United States v. J. Bravo-Mendoza , 509 F. App'x 589 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 15 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-50399
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 8:10-cr-00036-JVS-1
v.
J. GUADALUPE BRAVO-MENDOZA, MEMORANDUM *
AKA Daniel G. Bravo, AKA Guadalupe
Bravo-Mendoza,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, KLEINFELD and SILVERMAN, Circuit
Judges.
Bravo-Mendoza’s waiver of counsel complied with Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). He was advised of, and acknowledged that he
understood, the charges, potential sentence, and risks of self-representation.
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 506-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008), does not require that a
district court conduct a hearing to determine whether a defendant who is competent
to stand trial is also competent to represent himself at trial. Rather, Edwards
permits the trial court to deny a defendant his constitutional right to self-
representation if the defendant is so severely mentally ill that he is unable to carry
out the basic tasks necessary for self-representation. See United States v.
Thompson, 587 F.3d 1165, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ferguson,
560 F.3d 1060, 1070 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009). Despite Bravo-Mendoza’s odd
comments, the record establishes that he was able to represent himself. He made
peremptory challenges during voir dire, cross-examined witnesses, presented a
defense, introduced documents, testified, made a closing argument, made
appropriate and timely motions for judgment of acquittal, and argued that his prior
convictions were too old to be considered by the court at sentencing. Bravo-
Mendoza was also assisted by, and frequently consulted with, competent stand-by
counsel throughout the proceedings. The district court correctly respected Bravo-
Mendoza’s right to represent himself; furthermore, the record does not establish
that Bravo-Mendoza was denied a fair trial.
AFFIRMED.
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