United States v. Jesus Arreola-Beltran , 534 F. App'x 630 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               JUL 24 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 12-30143
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:11-cr-00096-BLW-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JESUS OCTAVIO ARREOLA-
    BELTRAN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 9, 2013**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: PREGERSON, MURGUIA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Jose Octavio Arreola-Beltran (“Arreola-Beltran”) appeals two separate two-
    level upward adjustments to his sentence, and the substantive reasonableness of his
    sentence. He was convicted by a jury for possession with intent to deliver
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    methamphetamine and conspiracy with intent to distribute methamphetamine in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Arreola-Beltran was convicted
    in a joint-trial with co-defendant Lucio Landeros-Valdez (“Landeros-Valdez”).
    The third participant in the crime, Jose Gabriel Virgen (“Virgen”), cooperated with
    the government and testified at the joint-trial. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and we affirm.
    1. Arreola-Beltran appeals a two-level upward adjustment for his role as an
    “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity” of at least “one
    or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) cmt. n.2. We review the district
    court’s factual finding that Arreola-Beltran was an organizer or leader of criminal
    activity for clear error. United States v. Rivera, 
    527 F.3d 891
     (9th Cir. 2008). We
    review the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Kimbrew, 
    406 F.3d 1149
    , 1151 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Here, the district court did not err in finding that there were critical facts that
    corroborated Jose Gabriel Virgen’s (“Virgen”) testimony that Arreola-Beltran was
    the leader of the small drug organization: (1) Arreola-Beltran was the only co-
    defendant to have phone contact with the confidential informant and undercover
    officers; (2) Arreola-Beltran told the confidential informant he was sending Virgen
    to the sale because Arreola-Beltran was nervous that Arreola-Beltran, Landeros-
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    Valdez, and Virgen were being followed; (3) at the controlled sale Virgen told
    Sargent Banda that he needed to confer with Arreola-Beltran about making a larger
    sale; and (4) at the time of arrest Arreola-Beltran possessed the monetary proceeds
    from the controlled sale.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the two-level
    upward adjustment because evidence was sufficient to “sustain a finding” that
    Arreola-Beltran “exercised some control over others involved in the commission of
    the offense.” United States v. Avila, 
    95 F.3d 887
    , 889 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal
    citation omitted).
    2. Arreola-Beltran appeals an additional two-level upward adjustment to his
    sentence for obstruction of justice. We review “a district court’s determination of
    the reliability of evidence used at sentencing for an abuse of discretion.” United
    States v. Felix, 
    561 F.3d 1036
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Marin-
    Cuevas, 
    147 F.3d 889
    , 895 (9th Cir. 1998)).
    At sentencing, the district court sua sponte raised the issue of obstruction of
    justice because Arreola-Beltran provided false information to a probation officer
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    during the preparation of his Presentence Report.1 See § 3C.1 cmt. n.4(H)
    (obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement applies where defendant provides
    materially false information to probation officer with respect to presentence
    investigation).
    Here, there is ample evidence that Arreola-Beltran knew of the drugs and
    willingly participated in the criminal activity. When he was interviewed by the
    probation officer, against the advice of counsel, Arreola-Beltran stated that he did
    not know there were drugs in Virgen’s car until he, Landeros-Valdez, and Virgen
    were arrested. At his own sentencing hearing, however, Arreola-Beltran testified
    that he found out about the drugs when he, Landeros-Valdez, and Virgen arrived in
    Oregon, and that Virgen asked Arreola-Beltran to help with the sale in exchange
    for money. Thus, because of Arreola-Beltran’s own admission, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in finding that Arreola-Beltran obstructed justice by
    providing materially false information to the probation officer preparing his
    Presentence Report.
    1
    The Government had previously raised a two-level adjustment for
    obstruction of justice on the independent ground that Arreola-Beltran allegedly
    made threats to co-defendant Virgen. Arreola-Beltran argues that there was
    insufficient evidence to support these allegations. We do not reach this argument.
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    3. We review the substantive reasonableness of the 240 month sentence
    imposed on Arreola-Beltran for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007); United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
    banc) (citations omitted).
    In Carty, we stated that “[t]he overarching statutory charge for a district
    court is to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to reflect
    the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just
    punishment; to afford adequate deterrence; to protect the public; and to provide the
    defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
    correctional treatment.” 
    520 F.3d at 991
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3553
    (a) and
    (a)(2)).
    At sentencing, the district court explained the basis for Arreola-Beltran’s
    240 month sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review. 
    Id. at 992
    .
    The district court reasoned that Arreola-Beltran’s 240 month Guidelines-range
    sentence was appropriate because: (1) co-defendant Virgen cooperated during the
    investigation, whereas Arreola-Beltran did not; (2) Arreola-Beltran pled guilty to
    drug trafficking in Idaho in 2008 but left the jurisdiction before the charge could be
    effectuated; (3) Arreola-Beltran lacked a record of employment even though he has
    been in the United States on and off since he turned eighteen, indicating that his
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    sole occupation is dealing methamphetamine; and (4) methamphetamine is a very
    serious drug that destroys many lives. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion when it imposed a 240 month sentence on Arreola-Beltran.
    AFFIRMED.
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