United States v. Hb, Juvenile Male , 695 F.3d 931 ( 2012 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 11-30099
    Plaintiff-Appellee,          D.C. No.
    v.                        4:10-CR-00111-
    H.B., JUVENILE MALE,                            SEH-2
    Defendant-Appellant.
          OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    April 10, 2012—Seattle, Washington
    Filed August 22, 2012
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, A. Wallace Tashima, and
    Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Nelson
    9593
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE        9595
    COUNSEL
    Mark D. Meyer, Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick & Higgins, P.C.,
    Great Falls, Montana, for the defendant-appellant.
    Laura B. Weiss, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael W. Cotter,
    United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney,
    Great Falls, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee.
    9596           UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE
    OPINION
    NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
    H.B. appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for
    aiding and abetting his cousin, W.B., in committing aggra-
    vated sexual abuse against their female friend, T.T.W., on an
    Indian reservation.1 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031 et seq.; 18 U.S.C.
    § 1153(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, H.B. claims that there
    was insufficient evidence to support his adjudication. In addi-
    tion, H.B. contends that the district court imposed an unrea-
    sonable sentence by ordering him to spend 18 months at a
    juvenile correctional detention facility followed by 12 months
    of juvenile delinquent supervision. We disagree, and affirm
    the adjudication and sentence.
    I.
    T.T.W. testified that, late in the evening on October 30,
    2009, she went to H.B.’s house to ask for a ride home after
    drinking heavily with some friends at a party. The next thing
    T.T.W. remembers is waking up in a bed, with no pants or
    undergarments on, with W.B. on top of her engaging in sexual
    intercourse. T.T.W. then observed H.B. next to her, holding
    her right leg down and saying either, “I get next,” or, “I get
    dibs.” When T.T.W. realized what was happening, she started
    crying, told W.B. to get off of her, and said that she wanted
    her clothes.
    At some point during the assault, while T.T.W. was crying,
    H.B. and W.B.’s grandfather entered the room to investigate
    a noise. W.B. covered T.T.W.’s mouth with his hand and the
    boys pulled a blanket over her to conceal her presence. W.B.
    “was still doing it to [her]” when the grandfather left the
    room.
    1
    We use the initials “H.B.,” “W.B.,” and “T.T.W.” to protect the identi-
    ties of the individuals involved in this case, as they were all minors at the
    time of the offense.
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE           9597
    Immediately after the incident, T.T.W. gathered her
    clothes, left the house, and went to the hospital. The regis-
    tered nurse who evaluated her testified that T.T.W. had a
    fresh bruise on her left arm. The report from the sexual assault
    examination also indicated, under the patient assault history,
    that the method used by the assailant included “holding and
    pinching,” which it described as “[h]olding legs apart.”
    On the other hand, W.B. testified that he and T.T.W. were
    having consensual sex when she “blanked out” and then
    “came to” and asked what he was doing. He further testified
    that she did not start crying until after he got off of her, and
    that they were no longer having sex when his grandfather
    came into the room. H.B. testified that he was watching tele-
    vision in his grandfather’s living room at the time of the inci-
    dent, and only entered the bedroom briefly to retrieve his
    telephone. He denied holding T.T.W.’s leg and stating either,
    “I get next,” or, “I get dibs.”
    Following a one-day bench trial, the district court adjudged
    W.B. and H.B. to be juvenile delinquents. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031
    et. seq. Specifically, the district court found W.B. to be a
    juvenile delinquent for “knowingly us[ing] force to cause
    [T.T.W.] to engage in a sexual act,” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 2241(a)(1), and adjudged H.B. to be a juvenile delinquent
    for “knowingly and intentionally” aiding and abetting W.B. to
    commit the act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district
    court also found that the offense took place on the Blackfeet
    Indian Reservation in Montana, and that H.B. and W.B. are
    Native Americans. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). In denying W.B. and
    H.B.’s motions for acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Fed-
    eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court acknowl-
    edged that this case involves disputed facts that rely heavily
    on credibility determinations, but found T.T.W.’s testimony
    to be more credible and consistent than that of W.B. and H.B.
    At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the district court
    ordered H.B. to spend 18 months in detention followed by 12
    9598        UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE
    months of juvenile delinquent supervision. Prior to rendering
    the sentence, the district court heard testimony from H.B.’s
    grandfather and legal guardian, listened to H.B.’s statements,
    and solicited comments from H.B.’s counsel and the govern-
    ment. H.B.’s grandfather described H.B. as an intelligent, car-
    ing individual who overcame adversity after being hit by a car
    when he was ten years old. When the government asked
    H.B.’s grandfather what type of enhanced structure he would
    be able to provide for H.B., should he be granted probation,
    H.B.’s grandfather stated only that he would be “more care-
    ful.” H.B.’s grandfather also did not know any specific infor-
    mation about sex offender treatment programs available in the
    area and did not have a program set up for H.B. at the time
    of the hearing.
    In explaining its disposition, the district court acknowl-
    edged H.B.’s positive qualities, including his intelligence and
    ability to graduate from high school despite adversity. The
    court also considered the gravity of the offense and stated that
    the federal Sentencing Guidelines range for an adult convic-
    tion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2 would be 235 to 293
    months of confinement. The court determined that, in light of
    the nature of the offense, H.B. should participate in a sex
    offender treatment program and recommended that H.B. be
    placed at the Reintegrating Youthful Offenders (“RYO”) Cor-
    rectional Facility in Galen, Montana. According to the court,
    the RYO facility provides “a safe, secure, and therapeutic
    environment for youthful offenders in a location that is closest
    to the juvenile’s family in Montana.” Despite the request by
    H.B.’s counsel to impose only a 12-month sentence, the dis-
    trict court determined that 18 months at the RYO facility was
    necessary to provide H.B. with the “structure and time” to
    complete the sex offender treatment program and to maximize
    his potential rehabilitation.
    H.B. filed a timely appeal.
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE            9599
    II.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
    review de novo a trial court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for
    judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Lequire, 
    672 F.3d 724
    , 728 (9th Cir. 2012). In determining whether sufficient
    evidence exists to support the verdict, we must “first construe
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the [government],
    and . . . then determine whether any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
    sonable doubt.” United States v. Shetler, 
    665 F.3d 1150
    , 1163
    (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
    ted). When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the government, we “may not usurp the role of the finder
    of fact by considering how [we] would have resolved the con-
    flicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at
    trial.” United States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1164 (9th Cir.
    2010) (en banc). Therefore, in a case involving factual dis-
    putes and credibility determinations, we “must presume . . .
    that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the
    prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 
    Id. (quoting Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 326 (1979)).
    We review a juvenile delinquency sentence under the Fed-
    eral Juvenile Delinquency Act for abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Juvenile, 
    347 F.3d 778
    , 784 (9th Cir. 2003).
    III.
    H.B. appeals the denial of his motion for a judgment of
    acquittal. In order for H.B. to be adjudged a juvenile delin-
    quent, the government was required to produce sufficient evi-
    dence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) W.B.
    committed the offense of aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C.
    § 2241(a)(1); (2) H.B. knowingly and intentionally aided and
    abetted W.B. in committing each element of the aggravated
    offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) H.B. acted before W.B. completed
    the crime; see 9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 5.1 (2010)
    9600         UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE
    (aiding and abetting); (4) H.B. was under the age of 18 at the
    time of the offense, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031 et. seq.; and (5) H.B.
    is a Native American and the offense occurred on the Black-
    feet Indian Reservation, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
    H.B. argues on appeal that the government’s evidence was
    insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that W.B.
    committed the offense of aggravated sexual abuse. Conse-
    quently, the government failed to establish the requisite ele-
    ments of H.B.’s aiding and abetting charge. See United States
    v. Garcia, 
    400 F.3d 816
    , 820 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Aiding and
    abetting is not a separate and distinct offense from the under-
    lying substantive crime, but is a different theory of liability
    for the same offense.”).
    [1] The crime of “aggravated sexual abuse” is proscribed
    in 18 U.S.C. § 2241. The statute prohibits “knowingly caus-
    [ing] another person to engage in a sexual act by using force
    against that other person.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1)
    (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (sexual abuse) (pro-
    hibiting individuals from “knowingly . . . caus[ing] another
    person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that
    other person in fear” or by “engag[ing] in a sexual act with
    another person if that other person is . . . physically incapable
    of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness
    to engage in, that sexual act . . . .”). The definition of a “sex-
    ual act” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) includes “contact
    between the penis and the vulva” which “occurs upon pene-
    tration, however, slight.” 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).
    [2] To render the distinction between sexual abuse and
    aggravated sexual abuse meaningful, Section 2241(a)(1) “re-
    quires a showing of actual force.” United States v. Fulton, 
    987 F.2d 631
    , 633 (9th Cir. 1993). While the statute does not
    define “force” or specify how much force is necessary to
    amount to a violation, United States v. Lauck, 
    905 F.2d 15
    , 17
    (2d Cir. 1990), Congress has stated that:
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE              9601
    [t]he requirement of force may be satisfied by a
    showing of the use, or threatened use, of a weapon;
    the use of such physical force as is sufficient to over-
    come, restrain, or injure a person; or the use of a
    threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel submis-
    sion by the victim.
    Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, H. Rep. No. 594, 99th Cong., at
    14 n.54a (2d Sess. 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
    6186, 6194 n.54a. In our few judicial decisions interpreting
    the term “force,” we have held that, “the force requirement is
    met when the sexual contact resulted from a restraint upon the
    other person that was sufficient that the other person could not
    escape the sexual contact.” 
    Fulton, 987 F.2d at 633
    (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Arch-
    dale, 
    229 F.3d 861
    , 868 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); see also
    United States v. Allery, 
    139 F.3d 609
    , 611 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (holding that force is sufficient if it “restrain[s] the victim and
    allow[s] the defendant to engage in sexual contact”).
    [3] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government, a rational trier of fact could conclude that, after
    T.T.W. woke up from being “black[ed] out,” W.B. used phys-
    ical force sufficient to restrain T.T.W. and engage in an
    unwanted sexual act. Specifically, the record supports the rea-
    sonable inference that W.B.’s weight on top of T.T.W., com-
    bined with his efforts to silence T.T.W. by covering her
    mouth with his hand, and H.B.’s physical restraint of
    T.T.W.’s right leg, together allowed W.B. to engage in
    unwanted sexual contact from which T.T.W. could not escape
    immediately. This finding of force is bolstered by the report
    from the sexual assault examination taken soon after the
    offense, which noted that T.T.W. had a fresh bruise on her left
    arm following the incident. In addition, the offense involved
    a power disparity in which the two teenage boys acted
    together against T.T.W. Cf. 
    Archdale, 229 F.3d at 864
    , 868
    (finding sufficient force for aggravated sexual abuse pursuant
    to 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) to justify a sentencing enhancement
    9602        UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE
    where the defendant, who was “six feet tall and over 200
    pounds,” grabbed the twelve-year old victim’s head and
    moved it “up and down on his penis,” and later “grabbed her
    hand above her head, and got on top of her’ ”); see generally
    United States v. Lucas, 
    157 F.3d 998
    , 1002 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (noting that “force can be implied from a disparity in size and
    coercive power between the defendant and his victim”).
    Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the government, a rational trier of fact could conclude that
    W.B. used force to engage in a sexual act with T.T.W.
    [4] In addition, a rational trier of fact could conclude that
    H.B. aided and abetted W.B. in committing the offense. H.B.
    restrained T.T.W.’s leg while W.B. had sex with her, said
    either, “I get next,”or, “I get dibs,” and then helped W.B. in
    concealing T.T.W.’s presence from their grandfather. See
    United States v. McDaniel, 
    545 F.2d 642
    , 644 (9th Cir. 1976)
    (aiding and abetting requires “know[ing] that the activity con-
    demned by the law is actually occurring and . . . intend[ing]
    to help the perpetrator.”).
    [5] While H.B. disputes some of the evidence presented by
    the government at trial, the district court’s factual findings
    and legal conclusions were supported by its “credibility
    assessments” and the “reasonable inference[s]” it drew from
    the evidence. 
    Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167
    , 1170. Therefore, con-
    struing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government, a rational trier of fact could find the essential
    elements of H.B.’s charged offense beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    IV.
    H.B. also claims that the district court imposed an unrea-
    sonable sentence by ordering H.B. to spend 18 months in
    detention followed by 12 months of juvenile delinquent super-
    vision. Specifically, H.B. argues that the district court failed
    to give meaningful consideration to the treatment alternatives
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE           9603
    authorized by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA)
    by placing H.B. in an overly restrictive environment for an
    undue period of time.
    The FJDA, which authorizes federal courts to sentence
    juveniles, is intended to remove juveniles from the criminal
    justice system and, instead, encourage treatment and rehabili-
    tation. 
    Juvenile, 347 F.3d at 785
    . As a result, “[a] successful
    prosecution under the Act . . . results in a civil adjudication
    of status, not a criminal conviction.” United States v. Doe, 
    53 F.3d 1081
    , 1083 (9th Cir. 1995).
    In fashioning a disposition, a district court “may suspend
    the findings of juvenile delinquency, place [the juvenile] on
    probation, or commit him to official detention which may
    include a term of juvenile delinquent supervision to follow
    detention.” 18 U.S.C. § 5037(a). The court also may enter an
    order of restitution. 
    Id. When selecting among
    the dispositions
    authorized under Section 5037, the district court must exer-
    cise its discretion “in accordance with the rehabilitative func-
    tion of the FJDA, which requires an assessment of the totality
    of the unique circumstances and rehabilitative needs of each
    juvenile.” 
    Juvenile, 347 F.3d at 787
    .
    [6] In general, “the FJDA disfavors institutionalization and
    in particular the warehousing of young people away from
    their communities.” 
    Id. at 785; see
    also 18 U.S.C. § 5039
    (“Whenever possible, the Attorney General shall commit a
    juvenile to a foster home or community based-facility located
    in or near his home community.”). A district court’s disposi-
    tion should therefore reflect the least restrictive means of
    accomplishing the juvenile’s rehabilitation. 
    Juvenile, 347 F.3d at 787
    . Moreover, district courts should “give due consider-
    ation to the unique concerns and needs of [Native American
    youth],” as they are “disproportionately subject to federal
    court jurisdiction for their delinquency offenses” on account
    of the structure of the FJDA. 
    Id. at 789 n.10.
    9604        UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE
    [7] In this case, the record reflects that the district court
    considered the totality of H.B.’s unique circumstances and
    rehabilitative needs in rendering the disposition. The district
    court specifically considered H.B.’s positive qualities, the
    nature of the offense, H.B.’s need for sex offender treatment,
    and the availability of “comprehensive correctional program-
    ming and rehabilitation services available” through the RYO,
    the only facility of its type in the state.
    [8] While H.B.’s counsel requested that the court impose
    a sentence of only 12 months in detention, which counsel
    argued would allow H.B. time to complete the majority of the
    18-month sex offender treatment program with the remainder
    to be completed on an outpatient basis as necessary, the dis-
    trict court did not abuse its discretion in ordering H.B. to
    spend the full 18 months at the RYO facility. The order of
    detention was no longer than necessary to complete the treat-
    ment program, and therefore not overly punitive. See 
    id. at 788 (finding
    seven-year sentence of juvenile unreasonable
    where the sentence exceeded what was necessary for treat-
    ment by more than five years). Moreover, without any evi-
    dence of a concrete alternative treatment plan, recommending
    that H.B. be placed at the RYO facility was not overly restric-
    tive. See 18 U.S.C. § 5039. Finally, by emphasizing that the
    RYO “is [the] closest [facility] to the juvenile’s family in
    Montana,” the district court’s disposition reflects consider-
    ation of the need to keep H.B. as close as possible to his fam-
    ily and community. See 
    Juvenile, 347 F.3d at 789
    (finding
    problematic a district court’s decision to place juvenile “inor-
    dinately far from access to his family, his tribe, and the sup-
    port mechanisms he had in the Fort Belknap Indian
    Community” without any justification). Thus, the sentence
    imposed by the district court was reasonable in light of the
    FJDA.
    V.
    The district court’s adjudication of H.B. as a juvenile delin-
    quent is supported by sufficient evidence, and the sentence
    UNITED STATES v. H.B., JUVENILE MALE         9605
    imposed is reasonable. Accordingly, the district court’s adju-
    dication and sentence are
    AFFIRMED.