Bridget Dorfmeister v. Zurich American Insurance Co. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    NOV 22 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRIDGET DORFMEISTER,                             No.   20-16776
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00057-DWL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE
    COMPANY, a foreign insurer,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 15, 2021
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Before: CLIFTON, BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Bridget Dorfmeister brought this bad faith claim against
    Zurich American Insurance Company following Zurich’s issuance of a Notice of
    Claim Status on June 5, 2017, that denied Dorfmeister’s benefits and closed her
    workers’ compensation claim. Dorfmeister now challenges the District Court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    grant of Zurich’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which we review de novo. Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). We also review de novo the application of
    substantive state law by a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction. Giles v.
    Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    494 F.3d 865
    , 872 (9th Cir. 2007).
    We affirm the District Court’s grant of Zurich’s motion to dismiss because
    Dorfmeister’s sole claim is time-barred.1 Under Arizona law, bad faith claims are
    subject to a two-year statute of limitations that “begins to run upon accrual” of the
    claim. Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
    30 P.3d 639
    , 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
    (quoting Doe v. Roe, 
    955 P.2d 951
    , 963 (Ariz. 1998)); see also 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542
    .
    Arizona courts have established that, under the common law discovery rule
    governing accrual of bad faith claims, “a cause of action does not accrue until the
    plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the
    cause.” Doe, 
    955 P.2d at 960
     (citation omitted). For claims arising from an
    insurer’s denial of benefits, a bad faith “cause of action should accrue only when
    the insurer terminates all negotiations with the insured because only at that point
    1
    For the same reason, we affirm the District Court’s denial of leave to amend. No
    amendment to Dorfmeister’s complaint could have allowed it to proceed because
    she alleged only one claim of bad faith that is time-barred under Arizona law. See
    Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 
    847 F.3d 646
    , 655 (9th Cir. 2017).
    2                                     20-16776
    can the nature and extent of [the] insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and
    fair dealing and of the damages that were proximately caused by this breach be
    determined.” Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 
    851 P.2d 122
    , 126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
    (citation omitted).
    Dorfmeister’s bad faith claim accrued on June 5, 2017, because on that date,
    Zurich issued a Notice of Claim Status denying Dorfmeister’s benefits and closing
    her workers’ compensation claim, thereby unequivocally “terminat[ing] all
    negotiations with the insured[.]” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). On that date, Dorfmeister
    knew or reasonably should have known of Zurich’s wrongful conduct and was put
    on notice of the accrual of her bad faith claim. The two-year statute-of-limitations
    period ended on June 5, 2019. Dorfmeister did not file her bad faith claim until
    December 9, 2019. Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s grant of Zurich’s
    motion to dismiss because Dorfmeister’s bad faith claim is time-barred.
    Dorfmeister argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
    the Industrial Commission of Arizona issued her a favorable compensability
    determination on May 1, 2018, but Arizona law compels a different conclusion.
    The Arizona Court of Appeals noted in Manterola that a bad faith claim “accrues
    when [the] plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of [the] ‘defendant’s
    wrongful conduct[.]’” Manterola, 
    30 P.3d at 643
     (quoting Taylor v. State Farm
    3                                    20-16776
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    913 P.2d 1092
    , 1095 (Ariz. 1996)). As the District Court noted in
    this case, Manterola held that a bad faith claim may accrue once there are
    “appreciable, nonspeculative damages[,]” even if those damages may subsequently
    be foreclosed in a separate action determining the issue of liability in favor of the
    defendant. Id. at 647. In other words, liability need not be determined before a bad
    faith claim may accrue. See id. at 646. In this case, while Dorfmeister could not
    know with certainty that Zurich’s denial of benefits was “wrongful” until the
    Commission issued its compensability determination, such certainty is not required
    for statute-of-limitations purposes because all elements of a claim need not be
    indisputably proven before that claim may accrue.
    Likewise, contrary to Dorfmeister’s argument, Merkens is not dispositive in
    this case because it addressed jurisdiction, not accrual, and narrowly held that a
    plaintiff must “have at least sought a compensability determination” from the
    Commission before filing a bad faith claim based on an insurer’s denial of benefits.
    Merkens v. Fed. Ins. Co., 
    349 P.3d 1111
    , 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). In fact, the
    Merkens court explicitly recognized that “there can be simultaneous proceedings in
    both the Industrial Commission [on compensability] and superior court” on the bad
    faith claim, during which the court adjudicating the bad faith claim “should wait to
    resolve any dispositive motions, or allow the case to proceed to a jury, until after
    4                                     20-16776
    the [Commission] has resolved the challenges to the denial or termination of
    benefits.” 
    Id.
     at 1115 n.6 (citing Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement
    & Power Dist., 
    571 P.2d 706
    , 709 (Ariz. 1977)).
    Finally, Dorfmeister’s reliance on Taylor, which the Arizona Supreme Court
    expressly limited to failure-to-settle cases, is unpersuasive. See Taylor, 
    913 P.2d at 1097
    . This case is distinct from failure-to-settle cases, as well as from legal
    malpractice cases, because no injury or non-speculative damages occur in those
    cases until final judgment is rendered in the underlying proceedings. In contrast,
    Zurich’s issuance of the June 5, 2017 Notice of Claim Status that denied
    Dorfmeister’s benefits and closed her workers’ compensation claim gave rise to an
    injury and non-speculative damages. As the District Court succinctly stated, “the
    injury in a denial-of-coverage case is the denial of coverage itself.”
    Dorfmeister is not a “successful party” on appeal and is therefore ineligible
    for an award of attorney’s fees under Arizona law. See 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12
    -
    341.01. Although Zurich is a “successful party” on appeal and is thus eligible for
    such an award, we have discretion to grant, in full or in part, or deny requests for
    attorney’s fees under Arizona law. See 
    id.
     We decline to award attorney’s fees to
    Zurich in light of the Associated Indemnity factors that guide Arizona courts’
    discretionary choice to award fees under § 12-341.01. See Associated Indem. Corp.
    5                                      20-16776
    v. Warner, 
    694 P.2d 1181
    , 1184 (Ariz. 1985). The third Associated Indemnity
    factor—whether “[a]ssessing fees against [Dorfmeister] would cause an extreme
    hardship”—supports our decision to decline to award fees to Zurich, because
    Dorfmeister has been “negatively impact[ed in her] credit, her living situation, and
    her marriage” following Zurich’s refusal to pay for her medical bills even after the
    Commission’s May 1, 2018 ruling that rescinded Zurich’s closure of Dorfmeister’s
    workers’ compensation claim, required Zurich to pay for continued treatment and
    disability benefits, and assessed Dorfmeister with a 4% permanent disability rating.
    See 
    id.
     The sixth Associated Indemnity factor—whether awarding fees on appeal to
    Zurich “would discourage other parties with tenable claims or defenses from
    litigating or defending legitimate contract issues for fear of incurring liability for
    substantial amounts of attorneys’ fees”—supports our decision because in the
    workers’ compensation context, the difference in the economic positions of the
    insured and the insurer may render potential plaintiffs wary of bringing even
    meritorious bad faith claims. See 
    id.
    AFFIRMED.
    6                                     20-16776