Jeffrey Peterson v. Gannett Company, Inc. ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 24 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JEFFREY PETERSON,                               No.    21-15057
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00106-MTL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    GANNETT COMPANY, INC.; PHOENIX
    NEWSPAPERS, INC., DBA Arizona
    Republic,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    DENNIS K. BURKE; MARCO A. LOPEZ,
    Jr.; LUIS BORBON HOLGUIN; VICTOR
    FLORES; LISA FLORES; MARIO E.
    DIAZ; SUZANNE BARR; DAVID LOPEZ;
    CRAIG HARRIS; DEMOCRATIC
    NATIONAL COMMITTEE; DIAZ,
    Unknown; named as Jane Doe Diaz,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021
    Phoenix, Arizona
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Before: GILMAN,** BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
    Jeffrey Peterson appeals the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of Peterson’s defamation claim against Gannett Company
    and Phoenix Newspapers, regarding an article that defendants published on
    Peterson’s business dealings. We review the district court’s grant of a motion to
    dismiss de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 
    393 F.3d 1068
    , 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    1.     To determine the legal standard that applies to Peterson’s defamation
    claim, we must first determine if he was a limited public figure. If he is, Peterson
    must show that the article was published with actual malice, “that is, with knowledge
    that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times
    Co. v. Sullivan, 
    376 U.S. 254
    , 280 (1964).
    The district court correctly concluded that, based on the allegations of
    Peterson’s operative complaint, Peterson is a limited public figure with respect to
    the subject of the news article. “Whether an individual is a public figure is a question
    of law that must be assessed through a totality of the circumstances.” Manzari v.
    Associated Newspapers Ltd., 
    830 F.3d 881
    , 888 (9th Cir. 2016). “In undertaking
    **
    The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2
    this inquiry, we consider whether (i) a public controversy existed when the
    statements were made, (ii) whether the alleged defamation is related to the plaintiff’s
    participation in the controversy, and (iii) whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected
    [him]self into the controversy for the purpose of influencing the controversy’s
    ultimate resolution.” Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 
    715 F.3d 254
    , 266 (9th Cir.
    2013).
    By these standards, Peterson is a limited-purpose public figure. Peterson’s
    complaint describes himself as a “well-known technology entrepreneur” who
    founded Quepasa.com (“a national sensation”) and who has developed and
    maintained a network of political connections to further his business enterprises.
    The article discusses Peterson’s business dealings at Quepasa and controversies
    concerning Peterson’s role in Mobile, another business venture. Given “the nature
    and extent of [Peterson’s] participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
    the defamation,” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266 (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted)—as well as the public nature of that controversy, which involved various
    other public figures and resulted in a state investigation of Peterson’s business
    practices—we conclude that Peterson is a limited public figure with respect to the
    business dealings discussed in the article. Peterson’s claim that his public-figure
    status ended long ago is inconsistent with the allegations in his complaint.
    Regardless, as we have previously noted, “every court of appeals that has
    3
    specifically decided this question has concluded that the passage of time does not
    alter an individual’s status as a limited purpose public figure.” Partington v.
    Bugliosi, 
    56 F.3d 1147
    , 1152 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995).
    2.     Because Peterson is a limited public figure, he “must demonstrate by
    clear and convincing evidence” that appellees made their allegedly defamatory
    statements with actual malice. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 265. We have carefully
    reviewed Peterson’s operative complaint and conclude that he has not alleged actual
    malice.    Peterson’s conclusory allegations do not “permit the conclusion that
    [appellees] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication.”
    Time, Inc. v. Pape, 
    401 U.S. 279
    , 291–92 (1971).1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    Peterson does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that he failed to allege
    actual malice with respect to his false-light claim. Peterson has therefore abandoned
    this claim. See United States v. Williamson, 
    439 F.3d 1125
    , 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Regardless, Peterson did not plead actual malice as to his false-light claim for the
    same reasons articulated above.
    4