Mark Young v. Bishop Estate , 497 F. App'x 735 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 07 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK WAH SUN YOUNG, No. 10-15930
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00403-SOM-
BMK
v.
BISHOP ESTATE; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Susan Oki Mollway, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 15, 2012
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: REINHARDT, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Mark Wah Sun Young appeals from the final judgment of the district court
dismissing with prejudice his claims against Defendants Kamehameha
Schools/Bishop Estate, Robert Bruce Graham, Ashford & Wriston, LLP, Corbett
A.K. Kalama, Diane J. Plotts, J. Douglas Ing, Nainoa Thompson, Robert K.U.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Kihune, Ronald R. Sakamoto, and Judge Colleen K. Hirai (collectively, the “Ten
Defendants”); and denying him leave to file an amended complaint against the
remaining three Defendants, James Francis Vrechek, Jason Tani, and Frank
Kanemitsu. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand. Because the parties are familiar with the history of this
case, we need not recount it here.
I
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice
Young’s claims against the Ten Defendants, which he had voluntarily moved to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
On appeal, Young correctly observes that Rule 41(a)(1) provided him “an
absolute right” to voluntarily dismiss his claims against those defendants who had
not yet answered his complaint nor moved for summary judgment. Concha v.
London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hamilton v. Shearson-Lehman
Am. Express, Inc., 813 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, Young never
invoked Rule 41(a)(1) in the proceedings below, and the district court had no
obligation to transform, sua sponte, his Rule 41(a)(2) motion into a notice of
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). The two provisions are not interchangeable, see
Commercial Space Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Boeing Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th
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Cir. 1999), and the district court was not required to restyle Young’s motion to
avoid the consequences of his explicit pleading choices.
Assuming, without deciding, that the district court was required to forewarn
Young of its intent to grant his Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal motion with prejudice and
to provide him additional time to withdraw the motion, we conclude that any error
was harmless. Young’s original claims against the Ten Defendants had already
been dismissed by the district court, Young had conceded that he had no real
chance to amend the complaint successfully, the magistrate judge had
recommended dismissal of the amended claims with prejudice, and some of the
Ten Defendants had already moved to dismiss the claims with prejudice. Young
had adequate notice of the possibility that the district court might dismiss his
claims against the Ten Defendants with prejudice and had the opportunity to object
to the dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, any failure of the district court to
provide additional notice was harmless, and provides no basis upon which to
reverse the district court’s exercise of discretion.
II
We have carefully reviewed the district court’s order denying Young’s
motion for leave to file an amended complaint against Frank Kanemitsu and Jason
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Tani and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to file new claims against these defendants.
III
We reverse the district court’s denial of leave to file an amended complaint
against Francis Vrechek for lack of jurisdiction, a decision we review de novo.
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sahni
v. Am. Diversified Partners, 83 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1996)).
A
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the probate exception does not
deprive the district court of jurisdiction over Young’s negligence claim against
Vrechek. That narrow jurisdictional bar
reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the
administration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes federal courts from
endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate
court. But it does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside
those confines and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006). Because Young’s negligence
claim against Vrechek “seeks an in personam judgment...not the probate or
annulment of a will,” id. at 312, it may be properly adjudicated in a federal forum.
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B
Likewise, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude federal
adjudication of Young’s negligence claim. That doctrine applies only “when the
federal plaintiff’s claim arises from [a] state court judgment, not simply when a
party fails to obtain relief in state court.” Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 613 (citing Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2003)). Although Young’s negligence
claim arises out of the same set of underlying facts that are the subject of ongoing
probate proceedings in the Hawaii courts, it does not seek relief from a state court
judgment. Therefore, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. See id. at 615 n. 2 (holding
that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when the injury complained of in the federal
action “does not arise from a state court judgment, but rather from the actions of an
adverse party”).
C
Finally, abstaining from the exercise of federal jurisdiction over Young’s
negligence claim is not proper under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). To
warrant abstention under Younger, the district court must find that (1) there are
ongoing state court proceedings, (2) which implicate an important state interest,
and (3) provide the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his claims,
and (4) the federal action would enjoin the state court proceedings or have the
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practical effect of doing so. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143,
1149 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the state’s generalized interest in interpreting and
giving effect to testamentary documents is not sufficient to satisfy Younger’s
second prong. Cf. Roden, 495 F.3d at 1150 (holding that a state’s generalized
interest in judicial efficiency does not qualify as an “important state interest” under
Younger). In addition, there is no indication that the district court’s adjudication of
Young’s negligence claim would effectively enjoin the pending state probate
proceedings. See id. at 1151 (holding that a mere concern over potential conflict
between federal and state proceedings is inadequate to satisfy Younger’s “effective
injunction” element).
Even if Younger’s four elements were “strictly met” in this case, id. at 1148,
a stay of federal proceedings would be the appropriate remedy, as Young does not
seek injunctive relief. See id. at 1148 (citing Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965,
968 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)) (in an action for damages, Younger requires a stay,
not dismissal, of the federal proceedings).
D
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of leave
to file an amended complaint is a matter committed to the district court’s
discretion. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Outdoor
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Systs., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 614 (9th Cir. 1993)). The district court
may properly deny leave on the ground that amendment would be futile. Id. at
845. However, the district court based its denial of leave to file an amended
complaint asserting a negligence claim against Vrechek solely on its perceived lack
of jurisdiction over that claim. Because that jurisdictional determination was in
error, we must vacate the district court’s order denying Young leave to file an
amended complaint against Vrechek. We express no opinion on the merits of the
proposed amendment.
III
The district court acted within its discretion in granting Young’s Rule
41(a)(2) motion with prejudice against the Ten Defendants. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s order denying leave to amend as to defendants Kanemitsu and Tani.
We vacate the district court’s order denying Young leave to file an amended
complaint against Vrechek and remand for further proceedings.
We express our gratitude to Allison Ehlert, along with Mandy Hu and
William Christopher, of the law firm of Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP, for
their pro bono representation of the plaintiff in this appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.
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