United States v. Daniel Baker ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-30042
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
6:20-cr-00006-SEH-1
v.
DANIEL WAYNE BAKER, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Following a conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Daniel Wayne Baker appeals from a
district court order denying his motion to suppress evidence. “We review [the]
denial of a motion to suppress de novo, and the district court’s factual findings for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
clear error.” United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2019). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court did not err in concluding that Baker validly waived
his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before speaking with
Agent Solon and Detective McDuffie on January 21, 2020. “We review a district
court’s ruling on a Miranda waiver under two standards: Whether the waiver was
knowing and intelligent is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Whether
the waiver was voluntary is a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de
novo.” United States v. Amano, 229 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2000).
Baker argues that the district court erred in finding that his waiver was
knowing and intelligent because the district court mistakenly believed that the
Miranda warnings were read aloud to Baker, as opposed to provided to Baker in
writing. But the district court’s relevant finding was that Baker’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent, and that finding is not clearly
erroneous.
Baker was provided with Miranda warnings on a written form, which he
reviewed before signing. “Although not dispositive, a written waiver of one’s
Miranda rights is strong evidence that the waiver is valid.” United States v. Bernard
S., 795 F.2d 749, 753 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Baker admits that he “does not argue that his Miranda rights were
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improperly administered.” Nor does Baker explain why the waiver of his Miranda
rights was not knowing or intelligent or why it was material whether the Miranda
warnings were given in writing or orally. In these circumstances, the district court’s
potential misunderstanding of whether the Miranda warnings were read aloud or
provided in writing does not provide a basis for relief.
2. Baker also argues that statements he made in his January 21, 2020
interview should be suppressed because his initial, un-Mirandized statements to
officers on January 16, 2020 were involuntary. This argument fails because,
although the district court found that Baker’s statements on January 16 should have
been suppressed under Miranda, the district court correctly found that the January
16 statements were voluntary, and, similarly, that Baker’s post-Miranda warning
statements were voluntary.
Baker’s reliance on United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006),
is thus misplaced. Williams explained that “absent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion with respect to
the postwarning confession.” Id. at 1152 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, Baker fails to point to any deliberately coercive or improper tactics
by the parole officers.
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Regardless, even if the statements Baker made on January 16, 2020 were
considered involuntary, Baker has not demonstrated error because his January 21,
2020 statements were sufficiently attenuated from the January 16 confession. To
determine if a subsequent confession is sufficiently attenuated from a prior one, “we
consider (1) the temporal proximity between the statements; (2) the intervening
circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United
States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 727 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, there was a five-day period
between the two confessions; Baker made his second confession to different law
enforcement officers from different agencies; and there is no basis to conclude that
any of the officers’ questioning reflected flagrant misconduct. Thus, Baker fails to
demonstrate that the district court erred in not suppressing the statements he made
to officers on January 21, 2020.
AFFIRMED.
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