Garcia-Tellez v. Holder ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        OCT 03 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                 U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JESUS GARCIA TELLEZ,                                     No. 07-72366
    Petitioner,                                   Agency No. A78-058-025
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued October 6, 2009
    Submitted September 28, 2011
    San Francisco, California
    Before:       GOODWIN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and LEIGHTON,** District
    Judge.
    Jesus Garcia Tellez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
    an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). We have jurisdiction under 8
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or
    by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition. We review the BIA’s factual findings for
    substantial evidence. Ghaly v. INS, 
    58 F.3d 1425
    , 1429 (9th Cir. 1995). We
    review de novo the BIA’s legal conclusions, including whether an offense
    constitutes an aggravated felony. Id.; Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1219
    ,
    1221 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Garcia Tellez exhausted his administrative remedies by challenging the
    immigration judge’s conclusion that his state conviction was an aggravated felony.
    See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 
    388 F.3d 713
    , 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that raising an
    issue before the BIA is all that is required to satisfy the exhaustion requirement).
    Garcia Tellez’s conviction under California Health and Safety Code § 11378
    is not a categorical aggravated felony because “California law regulates the
    possession and sale of many substances that are not regulated by the [Controlled
    Substances Act].” Cheuk Fung S-Yong v. Holder, 
    600 F.3d 1028
    , 1034 (9th Cir.
    2010); see, e.g., Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 
    473 F.3d 1072
    , 1078 (9th Cir. 2007)
    (finding that § 11379, which regulates the same drugs as § 11378, regulates
    substances not covered by the Controlled Substances Act).
    The BIA examined Garcia Tellez’s conviction documents and determined,
    under the modified categorical approach, that his state conviction constituted an
    2
    aggravated felony. We review this determination de novo. Ruiz-Morales, 
    361 F.3d at 1221-22
    .
    To identify a conviction as an aggravated felony under the modified
    categorical approach when the only documents in the conviction record are a
    felony complaint and judgment, “the judgment must contain the critical phrase ‘as
    charged in the information.’” Fregozo v. Holder, 
    576 F.3d 1030
    , 1040 (9th Cir.
    2009) (quoting United States v. Vidal, 
    504 F.3d 1072
    , 1087 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
    banc)). The clerk’s minute order does not indicate whether Garcia Tellez pled
    guilty to the offense as charged in the felony complaint. Because his conviction
    record is inconclusive, Garcia Tellez has met his burden to prove he is not barred
    from relief on the grounds of an aggravated felony conviction. Sandoval-Lua v.
    Gonzales, 
    499 F.3d 1121
    , 1130 (9th Cir. 2007).
    We have jurisdiction to review de novo whether the BIA applied the correct
    legal standard in determining whether Garcia Tellez was convicted of a
    “particularly serious crime.” Afridi v. Gonzales, 
    442 F.3d 1212
    , 1218 (9th Cir.
    2006), overruled on other grounds by, Estrada-Espoinza v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 1147
    , 1160 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Because the BIA erred in finding that
    Garcia Tellez was convicted of an aggravated felony, it applied the wrong legal
    standard when it applied the presumption from Matter of Y-L, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 270
    3
    (2002), that a drug trafficking aggravated felony presumptively constitutes a
    particularly serious crime.
    The BIA’s conclusion that Garcia Tellez failed to demonstrate he would
    more likely than not be tortured if returned to Mexico is supported by substantial
    evidence. Villegas v. Mukasey, 
    523 F.3d 984
    , 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that to
    establish a likelihood of torture under the Convention Against Torture, a petitioner
    must show that severe pain and suffering was specifically intended, and that
    conditions in the Mexican mental health system do not arise from a deliberate
    intent to inflict harm).
    We remand this case to the BIA to determine whether Garcia Tellez has been
    convicted of a particularly serious crime, and if he has not, whether he is eligible
    for asylum or withholding of removal.
    The petition for review is
    GRANTED.
    4