United States v. Margo Cruz ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 24 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-10114
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:18-cr-00827-DGC-2
v.
MARGO CRUZ, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2021**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: CLIFTON, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Following a conditional guilty plea of conspiracy to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Margo Cruz appeals the district
court’s orders denying his motions to suppress evidence. We “review [the] denial
of a motion to suppress de novo, and the district court’s factual findings for clear
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
error.” United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2019). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The pole camera surveillance of Gallego-Machado’s residence did not
violate Cruz’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. “Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.” Lyall v. City of Los
Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). Thus, Cruz’s “capacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether [Cruz] has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the invaded place.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). Cruz had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Gallego-Machado’s residence because “the purely
commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of
time on the premises, and lack of any previous connection between [Cruz] and the
householder, all lead us to conclude that . . . any search which may have occurred
did not violate [Cruz’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 91.1
2. Deputy Keith had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Cruz’s
vehicle. “[A] police officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop if the officer
has reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is
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Because we conclude that Cruz has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
Gallego-Machado’s residence, we do not decide whether the pole camera
surveillance constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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about to commit a crime.” United States v. Choudry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Here, Keith suspected that Cruz was following the vehicle in front of him too closely,
in violation of Arizona Revised Statute § 28-730. Keith also used a stopwatch to
verify that Cruz was driving less than two seconds behind the vehicle in front of him
while driving approximately 75 miles per hour. That conduct constituted a violation
of § 28-730, see, e.g., State v. Sweeney, 227 P.3d 868, 877 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(Brown, J., concurring), as an Arizona Driver’s License Manual confirms. See
United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 721-22 (9th Cir. 2001), amended,
272 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Muehler v. Mena, 544
U.S. 93 (2005) (noting that a traffic stop was reasonable when an officer relied on
the three-second rule from California’s DMV regulations to justify a stop).
Thus, Deputy Keith’s observation that Cruz had violated the traffic laws
provided sufficient grounds for initiating the stop. See United States v. Willis, 431
F.3d 709, 715 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that officer’s observation of a traffic
violation provided “specific and articulable facts” to justify the stop) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). While Cruz maintains that many drivers follow too
closely, the Supreme Court has explained that it is “aware of no principle that would
allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so
commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of
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the lawfulness of enforcement.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
3. Deputy Keith also did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop to
perform a canine sniff. See United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 714 (9th Cir.
2017) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that traffic stops can last only as long as
is reasonably necessary to carry out the ‘mission’ of the stop, unless police have an
independent reason to detain the motorist longer.”). Here, Cruz knew from DEA
Agent Stadler that a white vehicle had departed a suspected stash house and was
headed in Keith’s direction. Stadler’s knowledge of Cruz’s involvement in a
suspected drug transaction was imputed to Keith under the collective knowledge
doctrine, which “allows courts to impute police officers’ collective knowledge to the
officer conducting a stop . . . ‘where law enforcement agents are working together
in an investigation but have not explicitly communicated the facts each has
independently learned.’” United States v. Villasenor, 608 F.3d 467, 475 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2007)); see
also Ramirez, 473 F.3d at 1032 (“[W]e have been willing to aggregate the facts
known to each of the officers involved at least ‘when there has been communication
among agents.’”) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d
821, 826 (9th Cir. 1990)).
In addition to Keith’s imputed knowledge from Agent Stadler, Cruz was
behaving nervously during the stop, had suspicious travel plans, and was traveling
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along a known drug-trafficking corridor. These factors together justified Keith’s
prolonging of the stop for a canine search, and Cruz’s “evaluation and rejection of
. . . the [] factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality
of the circumstances,’ as [this Court’s] cases have understood that phrase.” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
AFFIRMED.
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