Melissa Morton v. United States ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 1 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA MORTON, AKA Melissa Ann No. 20-56099
Morton, AKA Melissa Thomson Morton,
AKA Melissa Thomson, AKA Melissa Ann D.C. No.
Thomson; et al., 8:19-cv-01957-PSG-ADS
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,** District
Judge.
Appellants appeal the district court’s dismissal of their quiet title action
against the United States for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s dismissal de
novo, DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019),
and we affirm.
Appellants claim ownership of real property located at 8801 Riderwood
Drive in Sunland, California. They brought this suit against the United States to
quiet title to that property. Specifically, Appellants sought to remove a cloud on the
title caused by two instruments related to a previous lawsuit: a 2007 notice of lis
pendens recorded by the United States and a 2008 default judgment obtained by
the United States against a prior lienholder. Shortly after receiving the complaint,
the United States filed a disclaimer with the district court disclaiming “any interest
in the real property that is the subject of this quiet-title action.” The district court
confirmed this disclaimer and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Appellants timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in
dismissing the case because the United States did not specifically disclaim the lis
pendens and default judgment by instrument number.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit
except where it has consented to be sued. United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 9
(2012). The Quiet Title Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States as
necessary to “adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States
claims an interest.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). But “[i]f the United States disclaims all
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interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time
prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by
order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease.” § 2409a(e).
Appellants’ contention on appeal that the disclaimer was insufficient
because it did not specifically reference the lis pendens and default judgment by
instrument number is without merit. The United States disclaimed “any interest” in
the subject property. This unrestricted language necessarily includes the lis
pendens and the default judgment to whatever extent those instruments represented
interests claimed by the United States in the first place. See, e.g., Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 93 (1989) (defining “any” as a synonym of “all”). Once
the United States filed its disclaimer of interest and the district court confirmed that
disclaimer, the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case ceased under the plain terms of
§ 2409a(e). Dismissal was therefore proper.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Appellants’ challenge to the assignment of this case to Judge Gutierrez lacks
merit. See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir.
2013) (observing that “judges are vested with ‘inherent’ authority to transfer cases
among themselves ‘for the expeditious administration of justice’” (quoting United
States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam))).
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