts as
an arm of the Supreme Court in conducting proceedings under this section and, in
that capacity, is an integral part of the judicial process.”). Accordingly, there was
no violation of the bankruptcy stay with the post-petition proceedings to disbar
Marshall. See Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1107 (“The theory of the exception is that
bankruptcy should not be ‘a haven for wrongdoers.’”).
Marshall’s myriad claims of constitutional violations arising from his
disbarment must, as two prior courts have held, be dismissed. His claim that his
state disbarment is void ab initio is a state judicial determination that lower federal
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courts are without power to review. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (“[R]eview of such [final state court] judgments may be had
only in [the United States Supreme] Court.”). Moreover, the conjectured
constitutional “violations” Marshall asserts are simply attempts to relitigate due
process arguments conclusively decided by the Supreme Court of Washington
during his disbarment proceedings. See Marshall II, 217 P.3d at 298–300
(rejecting conflict of interest, bias, and absence of notice arguments). As the
district court properly explained, all elements of res judicata under Washington law
are satisfied. See Hayes v. City of Seattle, 934 P.2d 1179, 1181–82 (Wash. 1997).
Finally, the bankruptcy court’s and district court’s denials of leave to amend
were appropriate. Adding additional members of the Bar Association or the
Justices of the Supreme Court of Washington as defendants would be futile under
Rooker-Feldman and the principles of absolute immunity, in addition to needlessly
prolonging this vexatious and wasteful litigation.
We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments on appeal and hold
that they do not impact the foregoing analysis.
AFFIRMED.
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