AMB Property, L.P. v. Official Creditors for the Estate of AB Liquidating Corp. ( 2005 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: AB LIQUIDATING CORP., fka          
    Adaptive Broadband Corporation,
    Debtor,
    AMB PROPERTY, L.P.,                               No. 03-16979
    Appellant,
           D.C. No.
    CV-03-00021-RMW
    v.
    OFFICIAL CREDITORS FOR THE                        OPINION
    ESTATE OF AB LIQUIDATING CORP.,
    fka Adaptive Broadband
    Corporation,
    Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    June 13, 2005—San Francisco, California
    Filed July 19, 2005
    Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge,
    M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judge, and
    Kevin Thomas Duffy,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Duffy
    *The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    8487
    IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.            8489
    COUNSEL
    Michael St. James, St. James Law, San Francisco, California,
    for the appellant.
    Robert A. Franklin, Murray & Murray, P.C., Cupertino, Cali-
    fornia, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    DUFFY, District Judge:
    This case arises from the bankruptcy of Adaptive Broad-
    band Corporation (“Debtor”). AMB Property, L.P. (“AMB”),
    8490              IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.
    Debtor’s pre-petition landlord, appeals from the district
    court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s judgment. In that
    judgment, the bankruptcy court sustained the Creditors’ Com-
    mittee’s objection to AMB’s claim against Debtor’s estate for
    breach-of-lease damages. For the reasons set forth below, we
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I.    Background
    This case was decided on stipulated facts in the bankruptcy
    court. On April 17, 2000 AMB and Debtor entered into a five-
    year lease (the “Lease”) for certain commercial property. The
    Lease required a Security Deposit of $1,000,000. A contem-
    poraneously dated Addendum allowed the Security Deposit to
    be in the form of a letter of credit. Debtor established a fully-
    collateralized $1,000,000 letter of credit, in favor of AMB,
    through Union Bank (“Letter of Credit” or “Letter”).
    Debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy July 26, 2001 and
    promptly rejected the Lease. AMB re-let the premises to
    another tenant and filed a $2,000,000 proof of claim for dam-
    ages resulting from Debtor’s rejection of the Lease. The Cred-
    itors’ Committee filed an objection to AMB’s claim, arguing
    that the Security Deposit should reduce the allowed claim by
    $1,000,000. The bankruptcy court agreed with the Creditors’
    Committee, and rejected AMB’s counter-argument that the
    security deposit should be applied to reduce AMB’s damages
    before calculating the amount of the allowed claim. AMB
    appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the district court;
    the district court affirmed. This appeal followed.
    II.   The Landlord’s Cap Under The Bankruptcy Code
    [1] This appeal turns entirely on a single provision of the
    Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6), and presents a ques-
    tion of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. See
    In re Quintana, 
    915 F.2d 513
    , 515 (9th Cir. 1990). Section
    502 sets forth the mechanism for calculating the amount of
    IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.                    8491
    allowable claims against a bankruptcy estate. Subsection
    (b)(6) governs claims by landlords and provides that if objec-
    tion to a claim is made:
    (b) the court, after notice and a hearing, shall deter-
    mine the amount of such claim . . . and shall allow
    such claim in such amount, except to the extent that
    . . . (6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for dam-
    ages resulting from the termination of a lease of real
    property, such claim exceeds . . . the rent reserved by
    such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of
    one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of
    the remaining term of such lease . . .
    11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6). This provision is commonly referred to
    as the “Landlord’s Cap” because it caps the amount a landlord
    may claim as damages because of a Debtor’s rejection of a
    lease. In sum, the relevant part of Section 502(b)(6) provides
    that a landlord’s claim is limited to the lesser of: (1) its actual
    damages; or (2) one year’s lease payments.1
    [2] AMB and the Creditors’ Committee agree that AMB’s
    gross damages were $5 million.2 Because this amount exceeds
    one year’s rent ($2 million), they agree that the Landlord’s
    Cap applies. The only issue in this appeal is whether to apply
    the $1 million Security Deposit/Letter of Credit against the $5
    million “gross damages” number or the $2 million “capped”
    number.
    [3] The Creditors’ Committee argues that the plain lan-
    guage of the statute, appellate decisions from other circuits,
    1
    Section 502’s alternative cap of 15% is not at issue in this appeal.
    2
    The exact damages claimed were $5,602,034.07. Consistent with the
    parties’ submissions and argument in this appeal, throughout this opinion
    the figure is rounded to $5 million. Likewise, one year’s rent of
    $2,000,755.20, and the proceeds of the Letter of Credit of $999,970.00,
    are rounded to $2 million and $1 million respectively.
    8492              IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.
    and legislative history support deducting the $1 million Secur-
    ity Deposit from the “capped” number. AMB counters that the
    plain language of the statute, various policy considerations,
    and the structure of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole require
    that the Security Deposit be applied to the $5 million “gross
    damages” number. The proper application of a security
    deposit in this context is an issue of first impression before
    this Court.
    III.   Section 502(b)(6) and Oldden v. Tonto Realty Co.
    According to the Creditors’ Committee’s interpretation
    (which was employed by the bankruptcy court and affirmed
    by the district court), Section 502(b)(6) requires a court to: (1)
    determine the landlord’s gross damages (net of any recovery
    through re-letting the property); (2) compare the gross dam-
    ages to the statutory cap of one year’s rent; (3) subtract any
    security deposit or letter of credit from the lesser of gross
    damages or one year’s rent; and (4) allow a claim for this
    amount. Employing this approach, AMB’s gross damages of
    $5 million exceed one year’s rent of $2 million. Accordingly,
    the $1 million Security Deposit/Letter of Credit was sub-
    tracted from one year’s rent, yielding AMB’s allowable claim
    of $1 million.
    [4] This analytical framework is largely based on Oldden
    v. Tonto Realty Co., 
    143 F.2d 916
    (2d Cir. 1944). Oldden, a
    case often cited by bankruptcy courts, involved a landlord
    who held a cash security deposit from a debtor, and addressed
    the question of “whether a landlord is required to deduct the
    amount of security held under a lease from the total damages
    provided by the lease or from the total claim allowable [under
    the Bankruptcy Code].” 
    Oldden, 143 F.2d at 918
    . The Oldden
    court concluded that the security deposit should be deducted
    from the allowable claim rather than the total damages. 
    Id. Congress endorsed
    this holding, as the House Judiciary
    Report to amended Section 502(b)(6) notes:
    IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.                 8493
    This paragraph will not overrule Oldden, or the
    proposition for which it has been read to stand: to the
    extent that a landlord has a security deposit in excess
    of the amount allowed under this paragraph, the
    excess comes into the estate. . . . As under Oldden,
    [a landlord] will not be permitted to offset his actual
    damages against his security deposit and then claim
    for the balance under this paragraph. Rather, his
    security deposit will be applied in satisfaction of the
    claim that is allowed under this paragraph.
    H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 353-54 (1977), reprinted in 1978
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309 (emphasis added). Indeed, the pur-
    pose of the Landlord’s Cap is “to compensate the landlord for
    his loss while not permitting a claim so large . . . as to prevent
    other general unsecured creditors from recovering a dividend
    from the estate.” 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6309.
    AMB argues that Oldden was wrongly decided and should
    be rejected by this Court. Mindful of the fact that the legisla-
    tive history’s endorsement of Oldden effectively eviscerates
    this argument, AMB urges us not to delve into congressional
    intent, arguing that the text of Section 502 is unambiguous
    and therefore precludes inquiry into legislative history.
    According to AMB, the plain language of Section 502
    requires a court to: (1) determine the landlord’s gross dam-
    ages (net of any recovery through re-letting the property); (2)
    subtract from those gross damages any “mitigation” from
    security deposits or letters of credit; (3) compare this “miti-
    gated damages” amount to the statutory cap of one year’s
    rent; and (4) allow a claim for the lesser of either the “miti-
    gated damages” or one year’s rent. Employing this approach,
    AMB’s gross damages of $5 million, minus the $1 million
    Security Deposit/Letter of Credit yield “mitigated damages”
    of $4 million. These “mitigated damages” exceed one year’s
    8494             IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.
    rent of $2 million. Accordingly, AMB argues the bankruptcy
    court should have allowed its entire $2 million claim.
    AMB’s plain language argument is misplaced. On its face,
    Section 502(b)(6) makes no mention of how security deposits
    should be applied in the calculation of allowable claims.
    Thus, the statute is ambiguous as to whether such deposits
    should be applied to a landlord’s gross damages or its capped
    claim. Given this ambiguity, Congress’s explicit endorsement
    of Oldden prevents us from accepting AMB’s invitation to
    reject the case outright.
    AMB alternatively argues that even if we accept Oldden in
    the context of cash security deposits, we should not extend
    Oldden’s rule to encompass letters of credit. AMB argues that
    such an extension will unnecessarily interfere with third-party
    relationships, unduly penalize landlords while failing to
    advance the policy of the Bankruptcy Code, and generally
    wreak havoc on commercial leasing.
    [5] Rather than simply applying Oldden to all letters of
    credit that are provided as security deposits, AMB urges us to
    adopt reasoning set forth by Judge Klein of the Bankruptcy
    Appeals Panel. AMB contends that Judge Klein’s majority
    opinion in In re Condor Systems, Inc., 
    296 B.R. 5
    (9th Cir.
    BAP (Cal.) 2003), and his concurrence in In re Mayan Net-
    works, 
    306 B.R. 295
    , 301 (9th Cir. BAP (Cal.) 2004), present
    the appropriate framework for analyzing the interplay
    between letters of credit and statutory caps under the Bank-
    ruptcy Code. However, despite AMB’s argument, the resolu-
    tion of this appeal does not require that we decide whether
    Judge Klein has set forth the appropriate procedure for apply-
    ing letter of credit security deposits to landlords’ claims.
    Regardless of whether we apply Oldden, or adopt Judge
    Klein’s reasoning, the result is the same; the judgment below
    IN RE: AB LIQUIDATING CORP.                        8495
    stands. Under either rationale, the proceeds of the letter of
    credit were properly subtracted from AMB’s allowed claim.3
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    In Mayan Networks, Judge Klein concurred in holding that the pro-
    ceeds of a letter of credit that was fully-collateralized by the debtor’s prop-
    erty should be deducted from the landlord’s capped claim. The letter of
    credit in this case was likewise fully-collateralized by Debtor’s property.
    Thus, even under Judge Klein’s reasoning, the proceeds were appropri-
    ately deducted from AMB’s capped claim.